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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
NEOLIBERALIZING THE STREETS OF URBAN INDIA:           
ENGAGEMENTS OF A FREE MARKET THINK TANK IN THE POLITICS OF 
STREET HAWKING 
This dissertation looks into the processes by which neoliberalism is mutating with 
various local and global discourses in order to transform urban space for marginalized 
street hawkers in the Global South, specifically Delhi, India. Following the current 
engagements in geographic literature on neoliberalism that focus on the contextually 
embedded character and the path-dependent process of the spread of free market ideas, I 
make free market advocacy think tanks--a rather unknown and under-investigated 
accomplice to this process--my main entry point. Corporate funded think tanks are often 
found advocating a neoliberal doctrine of free markets, minimal government intervention, 
and privatization. A self-professed civil society organization, the Center for Civil Society 
(CCS) in Delhi is one of the first neoliberal, national and foreign corporation funded, 
advocacy think tanks in India and one of its many agendas is to counter the popular belief 
that neoliberalism is harmful for the urban poor such as street hawkers.  
Various NGOs, social workers, scholars, academicians, and think tanks including 
CCS came together to form the National Policy of Street Vendors, 2009 (NPSV), one of 
the first policy proposals in modern India to tackle the problems of urban spaces of street 
vending. Through my investigations I wish to highlight the neoliberal attitudes that are 
concealed in this policy regarding street hawkers. By bringing these neoliberal 
undertones to the forefront, this dissertation discusses how this so called “pro-hawking” 
policy that is being pushed to be implemented in the majority of Indian cities is in fact 
hostile to hawkers. I demonstrate this fact by explaining that NPSV and its proponents 
view space as a capitalist commodity and are attempting to transform the rich social 
spaces of Indian city streets into hollow container spaces of capitalist production and 
consumption. In this way, this dissertation connects macro spaces of governance such as 
city streets to the micro spaces of governmentality such as think tanks like CCS.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Introduction 
This dissertation looks into the processes by which neoliberalism is mutating with 
various local and global discourses in order to transform urban space for marginalized 
street hawkers in the Global South, specifically Delhi, India. Following the current 
engagements in geographic literature on neoliberalism that focus on the contextually 
embedded character and the path-dependent process of the spread of free market ideas, I 
make free market advocacy think tanks--a rather unknown and under-investigated 
accomplice to this process--my main entry point. Corporate funded think tanks are often 
found advocating a neoliberal doctrine of free markets, minimal government intervention, 
and privatization. A self-professed civil society organization, the Center for Civil Society 
(CCS) in Delhi is one of the first neoliberal, national and foreign corporation funded, 
advocacy think tanks in India and one of its many agendas is to counter the popular belief 
that neoliberalism is harmful for the urban poor such as street hawkers. Various NGOs, 
social workers, scholars, academicians, and think tanks including CCS came together to 
form the National Policy of Street Vendors, 2009 (NPSV), one of the first policy 
proposals in modern India to tackle the problems of urban spaces of street vending. 
Through my investigations I wish to highlight the neoliberal attitudes that are concealed 
in this policy regarding street hawkers. By bringing these neoliberal undertones to the 
forefront, this dissertation discusses how this so called “pro-hawking” policy that is being 
pushed to be implemented in the majority of Indian cities is in fact hostile to hawkers. I 
demonstrate this fact by explaining that NPSV and its proponents view space as a 
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capitalist commodity and are attempting to transform the rich social spaces of Indian city 
streets into hollow container spaces of capitalist production and consumption. In this 
way, this dissertation connects macro spaces of governance such as city streets to the 
micro spaces of governmentality such as think tanks like CCS.  
 Neoliberalism and Neoliberalization  
Neo-liberalism is a strain of neo-classical economics that has concretized around 
the ideas of political democracy, individual freedom, and the constructive potential of an 
unfettered market. Its proponents preach the sermon of the market as the invisible hand 
and hence they are often found in opposition to the protectionist welfare state. Working at 
multiple scales neo-liberalism commands “good governance that involves ‘neo-
Schumpeterian’ economic policies that adhere to supply-side innovation and 
competitiveness, decentralization, devolution, and attrition of political governance, 
deregulation and privatization of industry, land and public services, and replacing welfare 
with ‘workfare’ social practice” (Leitner et al 2007, 1). The idea of this “utopia of endless 
exploitation” (Bourdieu 1998) is seeded in the works of 17th and 18th century English 
and Scottish philosophers who patronized the merchants and entrepreneurs of the nascent 
capitalist order while admonishing the medieval religious regimes and absolutist state. 
The “rise of economic man” in the works of Locke, Hume, Smith, and Paine found 
expression in the set of theories of Austrian philosopher Friedric von Hayek who is 
considered the founding father of neoliberalism in modern times. The basic 
understanding of Hayek’s economic theory is that individuals with an aim to maximize 
self-interest can allocate resources better than the state. Homo economicus, the rational 
human being who is the protagonist of his theory, exists before the backdrop of intense 
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market competition. He influenced Milton Friedman and Gary Becker of the Chicago 
School, which later became the hub of training students and propagating neoliberal ideas 
in the US and abroad in the 1960s. 
 Neoliberal ideas gained widespread prominence during the 1970s and 
1980s, as a response to the global economic recession originating within the Fordist mass 
production industrial system and Keynesian welfare policies. They were first 
experimented with in Pinochet’s Chile under the guidance of a group of university of 
Chicago graduates called the Chicago boys. Later Thatcher in Britain announced “there is 
no alternative” (TINA) to neoliberal reforms and Reagan in the US adopted neoliberal 
strategies to advance sharp economic growth. Gradually neoliberalism spread across the 
globe to places like the Philippines, Nicaragua, Mexico, Eastern Europe and the post-
Soviet states and is still in the process of consolidation in many of these countries.  In 
1978, Deng Xiaoping embraced liberalization in China, which had a communist led 
economy.  During the 1980s, Bretton Woods institutions –the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)--were transformed into agents to mobilize peripheral and semi-peripheral countries 
to market reforms. 
India opened to an era of market liberalization in the 1990s under the leadership 
of Narasimah Rao. The gulf war-related rise in oil prices had resulted in the depletion of 
India’s foreign reserves (Cerra and Saxena 2002). At the same time, two of the leading 
international credit rating agencies downgraded India as an investment destination 
(Ahemad 2011). As a result, non-resident Indian investors withdrew their local deposits, 
further reducing India’s foreign currency reserves (Cambridge and Harriss 2000 cited in 
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Ahemad 2011). In January of 1991, India was running an account deficit of $10 billion. 
The economic crisis forced the government of India to seek a loan of $1.8 billion from 
the IMF but only on the precondition that India would devalue its currency, abandon 
import substitution and planned growth strategies in favor of implementing ‘macro-
economic stabilization’ and ‘structural adjustment’ policies (Bradhan 1999, Ahemad 
2011).  
However, scholars maintain that over the last decade, neoliberal changes have 
been slow due to local resistance from the public and politicians alike. Since then, a 
neoliberal lobby made up of a huge international network of foundations, institutes, 
research centers, publications, scholars, and writers has been engaged in a process of 
what Gramsci called ‘cultural hegemony’ to normalize neoliberal reforms and 
subjectivity. CCS is working against this backdrop to disseminate neoliberal ideas and 
anti-state sentiments. 
The magnitude of scholarly attention given to neoliberalism makes it impossible 
to discuss it in detail here. But general themes in geography include spaces of 
neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002, Jessop 2002, Smith 2001), the scale of 
neoliberalism (Kohl and Warner 2004, Newstead 2005), neoliberal governmentality 
(Larner and Walter 2004), and globally hegemonic forms of capitalism (Peck 2001, 
Roberts et al 2003, Peet 2002, Peet et al. 2003, Harvey 2005). Even though neoliberal 
theory can be described as a set of coherent ideas and doctrine, in reality there is a vast 
disjuncture between theory and practice. These variations are integral to the 
dissemination of neoliberal doctrine in different social, political and cultural climates 
(Walker et al 2008, Brenner and Theodore 2002, Barnett 2004, Harvey 2005, George 
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1999, Massey 2007, Garth and Delazy 2000, Peck 2004). These “actually existing 
neoliberalisms” are mutated and “hybridized” forms of neoliberal doctrine and we must 
pay close attention to their path dependent dissemination and contextual embeddedness in 
different socio-political and economic landscapes.   
CCS’s discourse of empowering the poor can be visualized as contextually 
embedded in urban Delhi. First, CCS takes advantages of the specific historical tradition 
of political and social movements against the colonial government and the post-colonial 
developmental state that have more or less been defined under the rubric of civil society. 
Second, the articulation of the neo-liberal discourse of a limited state with the problems 
of the marginalized has been established on the grounds of corruption that characterizes 
the local institutional framework. Third, the process of manufacturing consent for the 
dissemination of neoliberal ideology and projects has been initiated in response to the 
slow introduction of neoliberal practices due to their unpopularity among the local elites, 
who see them as a threat to their material benefits and to the Nehruvian policies of mixed 
economic development. 
Contributions  
My study contributes to the field of urban geography and geographies of 
neoliberalism in the global south, where I present a novel case study of “actually existing 
neoliberalism” while paying attention to the path dependent dissemination of free market 
policies in India. While investigating the “roll out” of neoliberal policies, the dissertation 
explores how they mutate and hybridize in the Indian social-political and economic 
landscape. This work also contributes to the field of political geography where, following 
Spark (2006), I investigate how macrospaces of governance (such as cities, SEZs, 
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countries where structural adjustment strategies have been applied) are connected to their 
development as a practice in microspaces of governmentality (corporations, finance 
centers, think tanks, universities). By doing this, the work expands geographies of think 
tanks, which are limited to North America and Western Europe, to India. While engaging 
with the current engagements in geography where street hawking is viewed as spatial 
practice, this dissertation also makes contributions to the urban cultural geography by 
developing a framework of entangled spaces of informality where street hawkers are 
believed to continuously interact with multiple actors in multiple spaces at the same or 
different times. This focus is not restricted to their interaction with inefficient 
government and its corrupt enforcement agents but includes their interactions with the 
benevolent state that they often call for and in some ways desire. I conceive the space 
where they operate as much larger than the marketplace or even conventional public 
space. This space includes “spaces of common” or indigenous public space, private 
spaces of their homes in slums as well as the rural hinterland from where most of them 
come. 
Geographic literature on street hawking in urban space is limited as it 
concentrates on the state’s fierce responses ranging from wide-scale eviction to more 
apparent anti- hawking policies that are put in place as an effort to create a revanchist 
city. There have hardly been any studies that pay attention to how hawkers are divided 
and then reorganized and mobilized to form a part of global hegemonic discourse of 
neoliberalism that in turn shape “anti-hawking laws” but this time with their consent. 
This dissertation pays attention to such developments in India by bringing a Gramscian 
understanding to the current politics of street hawking, and paves the way for future 
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scholarship to critically analyze the role of third sectors in the spaces of hawking. Finally, 
this dissertation adds to Gramsci’s conception of state and civil society as I show how the 
model of participation in polices regarding urban space, specifically street hawking, are 
moments of passive revolution through which neoliberal hegemony is forged and 
consolidated. 
While contributing to the academic scholarship, this dissertation has on the 
ground implication as it also provides one of the first organized critiques to the National 
Policy of Street Vendors that is forwarded as a pro hawking arrangement of urban space.
1
 
Various NGOs, think tanks, activists, scholars as well as academicians have been 
associated with the development of the policy and eagerly await its adoption in Indian 
cities. Hawkers, who form more than 2 percent of the urban population, are going to be 
regularized, managed and affected by this elite centered policy that has hardly been 
debated and researched by critical scholarship. Hence, this dissertation takes a social 
stance against this neoliberal policy and consequent exploitation of marginalized street 
hawkers. 
Objectives And Outline Of The Dissertation 
I wish to highlight the engagements of CCS, a free market advocacy think tank, in 
policy spaces for the poor and marginalized. By doing this, the dissertation brings forth 
the neoliberal undertones that are antagonistic to street hawking as a practice in the rather 
neutral and seemingly pro-hawker stance of CCS and other think tanks and NGOs.
2
 By 
                                                          
1
 One exception is the article by Bandyopadhya at el (2012) “Zoning crossroads: a 
critique” in Seminar, August 2012 
2
 I will discuss the labeling of CCS as both a think tank and an NGO in Chapter 3. 
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finding a locus in CCS for an ethnographic inquiry, my work highlights an anti-hawking 
bias in the celebrated National Policy of Street Vendors 2009 that was recently passed by 
the Union Cabinet of the Government of India as Protection of Livelihood and 
Regulation of Street Vending Bill on 1 May, 2013. 
While it is apparent that liberalizing cities are adopting an anti-hawker stance to 
manage urban space, it is important to investigate how these cities are able to do so at the 
policy level. Who are the actors participating in such policy developments, and why do 
they do so? To find this out, I delve into the questions of what makes CCS a legitimate 
site to talk about street hawkers. How are they able to harness the authority to speak for 
and represent street hawkers?  I believe that the discourse of civil society aids in this 
process and hence I seek answers to questions like how is the discourse of neoliberalism 
reproduced within the particular discourse of civil society that is employed by CCS? 
Second, why is this particular articulation sought after? In other words, why is it 
beneficial for neoliberal doctrine to articulate with civil society discourse in this specific 
way? I answer these questions in Chapter 2 where I analyze the concept, discourse and 
practice of civil society. I discuss the history of civil society as a concept and theory to 
shed light to the current contextual engagements of the term. While discussing the 
practice of the term in contemporary Indian politics, I outline the history of this rich 
concept since the time of the Greeks. I discuss Gramsci’s ideas in detail and relate them 
to the development of state and civil society in India. This exercise sheds light on the 
selective appropriation of the term civil society by CCS. I show that although CCS 
zealously capitalizes on the term civil society, it ignores the interpretations of civil 
society that highlight it as a site of exploitation. In the last part of the chapter I discuss 
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how the discourse of civil society aids in deploying the global neoliberal hegemonic 
discourse and neoliberal governmentality in India.  
Since my research studies the interaction of CCS and street hawkers to investigate 
the politics of representation, chapter 3 and 4 provide a literature review and 
historiography of think tanks and street hawkers in the global context as well as India 
specifically. I also discuss my research methodology and positionality as a scholar during 
my interactions with both the groups in these chapters. I dedicate chapter 3 to the analysis 
of CCS as a transnational apparatus of governmentality and answer why it is an important 
site of inquiry. I discuss the reasons behind the dearth in scholarship on think tanks, 
especially ones in the global south, and explain how a geographical understanding can 
open new lines of inquiry to study them. My work provides a case study of neoliberal 
think tank in the global south, specifically India, where global neoliberal demands and 
regional constraints have crystallized CCS as a think tank that focuses on advocating 
changes on behalf of the poor and marginalized. Next I conduct a comparative analysis of 
the evolution of US and Indian think tanks, partly as an effort to show the climate that 
gives rise to different think tanks and partly to address the scarcity of scholarly literature 
on Indian think tanks. I outline different approaches to study think tanks by various 
scholars and show how CCS’s activities may be difficult to study by any one of those 
specific approaches. This is because in order to get recognition and funding, CCS has 
adapted as a think tank that, in the words of its founder Parth Shah “does it all.” Unlike 
other advocacy think tanks, CCS not only does advocacy and research but also works on 
the ground with the marginalized, just like an NGO. The policy cycle approach 
developed by Ableson (2002) that integrates all the existing approaches and pays 
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attention to the changing climate of opinion as a success factor is then used to analyze 
CCS as an institution and its various tactics to disseminate neoliberal ideas. In this 
chapter, I also outline my methodology, which includes discourse analysis and network 
analysis. In order to show how this methodology works on a think tank, I present two 
case studies that chart the tactics of CCS to garner the most important thing to its 
survival—media and public attention. This chapter grounds CCS as a transnational 
apparatus of governmentality and fulfills an important exercise of situating it in the 
global political economy in order to analyze its local politics.   
In chapter 4, I discuss questions regarding informality and street hawkers as 
research subjects. While discussing different approaches to study informality and their 
inherent problems, I develop my own integrated approach that pays attention to the 
multiplicity of social space and the heterogeneity of hawkers as subjects. Next, I conduct 
a literature review of street hawkers and situate hawking and the state’s response to it in 
the past 150 years of urban space of India. In this section I trace the Indian state’s 
response to street hawking in the latter half of 20
th
 century to its colonial legacy and then 
move on to discuss hawkers’ responses to the state’s practice over the last two decades. 
These new developments have set the stage for the formation of an alliance led by 
various NGOs that calls for changes in current spatial laws. I then reflect on some 
methodological and epistemological issues that I ran into at the beginning of my research, 
and discuss how my current work addresses them. This section also offers a critique of 
the research epistemology of CCS, NGOs and scholars who are active parts of the 
hawkers’ alliance in India.  
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In Chapter 5, I discuss how CCS and NPSV view spaces of hawking. The 
objective is to show that the rich social space in Indian cities is increasingly being treated 
with the neoliberal principle of space as commodity. I begin this investigation with the 
analysis of hawkers’ presence in public space. While discussing three connotations of 
public space, I analyze CCS’s stance on public space in its various publications and show 
how it challenges and attempts to limit the “public” and open character of space. In the 
second part of this chapter, I discuss NPSV’s decree to transform urban streets and parks 
into hawking and non-hawking zones. Using Timothy Mitchell’s ideas of enframing, I 
discuss how NPSV’s transformation changes rich communal space into abstract space 
that facilitates capitalist production and consumption; divides space to bifurcate rich 
social life into public and private, exterior and interior; and constructs a space that 
initiates and invites a tourist gaze that drives consumption as the sole social practice.  
In Chapter 6, the problems with NPSV’s proposed Town/ Ward Vending 
Committees (TVC &WVC) that are in charge of regulating street hawkers are outlined. In 
the first section, I discuss the issues that may arise while creating these committees, 
issues that NPSV simple refuses to acknowledge. Larger ward committees that form as 
the directive for these subcommittees have not yet materialized in many of the cities and 
hence, to believe that the creation and working of TVC and WVC will be a smooth and 
efficient process is foolhardy. In the next section, I go into the details of how the internal 
structure of these committees has a majority of members who will undermine the 
participation of hawkers in key issues because of their elite modernist imaginations of 
urban space. I discuss this vis-à-vis the rise of Resident’s Welfare Associations and the 
Bhagidari initiative that are attempting to transform Delhi into a world class city. I use 
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geography literature on urban neoliberalism to demonstrate, how Bhagidari system is 
attempting to transform Delhi into an entrepreneurial city.  Lastly, I highlight the 
entangled spaces of informality while discussing everyday problems of hawkers that have 
been exacerbated due to the introduction of market reforms in the spaces where the 
welfare state used to operate. 
Chapter 7 outlines the problem with NPSV’s model of participation that invites 
hawkers to form a part of TVC. CCS and other NGOs claim that street hawkers are street 
entrepreneurs, and in the first half of this chapter I will bring out the contradictions in 
these claims by using excerpts from various interviews and two hawker’s conferences 
that were held in Delhi and Jaipur. During the Jaipur conference, certain locational 
discords in NPSV became apparent, that I will discuss these in detail in the next section. 
Lastly, while discussing a case study of a Jaipur fruit and vegetable market that CCS is 
assisting through its advocacy work, I will bring attention to the growing presence of 
organized retail as a factor that affects street hawkers. Neither NPSV nor any of the 
NGOs consider this as a major threat. CCS, going further, completely supports the 
growing presence of malls and department stores as fair competition and as something 
that is imperative to the growth of hawkers. In the last two chapters I attempt to show 
how the current model of participation envisaged by NPSV speaks to Gramsci’s passive 
revolution theory because it allows only forms of participation which elite NGOs and the 
capitalist state deem acceptable. Chapter 8 offers the final summary and concluding 
remarks.  
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Delhi As My Field Site 
Delhi is an ideal site to study the state and civil society relationships in a 
neoliberal climate. It is the seat of parliament and of the ministries, and because of this 
the headquarters of most of the public companies like national airlines and national 
railways. Cadène (2000) maintains that Delhi and its hinterland are the second largest 
industrial agglomerate in India after Mumbai. On the one hand, it is the center of state 
power and on the other hand, it is distinguished in the field of industry, education, 
information and communication. In this sense, Delhi makes an ideal city to study 
contextual geographies of neoliberalism.  
According to Vadal et al (2000) Delhi is often considered too fragmented, a 
patchwork of nine historic cities, and for that reason it is unable to invoke appreciation or 
a sense of belonging among the people who inhabit the city. I do find this fact accurate 
because of a conspicuous lack of literature on the city, especially when we compare it 
with the bourgeoning critical literature on Mumbai, Calcutta and more recently 
Bangalore. However, Hosagrahar (2005) calls Delhi “a city of many cities: imagined, 
lived, and controlled, the landscape has been re-created, rebuilt, and made meaningful by 
the daily acts of inhabiting as well as planned interventions”(3). Instead of a viewing 
Delhi as a kitsch landscape, in Benjamin’s vein, I read Delhi as palimpsest. This is in fact 
the raison d’etre for its national capital status. Lastly, I was born in Delhi and have lived 
there for most of my life. I disavow the ‘lack of passion’ identified by Vadal et al (2000) 
and hope that my study contributes to the critical literature of the city. 
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Reading Delhi through its Past and Present 
Hosagrahar (2007) maintains that modernity is plural and experienced differently 
in different space, culture and society. Scholars have shown that modernity is transient, 
fleeting, contingent, discontinuous and has no sense of historical continuity (Baudelaire 
1981, Harvey 1989). Though Delhi in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century was not modern 
in the normative western sense, its citizens experienced modernism as a result of the 
“complex interplay between modernization as the deliberate reordering of space and of 
political and economic forms of organization” (Hosagrahar 2007, 5) and also as a result 
of their own cultural and social responses to these changes. The old walled city was an 
excellent example of mixed use practice, where different aspects of the inhabitants’ lives 
like work, home, worship found concrete forms on one single space. In 1863, the British 
established the Delhi Municipal Committee with an aim to reinvent the old city and make 
it tangible and aesthetically modern. The efforts to renew and modernize the city did 
change the urban and social character of the city but not in the way it was intended. After 
all, the conception of space traditional for the Indian mindset is very different. For 
example, Kaviraj (1997) discusses the misinterpretation of the novel Ghare Baire by 
Rabindra Nath Tagore to talk about the notion of public or common in Indian society. 
This famous novel was translated into English as “The Home and the World”. Kaviraj 
points out the misleading translation where ghare is correctly translated as ‘home’ but 
baire is misleadingly translated as ‘world’ when it actually means outside. He explains 
this confusion further by identifying public/private as western concepts of modernity, 
which are often conflated with traditional Indian cultural concepts of inside/ outside, 
own/others, self/not-self. However, the overlapping of concepts from different societies is 
never neat. In traditional Indian thinking, home is sacred, while the outside is dirty. For 
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example, it was and still is normal for women to clean the houses with great care and 
throw the garbage just outside their front entrance. To a western eye, this may appear 
absurd in terms of aesthetics and hygiene since the immediate surroundings of the 
dwelling remain filthy. However, the Indian tradition understands the “outside” as a 
space of ambiguity, risk, and lack of belonging and hence such practices are often 
deemed natural. 
The modernization efforts during British rule met traditional identities, which 
created local resistance and tactics to subvert the dominant order in myriad ways. Hence 
the British, out of frustration, went outside the wall city to construct the modern capital of 
New Delhi. However, the city of New Delhi at its conception was meant only for the 
British. The segregating character of colonial rule was manifested in the design “where 
wide avenues segregated the white rulers from brown babus in a finely calibrated 
hierarchy of status” (Baviskar 2003, 91). After independence, New Delhi was 
successfully co-opted by the Indian government and actively mobilized in creating a 
modernist national identity.   
Post-independent Delhi Master Plans follow the same “interventionist biopolitical 
rationality,” western modernist vision, and “politics of segregation” as did the British. 
The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was constituted in 1957 to manage the space 
of Delhi and its major task was to avoid haphazard and unplanned growth. Baviskar 
(2003) notes that the Delhi Master Plan “envisaged a modern city, prosperous, hygienic 
and orderly, but failed to recognize that this construction could only be realized by the 
labors of large numbers of the working class poor, for whom no provision had been made 
in the plan”(91). During the 1970s, in the wake of the upcoming Asian games in 1981, a 
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massive construction project was taken up to build flyovers and luxury apartments, and in 
these projects DDA violated its own regulations, justifying it as a matter of national 
prestige.  
In the 1980s Rajiv Gandhi took a step closer to liberalization and consequently 
DDA started envisioning a new public-private partnership involving transfer of land on 
lease to private cooperatives to build luxury homes in northwest and southwest of Delhi. 
New consumerism demanded shopping complexes around these areas, driving up the 
value of real estate. Of course, the slums were the first targets of bulldozers in these 
areas. However, the unruly character of the masses represented by slums was hard to 
control, especially when most of the affluent city could not survive for a day without their 
help. Modern Delhi presents a brilliant example of a “splintering post-metropolitan” area 
where the significance of the city as a national capital has always worked in contradictory 
ways for its citizens. These processes intensified after 1991, when Delhi embarked on a 
route to achieve a “global city status” by actively recreating its image as investor-
friendly. This is been done by encouraging urban entrepreneurialism, increasing public-
private partnership and withdrawing the welfare state from many important functions.  As 
Harvey (1989) has noted in the case of advanced capitalist countries, these process of 
economic restructuring are accompanied by changes in urban imaginary, which is being 
demonstrated in the rise of the new middle class in Delhi who are imprinting their 
imaginary on the city space. In recent years, Delhi has hosted sporting events like the 
Commonwealth games, which became just like Olympic games have elsewhere, a 
“catalyst to urban change” (Essex and Chalkey 1998). The aspirants of a utopian city 
soon made it a neoliberal urban dystopia for its poor inhabitants. I will raise these themes 
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and recent developments throughout the dissertation in order to situate the politics of 
representation of the street hawkers in various policies concerning urban street hawking 
and ideas held and disseminated by CCS. 
Finally, my research inquiry into CCS’s interactions with the hawkers briefly took 
me to the capital city of Jaipur in the northwestern state of Rajasthan. Jaipur, the pink 
city, is located on the outskirts of the desert and attracts scores of international tourists 
because of its rich heritage. The head of CCS, Parth Shah, invited me to study CCS’s 
work for street hawkers, by spending time with Ram (name changed), the national 
coordinator of their Livelihood Campaign. Ram had moved to Jaipur in 2009 on request 
of the corporate funder for their project of street hawkers. The corporate funder wanted 
CCS to partner with another NGO that had already been working with street hawkers. 
Also, the state of Rajasthan was perceived to be somewhat receptive to implement NPSV.  
In recent years, Jaipur is trying hard to assume a world-class city status in order to attract 
foreign tourists. Situated in the north-west of Jaipur, Vidhyadhar Nagar was developed by 
the Jaipur Development Board on a plot of 400 hectares in the late 1990s. About 8 years 
ago, hawkers from the central city district, which was declared a no-hawking zone, were 
relocated in the new township and given fixed hawking spots. According to several 
hawkers, they had a good business for first few years because of the growing demands of 
the new township. However, the opening of several retail departmental stores has affected 
their sales negatively in past 5 years. At the time I met Ram, he was trying to figure out 
why that had happened and what could be done about it. Although my research does not 
contextualize the fieldwork to the recent urbanization and developments in Jaipur 
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because my focus area is Delhi, the Jaipur interviews were indispensable to discern the 
politics of representation of hawkers by CCS.  
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Chapter 2: Civil Society: Concept, Discourse and Practice 
Introduction 
In 2011, Prakash Karat, the general secretary of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) felt the need to announce that “civil society movements cannot be substituted 
for political parties at any stage.” Here Karat was referring to the ongoing obsession with 
“civil society”, which was epitomized by the Jan Lokpal bill proposed and popularized by 
the famous Gandhian social activist Anna Hazare.
3
 On April 5
th
 Anna Hazare embarked 
on a hunger strike to pressure lawmakers to pass his bill, an anti-corruption measure that 
aimed to establish a Lokayuktas.
4
  In wake of high profile scams such as the 2G spectrum 
and the Commonwealth Games scam, different segments of civil society, particularly the 
urban middle-class, came to the support of Anna Hazare more than willingly.
5
,
6
 On 27
th
 
August 2011, the parliament succumbed to the fast undertaken by Hazare and passed the 
anti-democratic bill.
7
   
                                                          
3
 Also called Citizen’s Ombudsman Bill demands the creation of an independent body 
with non-democratically selected representatives from various civil society organizations 
to investigate corruptions. 
4
 Lokayuktas mean anti-corruption ombudsman organizations  
5
 2G spectrum scam  involved corruption charges against government officials and 
various politicians for undercharging mobile telephone companies for the licenses for 
frequency allocation. Commonwealth Games scam involved corruption charges against 
officials of the Games' Organising Committee for embezzlement of funds during the 
preparations and organization of the games in Delhi. 
6  
For further reference read Sitapati, Vinay. 2011 “What Anna Hazare’s Movement and 
India’s New Middle Classes Say about Each Other” Economic and Political Weekly 
XLVI 30.  
7
 CPI-M would go on to support Jan Lokpal bill in later stages 
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There is no disagreement that a vigorous anti-corruption undertaking that targets 
corruption at the top political and bureaucratic level is essential in today’s India8. Despite 
the hopes associated with the market’s ability to curtail political corruption, it has 
irrefutably reached a point at which every section of the society is eager to take a leap of 
faith on anyone or anything that proclaims to fight back. This desperation enabled Anna 
Hazare to ride the wave by exercising his moral authority through the Gandhian tactic of 
satyagraha or non-violent resistance and fasting. Though all sectors responded to 
Hazare’s tactics, the most striking element is the Indian middle class’s strong relation 
with the success of Hazare’s campaign and the campaign’s ability to impose the middle-
class vision of civil society on the entire nation’s. Sitapati (2011) notes of the three 
segments of the Indian middle class: “the neo-Gandhians conferred legitimacy; India 
Shining provided energy and finances; and Legal Activists helped navigate the legislative 
path” (39) to the campaign. This campaign also fits aptly with the goal of NGO-isation 
supported by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and IMF.
9
 
Harkening back to Karat’s statement, the alarming feature of this middle class- 
and NGO- led campaign is that the ‘civil society’ is decreed to have inordinate power 
over the state, the sovereign and democratically elected representatives. This chapter 
outlines the problem with such a conception of civil society. In order to explain why the 
Jan Lokpal bill, purported to be pro-civil society, is actually quite anti-democratic and 
                                                          
8
 But first and foremost the task is to define corruption and differentiate between types of 
corruption. Political and bureaucratic corruption is different from common corruption, 
which involves poor hawkers bribing the local authorities to practice their livelihood in 
off-limit public space. Read more 
9
 Three of the core members of “Team Anna” are winners of the Magasaysay Award, 
which is endowed by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. These members also run 
numerous NGOs funded in part by international institutions and individuals.  
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narrow in its outlook, we need to know what exactly civil society is and why it is such a 
popular phenomenon in urban India. The term ‘civil society’ permeates the political 
language, as if the word itself could provide a panacea for India’s urban crisis.10 Daily 
urban newspapers, news broadcasts about cities, or any conferences or seminars on urban 
issues for that matter, are all peppered with the term ‘civil society’. In the post-liberal and 
active urban political scene, the claims to the city are often couched in the language of 
civil society and its partner terms such as empowerment, local participation, social 
capital, liberty etc. Think-tanks and NGOs that champion the rights of hawkers also use 
language of civil society to gain access to the hawkers’ organizations and policy 
networks; hence it is important to investigate the usage and practice of civil society as a 
phenomenon in order to understand its implications.  
Civil Society 
Global Spread of Discourse of Civil Society 
Theoretically, civil society can broadly be defined as a space between family and 
state--though not necessarily mutually exclusive of them--a sphere of associational 
grouping where the type of association is a subject of debate and disagreement in terms 
of politics and economics (Mcllwaine 1998). There is a general consensus among 
academicians that the discourse of civil society in the latter half of the 20
th
 century 
manifested a tendency that resulted in its decoupling with the state (Alexander 1997, 
Chandhoke 1995, 2005, Ehrenberg 1999, Nandy 2002, Roy 2003, Gupta and Ferguson 
                                                          
10
 There are differences between organizations that comprise urban and rural civil 
society. Rural civil society organizations are mostly represented as dominant caste 
associations while the urban civil society are increasing becoming dominated by the 
Resident Welfare Associations and elite citizen’s groups.  
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2002, Ferguson 2006). In the face of general frustration with the strong and repressive 
state apparatus, civil society appeared as a panacea to many who disliked some or any 
form and function of the state.  
The rise of the solidarity movement in Poland marked the insertion of civil 
society movement in contemporary political debate in Eastern Europe (Arato 1981, 
Kumar 1993, Rupnik 1979). Ehrenberg (1999) maintains that  in the climate of “actually 
existing socialism” the concept of civil society in Eastern Europe derived lineage from its 
liberal conception of ‘constitutional republics’ and was pitted against the “grasping and 
intrusive state apparatus, obsolete central planning of heavy industrial production, and 
pervasive repression of social initiatives origination outside the control of party-system” 
(173).  
In Latin America, the discourse of civil society was formulated by the leftist anti-
military leaders as a struggle against the military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Fals Borda 1992, Garretson 1989). There the discourse was further invigorated with the 
collapse of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes due to economic crises and subsequent 
fiscal restraints. The grassroots organizations that filled up the hollow spaces of the 
state’s actions also gained approval of the social and cultural forces such as organizations 
associated with Catholic Church (Kamrava and Mora 1998). From Southeast Asian civil 
rights activists to African peasants to Middle-East intellectuals, those opposing repressive 
regimes picked up the language of civil society as they advocated for people-centered 
development. In an attempt to reconcile the project of socialism with democracy, the idea 
of civil society was deemed by these movements as one of the underpinnings of modern 
democracy (Fine and Rai 1997). However, as Rodan (2003) maintains, it is not necessary 
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that the civil society would lead to the path of democracy. In fact, authoritarian regimes 
may engage in political accommodation with some groups without fundamental changes 
in their authoritarian rule (as in the case of Singapore). In the 1990s a “new policy 
agenda” forged under neoliberal principles, emphasizing the importance of civil society 
was undertaken by multilateral and bilateral organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and 
UNDP. These initiatives directed the participating countries to foster “ways of increasing 
the resilience of societal institutions that may be able to fend off anarchy even if the state 
is very weak” (World Development Report, 1997, 160). Influenced by the liberal political 
theory, the notion here is that the NGOs are a part of civil society and are much more 
efficient than state in delivering aid to poor. 
Importance of Analyzing the Concept of Civil Society 
An understanding of the roots of the notion of civil society and its spread as a 
discourse is critical to my analysis. This is because scholars (such as Weaver and 
McGann 2000, McGann 2011) often define think-tanks and NGOs as a part of civil 
society or the third sector that stands outside both state and the market. I challenge this 
contention here by problematizing the neat category of civil society itself. Taking the 
discussion from there, the concept of civil society provides the best entry point for the 
critical analysis of the process whereby urban poor such as hawkers confront neoliberal 
urban social-economic space with the help of free market think tanks and NGOs which 
work under the rubric of civil society.  
Such think tanks and NGOs zealously capitalize on the language of civil society 
and its partner terms such as freedom, empowerment, liberty, rights, association and 
participation to establish social causes with which to fight the state. For this reason, it is 
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important to explore the critical history of the concept of civil society in its different 
phases in order to understand and contextualize the current neoliberal usage of this term 
in different countries and societies. Also since the advent of modernity, this contested 
term has aroused countless debates and theories, some of which I will outline in next 
section and in some of these conceptualizations, I hope to, as Ehrenberg (1999) 
maintains, “evaluate contemporary assumptions about its democratic potential” (ix) and 
thereby locate the critique of the current neoliberal avatar. Chandhoke (1995) maintains 
that conceptual histories are significant in making us aware of the “pitfalls of inherited 
interpretations” (77). This is especially true for civil society since a romanticized 
adherence to the concept can impel “flawed political practices” (77). Lastly, a genuine 
theory of civil society is indispensable to the understanding of the politics where NGOs 
and think tanks are involved. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, politics of intellectuals, and 
ideas of common sense provides a brilliant investigative framework to evaluate the 
current anti-state rhetoric in India as a whole and Delhi in particular.  
The term ‘civil society’ conjures conflicting meanings, images and 
interpretations. Scholars have claimed that most explanations of civil society can be 
broadly grouped under Left and Right (Kaldor 2003, Edwards 2004, Powell 2007). This 
particular categorization seems to overlap with another categorization that is based on the 
relationship of civil society with the state. Some usages of civil society associated with 
the Right--for example the ones employed by CCS-- tend to position civil society against 
the state. These uses contrast with the ones on the Left, according to which state and the 
civil society are different faces of the same coin and decoupling the two would result in 
an impoverished understanding of both (Kumar 1993, Chandhoke 1995, Gupta 1997, 
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Nandy 2002, Robinson 1997, Roy 2003). Dunn says that “civil society is frequently  
employed to pick out a feature of the history of the universe which is presumptively good 
[or at least comparatively trustworthy] in contrast with a feature of its history [the state] 
which is tendentially or necessary bad [or at least comparatively untrustworthy]” (Dunn 
2001, 54). However, one thing that will stand clear in the inexhaustive repertoire of 
interpretations that follows is that the term ‘civil society’ is pliable enough to cater to the 
different social conditions of each of the time periods in which it has been used, starting 
with the ancient Greeks.  
 
Conceptual Legacy of Civil Society: Analysis of Current Theoretical 
Engagements 
While developing their thoughts on the polis (Greek city-state)
11
, Plato and 
Aristotle encountered (civil) society that was comprised of nuclear families and a village 
community.
 12
 Both philosophers employed a teleological mode of thought to designate 
different spheres of civil society in an all-encompassing state. Man was essentially a 
political being and naturally a part of political society called Koinonia politik.  The state, 
                                                          
11
 According to Stauss (2005), the blossoming of the polis in 5
th
 century BC owed its 
spiritual roots to the fact that the form motive (constant like water) gained primacy in 
Greek thought over the matter motive (changing like ice, steam). This corresponded with 
the transition from the older undifferentiated clan to the more differentiated legal order of 
the polis. For Plato, rational understanding was only possible of the things that are 
invisible and constant and, things that were visible can only be absorbed through senses. 
Plato’s polis was the embodiment of the form motive, and hence capable of being 
understood rationally. Hence, the knowledge of forms was the most essential art for a 
king who is also a philosopher king to rule. This was the first time a system of positive 
law developed. The rational element of the city which is ‘one’ would reign over the 
multiple irrational and all the disagreements among the citizens would be dissolved in the 
polis. 
12
 The term civil society does not find expression in the writings of ancient Greeks since 
the society was actually considered a political society.  
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they assert, regulated all the aspects of society and converted mere life into the good life. 
Of course, the Greeks’ conception of polis took place amidst the moral and political 
confusion of the day and hence both the philosophers strived to establish a moral 
principle of government. 
13
 
The Hellenistic age saw the transformation of the city-state into a larger central 
state (Garnsey 2000, 401)
14
. At this time the polis exerted a weaker pull on the 
philosophers and the widespread disenchantment towards political society was reflected 
in the development of moral philosophy as separate from political philosophy. Epicurus 
(341 BCE- 270 BCE) rejected politics and said that the individual desire for happiness 
and pleasure was the only means for ‘good life’. Pain should be avoided by living a life 
withdrawn from all political and societal associations.  
In Roman times, the most significant development which provided the conceptual 
grounds for the development of modern civil society was the birth of individual law, 
particularly the right to own property. During the time of Augustus (63 BC- 14 AD) a 
legally recognized private realm started evolving alongside the public realm. According 
to Eherenburg (1999) the Roman notion of res publica soon implied a coexistent sphere 
of res privata. The Roman law stopped at the doorstep—the individuals were separated 
                                                          
13
 Both philosophers addressed the moral confusion of being in the city and increases in 
private wealth in their writings on state and society. Plato asked in his The Republic “Does 
not the worst evil for a state arise from anything that tends to rend it asunder and destroy 
its unity, while nothing does it more good than whatever tends to bind it together and make 
it one?” (Plato 1997, 163 cited in Ehrenberg 1999, 5) Aristotle in his famous condemnation 
of usury and profit maintained that the human potential of human activity can get distorted 
by the pursuit of wealth (Aristotle 1996). 
14
  Massive successful conquests of Philip(II) and his son Alexander have been linked to, 
and often blamed for, the destruction the system of a free and independent polis ( Brown 
2007, 79; Coleman 2000 ). The large size of the Empire encouraged people to travel to 
different cities and citizenship was not bound to one single city.  
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into a public citizen and a private person. Roman law regulated the relations between 
individuals and property, giving security to individual ownership as well as making it 
easy to transfer ownership through legal procedures.  
From the disintegration of the Roman Empire until the late middle ages, 
Christianity provided a consistent theory of civil society and state, the former now 
organized by the church and the latter a promoter of the church. Pope Gelasius (493) 
proposed a “two sword” theory, which saw church and state as separate spheres despite 
their united purpose. This initiated a separation between “sacred and secular, the 
ideological and the political without which emancipation of the society, development of 
nations state, Renaissance and later day reformation would have not occurred” (Szücs 
1988, 300).  
According to Cohen, and Arato (1992), there were two main changes in the next 
few centuries that opened the necessary space for modern civil society to originate. First, 
the absolute primacy the church enjoyed through the 12
th
 or 13
th
 century began to be 
challenged by the growing power of the royal prince. As the market extended, the new 
bourgeoisie started evolving, helping the transfer of local monopolies in trade to the royal 
power that could help expand trade by exploiting national resources and conducting 
foreign relations (Eherenburg 2001, 56). Amidst the environment of corruption in the 
absence of a strong political authority, Machiavelli’s (1469- 1527) ardent belief in the 
republican tradition of ancient Rome, led him to conceptualize a theory of a society 
where politics recaptured the forefront with the new prince at its helm.  
The second change that Cohen and Arato (1991) address is the depoliticization of 
the former power holders, estates and corporate bodies that created a ‘veritable society of 
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orders’ (86).  This led to the development of the modern concept of civil society in the 
17
th
 to19
th
 centuries. During the early 17
th
 century in the writings of contractarians and 
theorists of natural law such as of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau Montesquieu, the state of 
nature emerged as pre-political. Here we witness the inauguration of the separation 
between the State and state of nature-civilization although a clear distinction between the 
civil and political is still absent (Bobbio 1988). For Hobbes, the state of nature was 
characterized by unbridled passions to accumulate power and wealth that hindered 
physical and material well-being. The only way to avert this condition of anarchy was for 
man to enter into a contract with the state where there is mutual and universal transfer of 
the natural right to it; in return, the state, headed by a strong sovereign provides peace 
and stability.
 15
 
Among all the contractarians, Locke was the first influential naturalist to bring the 
theory of property to the forefront of a theory of civil society. For him, the state of nature 
was not violent and was, in fact, an extra-political entity called society “marked by civil 
exchanges between free and propertied individuals” (Chandhoke1995, 80). The only 
reason the state was required was because it could protect private property. In these 
theories, the state and the society were neither historically nor spatially located; this 
vision was later shifted by the classical political economy school. 
                                                          
15
 Hobbes’s civil society had similarities to the ancient commonwealth where the state 
and society were fused   together by the will of the people to create better living 
conditions. But unlike the Greeks’ political society that ‘relied on a notion of moralized 
law rooted in ethos’, Hobbes’s society was based on positive law limited only to 
enactment and command” (Cohen and Arato 1991, 87).  Even though the civil society 
was an act of politics, contrary to the popular conception, Hobbes did leave “a 
considerable room for private intuitive and unregulated activity” (Eherenberg 2001, 76) 
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The ideas of the political economy school, which was a product of the 
Enlightenment, parallel the teleological narrative of modernity. Civil society formed the 
apex of civilization and the lower states were that of ‘oriental and occidental despotism’ 
and feudalism (Chandhoke 1995, 91). These stages were characterized and distinguished 
on the basis of modes of production. Hence, now the sphere of economy, not of politics, 
formed the ‘determinant of notions of propriety, property, government moral principles, 
and society and political institutions’ (90).  
Foucault (1994) traces the separation of civil society and political society to the 
work of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson and 
Adam Smith. According to Brewer (2007), 18
th
 century Scotland’s emphasis on 
universal, non-elitist education as well as respect for science, invention and rational 
inquiry sets the backdrop of Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767)16. 
In his theory, Ferguson tried to limit political power and ascribed more confidence in 
“mixed government rather than simplistic versions of democracy” (Brewer 2007 107). 
Ferguson believed that commercialization would not necessarily bring peace and liberty 
and that is the reason why his theory strived to base “civil society on a set of innate moral 
sentiments”. While Hobbes’s and Locke’s society were marked by individual interests in 
private gain, Ferguson’s civil society was characterized by people who were driven by 
altruism, solidarity, and generosity (Eherenburg 2001, 91).  
Oz-Salzberger (2001) credits both Hume and Smith for bringing commerce’s 
civilizing potential to the forefront in their theories of civil society. The transformation of 
                                                          
16
 In this Ferguson developed a typology of society – rude, barbarous and polished and 
spent much of his intellectual endeavor trying to chart the structure of the polished 
society and the threats that it faced from the negative aspects of industrialization (Brewer 
2007). 
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mercantilism into capitalist manufacturing society formed the backdrop of Adam Smith’s 
The Wealth of Nations in which he integrated growing market processes and economic 
activities into the first bourgeois theory of civil society. Highly critical of the nefarious 
state bureaucracy that regulated economic affairs and impeded growth, Smith celebrated 
the freedom of rational individualism, which formed civil society. Civil society was 
based on the market-organized network of mutual dependence. In the age of freedom, the 
specialization of labor would contribute to the mutual dependence of actors in civil 
society. Egotistical, self-serving individuals would lead to the ‘unintended consequence’ 
of benefiting the entire society: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, 
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. 
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them 
of our own necessities but of their advantages” (Smith 1776, 7). The powerful invisible 
hand of the self-correcting market would regulate civil society much more efficiently 
than the mercantilist state.   
It is important to discuss another anti-absolutist doctrine of the 18
th
 century that 
formed the source of one of the modern strains of civil society. The pluralist 
interpretation of civil society, a product of the theories developed by Montesquieu, 
Rousseau and de Tocqueville find expression in a variety of contemporary usage that 
pulls civil society further away from the state and its associated political structure.  
Montesquieu (1689-1755 AD), the French Enlightenment thinker propagated 
intermediate associations and offered a theory of balanced constitution. Impressed by the 
English model, he believed that aristocratic associations and commerce would bring 
peace and stability in society. He was one of the few theorists of civil society who 
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identified the interests of one class with the interests of the whole society. The primacy of 
Montesquieu’s nobility, Locke’s natural rights and Hobbes’s sovereign were challenged 
by Rousseau’s conception of a moral civil society. Adopting a new take on the contract 
theory, Rousseau (1712-1778) maintained that giving away rights to the sovereign for a 
peaceful civil society or relying on self-interested actions to build a productive civil 
society would be unsuccessful. Individuals, instead, could exchange their rights mutually 
to form a general collective will. Alexis De Tocqueville adapted different pluralist 
interpretations of civil society into one and announced the United States to be the 
prototype of modern civil society. In the U.S., he argued the democratic associations and 
intermediate voluntary organizations that are bonded by common cultural values in terms 
of customs and manners countered the absolutist and centralizing tendencies of the state. 
The theories of classical political economy contributed immensely to the concept 
of civil society. Civil society was separated from the state and politics and was relocated 
to the sphere of economics. However, Chandhoke (1995) maintains that the project of 
classical political economists was limited, as they assigned excessive privilege to the 
economic sphere in order to fight the absolutist state. The work of Hegel and Marx and 
later Gramsci attended to some of the tensions in this valorized sphere of civil society. 
Hegel argued, unlike Adam Smith, that the egoistical individual had the capacity 
of destroying the ethical life of civil society. For Hegel, the historically-produced realm 
of civil society was different from both family (characterized as ethical life of 
unreflective love) and the state, (characterized as universal and institutionalized ethical 
life). Civil society was not a separate sphere but dialectically related to the family and 
state where the mediations between particularity and universality took place and by this 
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very dialectical advance, “subjective self-seeking turned into the mediations of particular 
through the universal” (Ehrenberg 1999, 124). So what exactly was the universal ethical 
life for Hegel? Chandhoke (2003) maintains that for Hegel, the ethical life was “found in 
a society where the members share(d) certain ideals and where they are united by a 
morality which prescribes their role” (119). Hegel attempted to seek a model by vertically 
connecting the civil society with the universal state, the latter extending the system of 
mediations within the former. These systems of mediations are of two orders. First are the 
public authorities that guarantee the rights of the individual, such as courts, welfare 
agencies, and police. Second are the classes, or the estates and the corporations, which 
monitor and manage the actions of individuals. At the same time, these estates provide 
socialization that convinces individuals that their salvation lies in associating with others. 
Marx rejected Hegel’s universal state. Marx formed his theory of civil society and 
state when he came into conflict with the Prussian censors during his early days as a 
radical journalist (Ehrenberg 1999). He realized that “arbitrary censorship and economic 
regulations” (132) were inclined towards the powerful (bourgeoisie). This fact made it 
difficult to conceptualize state power as autonomous. Later, in On the Jewish Question, 
Marx formulated the famous critique of young Hegelian Bruno Bauer, who blamed 
religion as the major impediment to the human progress. Marx contended that driving 
religion, or for that matter class, ethnicity, caste, property etc, out of politics does not 
mean that it would cease to exist in civil society. Failure to realize this distinction leads to 
uncritical confusion of political emancipation with general human emancipation (Marx 
1843, 30). Keane (1988) elucidates this further in relation to a secular and democratic 
state and society: “the modern bourgeois era as Marx pointed out is unique in so far as it 
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effects a separation of political and social forms of stratification. It subdivides the human 
species for the first time into social classes; divorces individuals’ legal status from their 
socioeconomic role within the civil society and sunders each individual into both private 
egoist and public citizens” (57). The political revolution had left the “pillars of the house 
standing” and had not affected civil society where man lived a depoliticized life (Marx 
1843). In civil society, particularity became a universal principle, which was the domain 
of exploitation where the appropriation of surplus labor took place. Civil society for Marx 
represented a monolithic bourgeois ideology.  
Civil society was the arena where reproduction of dominant relationships took 
place but it could equally have been the site where the subaltern classes fight for social 
and economic emancipation. Marx found the proletariat to be the universal class and an 
agent who could bring about a radical revolution that aimed at general human 
emancipation, not just partial political revolution. The first step would involve the 
overtaking of the state by political revolution. The second stage would involve the 
destruction and dissolution of all the forms of existing capitalist social order by using 
political supremacy. Thus for Marx, even if the state was an illusory condition, its 
democratic potentials were significant for superseding civil and political society for 
human emancipation. Marx therefore made clear distinction between bourgeois and non-
bourgeois civil society, which belonged to a bourgeois and non-bourgeois state 
respectively. 
Fontana (2006) explains that Marx’s critique of liberalism and bourgeois society 
ended in reproducing the distinction between the state and society that was so 
characteristic to his liberal opponents. The state was negative, repressive and coercive 
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with no positive functions and redeeming value. Gramsci, on the other hand, went back to 
the Hegelian distinction between state and civil society, thereby giving the state a more 
positive role. Also Gramsci’s analysis disagreed with the teleological pattern of society 
envisaged by the earlier political economists such as Smith, Hegel, and Marx that was 
marked by “unilinear expansion and contractions of capitalism, in which each country 
followed in line behind the leader” (Burawoy 2003, 203). Capitalism could develop in 
multiple directions with varying configurations of state, society and economy and that is 
the reason Gramsci’s theory and conjunctural analysis is most relevant in the current 
global climate. 
Gramsci’s Idea of Civil Society 
At the time when Marx wrote Capital in 1867, England, France and Germany 
were replete with numerous intense working-class movements. In contrast, when Gramsci 
started writing Prison Notebooks, capitalism had entered a monolithic phase. Also, in his 
own country, fascism was suppressing working class unions and eroding the 
achievements from their previous struggles. Subsequently, the success of Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia led Gramsci to develop his concept of hegemony, civil and political 
society and the role of intellectual, all while he was trying to discern why socialism had 
failed to take off despite the abundance of working class movements.  
Gramsci maintains: 
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’: 
the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is, the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These two 
levels correspond on the one hand to the functions of ‘hegemony’ which the 
dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of ‘direct 
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domination’ or command exercised through the state and ‘juridical’ government 
(Gramsci 1971, 12). 
  
In his conception of state and civil society, Gramsci inverted the relationship 
between the base and the superstructure and maintained that the civil society instead of 
the base mediates history. The superstructure is comprised of both political and civil 
society. Both political and civil society corresponds to different sites and forms of power. 
Political society is the location of the coercive apparatus involved in disciplining the 
body by institutions like penal codes and prison; civil society, on the other hand, 
disciplines the mind through educational, cultural and religious institutions and is the 
location where the state functions in minute, invisible ways to influence people. Gramsci 
maintained that so far as state is referred to as the ‘night watchman’, the coercive forces 
still predominates, but as soon as the state is called civil society, or the ethical state, the 
coercive forces are no longer needed and society is regulated by itself. He argued:  
The assertion that the state can be identified with individuals ( the 
individuals of a social group), as an element of active culture (i.e as a movement to 
create a new civilization, new type of man and of citizen), must serve to determine 
the will to construct within the husk of political society a complex and well-
articulated civil society, in which the individual can govern himself without his self-
government theory entering into conflict with political society- but rather becoming 
its normal continuation, its organic complement (Gramsci, 1971, 268). 
 
This significant role played by civil society does not mean that it is in any way 
independent of the economic base. A structural change in the economic base will 
manifest its effects on civil society too, but it is civil society along with political society, 
which will ultimately manage the base.  
Unlike Marx, for Gramsci, history did not unfold in a prescribed teleological 
manner but as “a discontinuous series of hegemonic formations or hegemonic blocs” 
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(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 71). If the bourgeois civil society was successful in negotiating 
the dichotomy between the economic base and the superstructural state, the outcome 
would be the creation and continuation of capitalist hegemony; if it failed, the counter-
hegemonic current would subvert the capitalist state to construct new forms of political 
organization.  
As opposed to the liberal conception in which civil society protects an individual 
from the state, both Gramsci and Marx maintained that it is the state and the ruling elite 
that civil society safeguards. But unlike Marxian civil society, the Gramscian model had 
the potential of rational self-regulation and freedom. In this sense, Gramscian civil 
society was closer to Hegelian civil society. Gramsci acknowledged the alternative 
currents that flow within civil society and as much as it is a “site where legitimacy of the 
state is forged, it is also the terrain of contestation” (Chandhoke 1995, 154). The 
ideological and cultural practices of civil society are actively engaged in the production 
of consent, which Gramsci described as the creation of hegemony, which is the influence 
of one group over all other groups. For example, the ruling bourgeois class, through the 
sites of consent, diffuses such ideas, norms, values, social relations and cultural traditions 
that the working class identifies its own welfare with that of the former and do not revolt 
against the exploitative setup. Creation of hegemony may involve coercion, sometimes 
overt while other times, in specific configuration with consent. Hegemony can be limited 
and as well as expansive. One example of limited hegemony is the one attained by 
coercion. Passive revolution, a way for the bourgeoisie to maintain its hegemony by 
allowing small concessions to the subaltern groups or the proletariat is also an example of 
limited hegemony.  
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For my analysis hegemony is a very useful concept. First, it explains things better 
than the term domination and class alliance. Second, Gramsci wrote that “popular beliefs 
and similar ideas are themselves material forces” (Gramsci 1971, 165). So the theory of 
hegemony provides a break from the concept of ideology as a set of mere ideas, thereby 
directing our attention to the materiality of ideology. For a better understanding of 
hegemony we must understand Gramsci’s concepts of ideology, collective will, organic 
intellectuals, and historic bloc. 
Gramsci rejected Marx’s negative connotation of ideology as something that 
conceals the contradictory character of the hidden real essential patterns, for one where 
ideology becomes a neutral concept referring to the political consciousness of classes 
including that of proletariats (ibid 250). Ideologies are more than mere systems of ideas. 
Gramsci explains this by distinguishing between the ‘arbitrary elucubrations of particular 
individuals’ (1971, 376) and organic ideologies that are necessary for a given social 
structure. The latter “organize human masses and create the terrain on which men move, 
acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc” (Gramsci 1971, 377). Haugaard 
(2011) maintains that for Gramsci, the bourgeois strength of ideology does not reside in 
obscuring the truth which gives rise to false consciousness, but “is located in the capacity 
of a set of ideas and consciousness to tie together divergent interests into a singular 
hegemonic interpretative horizon” (47). This is critical for the function of moral and 
intellectual leadership that creates hegemony that goes beyond class distinction to create 
“common will”.  Laclau and Mouffe (1985) agree : “For, whereas political leadership can 
be grounded upon a conjectural coincidence of interests in which the participating sectors 
retain their separate identity, moral and intellectual leadership requires that an ensemble 
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of ‘ideas’ and ‘values’ be shared by a number of sectors- or to use our (their) own 
terminology, that certain subject positions traverse a number of class sectors” (66-67).  
Ideology, common will and material resources form a historic bloc. According to 
Gramsci it is the intellectuals who cement the gaps between the structure and 
superstructure in order to create a historic bloc. Every social group in the economic world 
organically creates their specific intellectuals. These intellectuals are different than the 
traditional intellectuals who are people characterized by intrinsic activity of thinking who 
tend to represent a historical continuity and recognize “themselves as ‘independent’, 
autonomous, endowed with a character of their own, etc”( Gramsci 1971, 8). The organic 
intellectuals or new intellectuals are the ones who can organize and educate the groups to 
create a hegemony built on consent and Fontana (2010) maintains that the hegemonic 
relationship is necessarily an educational relationship (34). These intellectuals are 
involved in the struggle for expansion and solidification of their own class.  
Reconsidering Gramsci  
In an effort to tackle economic determination in Gramsci and advance the theory 
of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) replace the concept of ideology with the concept 
of discourse. They use Foucault’s conception of discourse that was elaborated in 
Archeology of Knowledge. According to Foucault, a discursive formation is a ‘system of 
dispersion,’ which has a unity or regularity within the dispersed elements (objects, modes 
of statements, concepts, thematic choices).
17
 The rules that govern such formations are 
the ‘rules of dispersion.’ Discourse can be thought of as a set of ideas, or a form of 
                                                          
17
 Foucault in Archeology of Knowledge dismissed “four hypotheses of unifying 
principle of discursive formation – reference to the same object, common style in the 
production of statements, constancy of the concepts and reference to a common theme”  
Laclauand Mouffe g 105. 
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language or a group of statements with its own rules that are socially constructed and 
frame our understanding of and about something. They provide an organizing structure 
that actively shapes our understanding of the world and things in it.  
For Laclau and Mouffe, discourse is constructed when the process of articulation 
happens, which works to establish a relation among elements in such a way that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. Just like Gramsci’s ideology, 
the practice of articulation of discourse involves both linguistic elements and non-
linguistic elements or the material world. However, the distinction between the economic 
base and superstructure that was inherent in Gramsci’s ideology disappears in a 
discourse. This happens because both base and superstructure become discursive and 
therefore susceptible to instabilities since discourses by their very nature are not unified 
(only made of dispersed elements) and fixed. Hence, I refer to civil society and neo-
liberalism not in terms of ideology but as discourses, which are discrete and unstable. 
Geographers in recent scholarship have attempted to bring together Gramsci and 
Foucault to conceptualize neoliberal hegemonic discourse ( Ekers and Loftus 2008, 
Larner 2003, Peet 2002, Roberts at el 2003, Sparke 2006). I continue this trend and arrive 
at a framework of state and society that avoids any kind of structuralist trap in which the 
state is seen as a separate entity standing outside of society. Gramsci identified state as 
comprised of both political and civil society. For him, the (bourgeois) state is 
characterized by set of coercive apparatus or political society that include police and 
courts, while civil society is engaged in generation of consent through schools, hospitals, 
etc. The role of both state and civil society is to create hegemony in the society. This 
sphere is extensive, as for Gramsci, even a father can act as a legislator for his children 
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(Gramsci 1971, 266). Foucault extends this notion of Gramsci’s when he declares “cut 
off the king’s head (1994, 122).” By this he wanted us to identify multiple ways in which 
power works and produces, and so challenges the notion of state as the sole and unitary 
center of power. Using the concept of governmentality and bio-power, he directs 
attention to the operations of power that cover all sites of social interaction-- community, 
school, family and body. 
Foucault’s notions of power, discourse and governmentality attend to the class 
determinism implicit in the Gramscian formulation of civil society. Governmentality is, 
Foucault writes, “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of very specific albeit 
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (1994, 102). 
Governance, Foucault maintains, means ‘conduct of conduct.’ The first connotation of 
conduct is to guide and regulate, and the second connotation of conduct is to moralize 
behavior.  This type of “art of governing is different from the “doctrine of the prince and 
the juridical theory of sovereignty (201- 206).” The latter requires exercise of authority 
over people and territory, and an ability to regulate and discipline them. The former 
requires a specific understanding of the people and their relationship with the things so as 
to ensure potential of growth, and prosperity of the population. Population in the era of 
“art of governing” became the ultimate aim of the government, an object whose control, 
regulation, welfare was the function of the state. Population instead of the “power of 
sovereign” became the end of the government. Foucault further maintains that 
disciplinary power and governmentality coexist. “We need to see things not in terms of 
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the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent 
replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a 
triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government” (Foucault 1991, 219).  
While Gramscian notions dismantle the distinction between state and civil 
society, Lazzarato (2004) maintains that Foucault’s conceptualization of bio-power 
wrecks the distinction between the state and bio. State power is not just negative but also 
productive, as it produces subjects. The organized power of armies, schools and factories 
are the result of discipline and governmentality. For Gramsci the micro-practices added 
up to colossal structures of power which were canonized at the level of the state, and had 
their origin in the processes of capitalist society. But for Foucault these macro-processes 
of power did not originate in the will to power, rather they are constituted in the logic of 
capitalism. So for Foucault, capitalism is a constitutive factor in the production of state, 
society and bio power.  
Civil Society in Indian Context 
Subaltern studies and post-colonial scholar Partha Chatterjee probably provides 
the most suited interpretation of Gramsci’s ideas of state, civil society and hegemony in 
the Indian context. Chatterjee (1986, 2003) explains that civil society, a product of 
modernity, is essentially a bourgeois society, and is “characterized by modern 
associational life originating from the western society that is based on equality, 
autonomy, freedom of entry and exit, contract, deliberative procedures of decision-
making, recognizance rights and duties of members, and such other principles” 
(Chatterjee 2003, 135). Political society, on the other hand, is a product of democracy and 
encompasses all the population that has been left out of civil society. Chatterjee identifies 
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this political field as the spatial expanse where governmental technologies work. To 
describe this he makes two different routes of connections of both civil society and 
political society to the state-- “one is the line connecting civil society to the nation-state 
founded on popular sovereignty and granting equal rights to citizens. The other is the line 
connecting populations to the governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of 
security and welfare” (2004, 39). He further maintains that “whereas the legal-
bureaucratic apparatus of the state has been able, by late colonial and certainly in the 
post-colonial period, to reach as the target of many of its activities virtually all of the 
population that inhabits its territory, the domain of civil society institutions as conceived 
above is still restricted to a fairly small section of citizens” (2001, 172).  
To explain the development of Indian state and civil society, Chatterjee finds 
Gramsci’s ideas of passive revolution insightful. In Italy, Gramsci explained that the 
bourgeois state was able to satisfy the demand of the society by “small doses, legally, in a 
reformist manner—in such a way that it was possible to preserve the political and 
economic position of the old feudal classes, to avoid agrarian reform, and especially 
avoid the popular masses going through a period of political experience such as occurred 
in France” (1971, 119). A similar thing happened in India. Chatterjee (1986) describes 
Indian struggle for independence from the British as a kind of passive revolution which 
after its success did nothing to eradicate colonial institutional structures or the pre-
capitalist dominant class.  
Kaviraj (1991) establishes that the state’s planning elite—‘the body of experts’ 
who were to maintain the relative autonomy and managing the competing interest of the 
bourgeois and other dominant class--could not remain neutral for too long and 
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succumbed to the pressures of the dominant class with grand visions of development. 
Chatterjee maintains that“[W]here an emergent bourgeois lacks the social conditions for 
establishing complete hegemony over the new nation, it resorts to a ‘passive revolution’, 
by attempting a’ molecular transformation’ of the old dominant classes into partners in a 
new historic bloc and only a partial appropriation of popular masses, in order to create a 
state as a necessary precondition for the establishment of capitalism” (Chatterjee, 1986, 
30) 
Since the dominant class’s intellectual-moral leadership in India has always been 
fragmented, Kaviraj (1991) maintains the postcolonial developmental projects are unable 
to connect to the vernacular and the poor. This has given rise to considerable tensions in 
neoliberal India, and I will extend this line of thought further in Chapter 4 to explain the 
politics of informals. 
Anna Predicament: Problems with Civil Society based on Associations  
The revival of ideas surrounding the term civil society in post-colonial India 
emerged amidst a climate of disenchantment with the developmental state (Béteille 1996, 
Ghosh 1989, Guha 1989, Gupta 1997, Kothari 1988, Kothari and Seth 1991, Mohanty 
1998, Shah 1988, Rubin 1987).  As opposed to the 1980s romantic revivalism of the 
concept by social movements and citizens groups that represented the poor who were 
excluded from the benefits of elite modernization schemes, the recent interest in civil 
society represents an assault launched in the name of neoliberal doctrine on the 
regulatory welfare state. CCS espouses this particular concept that is influenced by anti-
state theories of Adam Smith and Richard Plain as well as associational models of 
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pluralist schools of thought. With a review of literature of civil society in Indian setting, 
let me show how such an interpretation is anti-democratic and leaves pillars of 
domination intact. 
Rajni Kothari (1988) criticizes the Indian state for its excessive focus on, ‘market 
efficiency’, ‘profitability’, ‘development’ and ‘national security’. He hopes that civil 
society would strengthen democracy by acting as a launch pad for human governance. 
Civil society, which incorporates contemporary social movements and networks of 
voluntary and self-governing institutions like village panchayats
18
, form the grassroots 
model of mass politics in which ‘people are more important than state’ (Kothari 1988, 
212). Here Kothari falsely assumes that the associations which form civil society are 
democratic in their composition; he thereby neglects the social and caste cleavages that 
propagate exclusion and hierarchy. Béteille (1996), influenced by de Tocqueville, attends 
to this by proposing a slightly different conception of the associations of modern civil 
society. A vibrant civil society constitutes open, secular and democratic institutions like 
banks, hospitals, municipal corporations, schools and newspapers that are based on 
individual autonomy instead of direct participation or self-governance. Béteille, a skeptic 
of religious institutions, also views the state as an enemy of civil society. He misses the 
essential point that the state is significant to the working of civil society. Civil society 
needs the basic political-legal framework that institutionalizes the normative pre-
                                                          
18
 In the 1950s and 60s, in an effort to decentralize power and governance, Panchaiat or 
Panchayat was evolved as a system of governance in Indian villages. In this system, five 
elderly and wise men of the village are elected to make important decisions about the 
development of the village, to plan the finances, and to solve petty disputes.  
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requisites of rights, freedom and rule of law. Secondly, civil society needs the state for its 
organic growth and to function democratically. 
 Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption campaigns overlook and undermine this crucial 
relationship between the political-legal framework and fundamental rights on the one 
hand and democracy on the other. Hazare’s engagements elsewhere demonstrate this fact. 
Hazare, the environmental warrior, lives in a small room behind a temple in the village of 
Ralegan Siddhi in the state of Marahasthra. His accomplishment lies in the fact that he 
was able to transform the draught- prone and poverty- stricken village into a lush, green 
and sustainable model village. This he achieved through changing the environmental 
character as well as the social-political, economic fabric of the town by the exercise of his 
moral authority coupled with occasional coercive measures. Mukul Sharma (2006) talks 
in detail about some rules that Hazare enforced: 
Five universal rules have evolved out of the developmental experiences in 
Ralegan. They are ‘nasbandi’ (restriction of family size), ‘nashabandi’ (ban on 
alcohol), ‘charaibandi’ (ban on free grazing), ‘kurhabandi’ (ban on tree felling) and 
‘shramdan’ (donation of voluntary labour for community welfare). It is mandatory 
for the villagers to take oath that they will follow these rules. The path of rural 
development here depends in a large measure on many other ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’. No 
shop in Ralegan can sell ‘bidis’ or cigarettes. Film songs and movies are not 
allowed. Only religious films, like Sant Tuka Ram, Sant Gyaneshwar can be 
screened. Only religious songs are allowed on loudspeakers at the time of marriages 
(Sharma 2006, 1984).  
 
Anna Hazare’s ties to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the influential right-
wing Hindu nationalism organization, are no secret. Sharma identifies the language used 
to make people acquiescent ‘highly brahaminical and hegemonic.’19  In a nutshell the 
success of the environmental movement has helped to consolidate the moral authority of 
                                                          
19
 Brahmin is the highest and the most privileged caste in Hindu society and Brahmins 
have exercised cultural hegemony over Indian social structure for many centuries. 
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Hazare, which he uses to enforce his notion of an ideal Hindu society within the village. 
As Sharma notes, his “achievement establishes it’s own institutions, justifying its own 
structure of governance” ( 2006, 1985).  
Disparaging elections, Hazare claims that power and politics bring corruption. 
And so there have been no election of gram Panchaiat in the village in 24 years. Civil 
society as a sphere of democratic dialogue and contestation is compromised with 
Hazare’s highly selective ideology. In fact, many religious or nationalist civil society 
movements such as the one signified by Anna Hazare’s environmental movement use 
language and emotional vocabulary of passion, sacrifice and martyrdom versus the 
mundane democratic language of political debate, minority and indigenous inclusion and 
tolerance. These movements are seen to increasingly join hands with the new middle 
class and pro-neoliberal lobby groups who bemoan the result of social democracy 
(extended in chapter 4) to fight and oppose the welfare state in the name of civil society. 
The same is true for NGOs and think tanks such as CCS, who use discourse of the state’s 
mismanagement, corruption, and decentralization as reasons to bypass the state. Spivak 
(2008) rightly calls them “self-selected moral entrepreneurs who give people 
philanthropy without democracy”.  
Why is the Discourse of Civil Society Essential to the Project of 
Neoliberalism? 
As is apparent from earlier discussions, civil society discourses are often pitted 
against the repressive state. This is a technique that CCS uses too. This trend is important 
to investigate further because as Ferguson (2007) explains, “the uncritical and ahistoric 
use of civil society, which at one time helped people to fight repressive state is now 
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helping to promote a “profound antidemocratic transnational politics” (91).  Historically, 
civil society has never been used in isolation from the state, but discourse about state and 
society makes their separation seem natural. Roy (2003) complains, “strengthening civil 
society and endeavors of the state are seen as inversely related to one another: the state 
must retreat if civil society is to flourish” (82). There is no questioning of the fact that 
neoliberal doctrine in the form of projects and market logic is penetrating across the 
globe. But why is the discourse of civil society instead of any other discourse used to 
achieve these changes in countries such as India? How does the discourse of civil society 
work and why has it become essential to the project of neoliberalism in India? One 
explanation is that the popular discourse of civil society suits the discourse of 
neoliberalism because ‘civil society’ is a discourse of utopia that envisages the ideal self-
organized democratic society and dismisses authoritarian or obsolete state. But as 
Gramsci has maintained:  
The ideas of the Free Trade movement are based on a theoretical error 
whose practical origins is not hard to identify; they are based on a distinction 
between political society, which is made into and presented as an organic one, 
whereas in fact it is merely methodological. Thus it is asserted that the economic 
activity belongs to civil society and the state must not intervene to regulate it. But 
since in actual reality civil society and state are one and the same, it must be clear 
that Laissez- faire too is a form of State “regulation” , introduced and maintained by 
coercive means ( Gramsci 1971, 160). 
 
Since civil society and the state are “one in the same”, perhaps the second reason 
explains things better. The many of the contemporary discourses of civil society do not 
bemoan all kind of state activities. In fact, they oppose only a kind of welfare and 
regulatory state that hinders freedom of the market. In short, these discourses promotes 
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free market ideas; aids in deploying global hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism with 
rather ease; and helps in the creation of a neoliberal governmental subject.  
 
Making Common Sense Work: Connecting the Discourse of Civil Society to the 
Global Hegemonic Discourse of Neoliberalism 
Hegemonic discourse is composed of careful, rationalized and organized 
statements, which carry certain ideas that claim to be true and are disseminated by 
experts and organic intellectuals. Peet (2002) contributes a Gramsci-Foucualdian notion 
of global hegemonic discourse (GHD) while studying neoliberal Africa. GHD refers to “a 
system of political ideas, derived from leading class interpretations of regional 
experience, elaborated in coherent and sequential theoretical statements, as with policy 
formations, within internationally recognized body of experts” (57). With intense 
regulatory power and a broad geographic swath, these discourses penetrate different 
locales and are able to persuade or coerce people to become its subjects. Neoliberalism is 
one such hegemonic discourse. However, scholars studying neoliberalism have also 
emphasized the “contextual embeddedness” of hegemonic neo-liberal projects and I 
argue that the use of civil society in neoliberal discourse is a result their contextual 
embeddedness and path-dependent interactions. 
Let me explain this process with the help of Gramsci’s idea of common sense. 
According to Gramsci, hegemony can also be understood in relation to his concept of 
common sense. Gramsci maintains that "[E]very philosophical current leaves behind a 
sedimentation of common sense: that is the document of its historical effectiveness. 
Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming 
itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have 
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entered ordinary life. Common sense creates the folklore of the future, that is, a relatively 
rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given place and time” (324). However, as Jones 
(2006) maintains, common sense for Gramsci is also “unsystematic, heterogeneous, 
spontaneous, incoherent and inconsequential, a ‘chaotic aggregate of disparate 
conceptions’ that holds together” (Jones 2006, 54). Common sense can be intervened by 
hegemonic influences and since by nature it is not rigid, it can be actively created by the 
mediations of hegemonic groups. I believe that the term ‘civil society’ currently resides at 
the level of common sense, where people in India uncritically accept anything associated 
with civil society as good, democratic, pro-people and community. Hence, it is beneficial 
for neoliberalism to co-opt the term civil society in order to invade the common sense of 
people and shape them into neoliberal subjects. 
It is easy to see how this has come to happen in the Indian setting. Roy (2003) 
explains that the discourse of civil society has been used to propagate a neoliberal 
doctrine of the roll-back of state in terms of less regulation, privatization and withdrawal 
of welfare initiatives because the discourse of “state” and “free market” are no longer 
relevant. On the one hand, with the growing discontent of the IMF and WTO, the poor 
have actively refuted the discourse of a free market. On the other hand, state in many 
countries of the south is also looked upon with skepticism. For example, in India, it is a 
well-established fact that after the British left the country, elite groups co-opted the 
Indian state successfully. Kaviraj (1984), maintains that ‘state-bourgeoisie agency’ even 
after independence was based on institutional structures of the colonial rule. The 
institutional structure lacked a necessary precondition that was supposed to bind it 
together--unforced commonsense (227). Instead, something else was used to bind the 
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state together. Nandy (1989) explains that the “(Indian) state has established closed, 
inviolable links with megascience and megatechnology- not only because it must depend 
on modern science, and technology to give teeth to its coercive apparatus, but also 
because it can use the achievement in these sectors, especially when they are spectacular, 
to legitimize itself as a repository of scientific knowledge and negation of native 
irrationalities” (10). Armed with a reliable discourse of science and technology, the 
modernist state agenda never felt the need to co-opt “low culture”, the rural, ethnic or 
“vernacular”. Hence, in 1970s and 80s, the developmental state entered a crisis phase 
with social movements springing up in different parts of the country. The phenomena of 
NGOs and other community organizations, adorned with civil society discourse, in this 
backdrop appeals to the “low culture” as they work closely with the community and pay 
close attention to their issues, even if they follow the same notions of development and 
modernity as the modernist Indian state or the west.  
The Power of Freedom in the Discourse of Civil Society: Promoting Neoliberal 
Governmentality   
The discourse of civil society also aids in promoting neoliberal governmentality. 
Foucault (1991) maintains that analyzing “regimes of  practice means to analyze 
programs of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done  
(effects of Jurisdiction), and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (‘effects of 
‘veridiction’)” (75). Foucault’s work on governmentality adds not only to the neo-
Gramscian analysis of the ideological conditions for the operation of neoliberalism 
exemplified by Stuart Hall (1984, 1988) on Thatcher’s Britain , but also directs our 
attention to the “ethical and technical character of neo-liberalism as an art of 
government” (Barry et al. 1996, Burchell 1993, Rose 1993). Foucault saw two major 
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differences between eighteenth- century classical liberalism and modern neoliberalism. 
First for neoliberals, the market regulates and controls the state, while liberal theorists 
state defines the market (Lemke 2001). Lemke (2001) writes that for Foucault the second 
difference arises from the basis of government. Individual freedom was the precondition 
for the rationale of the government in classical liberalism, and the state could undermine 
the freedom only when its foundation was challenged. However, in the neoliberal era, 
where economic norms such as ‘cost benefit calculations and market criteria’ penetrate 
the social domain, the rationality of the state is pegged no longer with pre-given human 
nature but with an ‘artificially created form of behavior’:  
[N]eo-liberalism no longer locates the rational principle for regulating and 
limiting the action of government in a natural freedom that we should all respect, 
but instead it posits an artificially arranged liberty: in the entrepreneurial and 
competitive behavior of economic-rational individuals. Whereas in the classic 
liberal conception, homo economicus forms an external limit and the inviolable core 
of governmental action, in the neo-liberal thought of the Chicago School he 
becomes a behaviouristically manipulable being and the correlative of a 
governmentality which systematically changes the variables of the ‘environment’ 
and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of the individuals” (Lemke 2001, 200). 
  
 
Rose (1999) elaborating this phenomena explains that modern neoliberalism 
operates through the mode of freedom, where technologies of self prepare an individual 
for the subjection of the self. “These technologies – a form of injunctions to moral 
government …are embodied in language, in knowledge, in technique, in fabrication of 
spaces” (43). The free human being, a self-activating, self-managing and self- 
enterprising individual, is transformed and inscribed with mores of work efficiency and 
optimization and wealth creation. In modern times, in the name of freedom, the process 
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of self-subjection of individuals has provoked Rose to distinguish “freedom as the 
formula of resistance from freedom as a formula of power” (65). 
Dean extends the concept of technologies of self to add “technologies of agency 
which seek to enhance and improve our capacities for participation, agreement and 
action; and technologies of performance in which these capacities are made calculable 
and comparable so that they might be optimized” (173). These technologies working at 
the level of family, school, neighborhood, and workplace, reconfigure and reorganize 
social relations and empower individuals to work as active citizens, responsible 
customers, and efficient individuals aware of their own risks. Burchell (1996 ) calls this 
‘contractual implication’ (29), a term that he borrows from Jacquese Donzelot (1991). 
This implies that in order for individuals to exercise freedom of action and decision that 
hitherto were managed by the state; the individual assumes absolute responsibility not 
only for their actions but also for the outcomes of their actions.  
Ram, CCS’s national coordinator for the Livelihood Champaign, commented on 
the kind of freedom that CCS as a civil society organization envisions: “CCS’s main goal 
is free the civil society of India, which means economic freedom, social freedom, 
political freedom, freedom to do whatever you think...even if it may do some wrong to 
few people… we’ll say, go ahead and do it. Because you are not doing it for me, you are 
doing it for yourself. If the result is harmful, at least you will blame yourself not someone 
else.” 
This new form of responsibilization that is an effect of governmentality is the 
pertinent theme to my study as the street hawkers are also implicated in ‘contractual 
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implication’ once the welfare state withdraws from the spaces of informality. Also, civil 
society discourse that promotes governmentality in the name of freedom, helps different 
strands of neoliberal ideology to get articulated with the existing ideas, practices and 
subjects. For example, existing social relations are being reshaped in the form of new 
socialism or communitarianism based on the western concept of secular yet closed 
associations rather than the ones based on traditional Indian values of family, clan and 
kinship. Citizens are encouraged to be transformed into hyper-consumers in order to be a 
part of an active consumerist society. Modernist spatial ideas are intensified under elite 
citizens’ groups to give way to a sanitized city.  
Civil Society as a Floating Signifier 
As mentioned earlier, civil society discourse sometimes is more successful in 
promoting pro-market ideas than are the discourses of the state and neoliberalism. 
Arnoldi (2009) maintains that in order for an idea to be sellable, there has to be a certain 
level of catchiness. It is also useful for a term to be vague so that it can be attached to 
many different referents. According to Rose (2001), “part of the power of a specific 
discursive formation may rest precisely on the multiplicity of different arguments that can 
be produced in its terms” (158). A universal discourse is able to penetrate the local 
common sense successfully if it is deployed through interpretative repertoires, which are 
“systematically related sets of terms that are often used with stylistic and grammatical 
coherence and often organized around one or more central metaphors. They develop 
historically and make up an important part of the ‘common sense’ of a culture, although 
some are specific to institutional domains” (Potter, 1996, 131 as cited in Rose 2001, 156) 
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The concept of civil society can be connected to almost any issue. Specifically 
listed on the CSS website are education, livelihood, environment, and governance, which 
themselves constitute vague and inclusive referents.  Arnoldi, using Hardt and Negri, 
explains this vagueness in terms of ‘floating signifiers’, which work on the principle of 
inclusion rather than binary exclusions. These floating signifiers can be attached to many 
different referents precisely on account of their vagueness. This is in fact their strength.  
Hegemonic discourses are powerful if they are flexible enough to co-opt whatever issues 
happen to be of pressing importance in public discourse on a day-to-day basis.     
For Kumar, civil society is “a concept rich in historical resonances; a concept 
where a good part of the appeal is the sense of many levels and layers of meaning, 
deposited by successive generations of thinkers. With it, as most of its uses clearly 
testify, we are in the realm of the normative, if not indeed the nostalgic. 'Civil society' 
sounds good; it has a good feel to it; it has the look of a fine old wine, full of depth and 
complexity” (1993, 376). Civil Society forms an interpretative repertoire which is 
regionalizing the universal discourse of neoliberalism. Here the buzz words of civil 
society discourse such as self-help, social capital, decentralization, micro-level planning, 
and participation are the best in generating neoliberal governmentality.  
Conclusion 
There are two things that stand distinctly in the analysis of the critical history of 
civil society. First, every philosopher conceived his notion of civil society at a particular 
time and in a specific climate. For example, the Hellenistic philosophies drew inward 
amidst expansion of the Roman Empire and loss of a feeling of belonging in the polis. 
Medieval philosophies were influenced by the dominance of Christianity while 
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Enlightenment philosophies reflected the expansion of markets. Hence in our current 
study, it is important to contextualize the current use of civil society in the contemporary 
political, economic and social environment. In the last section of this chapter, I have 
attempted to answer how the model of civil society envisaged by CCS reflects on the 
current neoliberal environment. CCS’s interpretations of civil society draw from the 
selective theories of Adam Smith and Richard Plain. All of the other conceptualizations 
of civil society that highlight the importance of state and outlines the dangers of market 
and individualism in civil society are ignored. Secondly, it is clear that different scholars 
have posited civil society and state in various configurations throughout history. Liberal 
thinkers and classical political economists have attributed a degree of autonomy to the 
sphere of civil society while the works of Hegel- Marx-Gramsci (HMG) highlight that the 
two are closely interrelated and analysis of one requires the understanding of the other. 
HMG presented a strong critique of not just the liberal tradition of civil society but via 
that also a critique of the capitalist society inflicted by exploitation, poverty and 
alienation. I will use these theories as the base to analyze the current conditions of the 
marginalized section of Indian society represented by hawkers.  
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Chapter 3: Altering the Climate of Opinion: The Centre for Civil Society as a 
Think Tank 
"We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, 
a deed of courage." —Friedrich . A. Hayek (statement of philosophy, CCS website)
20
 
Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of The Centre for Civil Society (CCS) as 
a think tank. I begin with a brief discussion of how think tanks and NGOs function as 
transnational apparatus of governmentality. Next, I provide my working definition of 
‘think tank’ and explain why they are neglected as central objects of analysis in scholarly 
research, a lacuna that I address. I move on to present a comparative analysis of the rise 
of think tanks in the US and India and while doing so, I introduce to readers different 
models of think tanks that exist in the contemporary world. I conduct a literature review 
and discuss different approaches to studying think tanks that have been developed by 
scholars and explain how CCS may be difficult to analyze using any one of those 
approaches. I also outline my methodology for studying CCS that includes discourse 
analysis and network analysis. In order to show how these methodologies work on think 
tanks, I present two case studies that chart the tactics of CCS to garner the most important 
things for its survival—media and public attention. 
                                                          
20
 http://ccsindia.org/academy/ 
 57 
 
Think Tanks: Transnational Apparatus Of Governmentality 
What are think tanks and why do they form an important site of investigation? To 
scholars studying the spread of hegemonic global capitalism through penetration of 
neoliberal policy changes in different countries, think tanks can provide an important site 
of inquiry. According to Harvey (2005), neoliberalism can be thought of as two distinct 
but overlapping phenomena: a moral-philosophical theory of individual rights with 
principles of liberty and freedom; and a project to strengthen the capitalist elite. The 
philosophical theory is used to rationalize the capitalist agenda but where the agenda 
fails, rhetorical expertise is deployed to justify and obscure the contradictions. Think 
tanks are “shock troops of neoliberalism” (Cahill and Beder 2005, 43) that make 
contradictions fuzzy and the climate of opinion more palatable for policy changes to kick 
in. Sparke (2006) emphasizes that political geography of neoliberalism should investigate 
how the expansion of neoliberalism in macrospaces of governance (such as cities, SEZs, 
countries where structural adjustment strategies have been applied) is connected to its 
development as a practice in microspaces of governmentality (corporations, finance 
centers, think tanks, universities). Firstly, this can be done by analyzing the “globalist 
ideologies that suture together ideas about institutional and individual entrepreneurialism 
with grand vistas of free market led development” (362). Works of “TINA – touts” such 
as Thomas Friedman and Jagdesh Bhagwat, who is an active member of CCS, provide 
valuable sources for such analysis.
21
 Second is to explore the force of TINA discourse in 
action-- charting its emergence and marketing through appeal to common sense, 
exemplified by civil society and empowerment discourse; tracking its spread through 
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 TINA is an abbreviation to “There is no alternative”, a slogan used by Margaret 
Thatcher to emphasize the necessity of free market policy and structural changes.  
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organizations such as think tanks funded by the World Bank and foreign business donors; 
and tracing its impact on local policies. About 75 percent of CCS funding comes from 
foreign contributors. Armed with these funds, CCS invades local policy and advocacy 
networks, thereby representing foreign interests.  
Scholars have talked about how foreign interests easily permeate when state and 
civil society are separate entities. Ferguson (2006) points out the analytic limitation of the 
state-civil society opposition and maintains that this opposition is susceptible to anti-
democratic political and ideological use. The state-civil society opposition often entails 
an understanding of civil society as “sandwiched between the patriarchal family and 
universal state” (Mamdani 1996, 14 as cited in Ferguson 2006, 92). This understanding 
places state above the local and has enabled the nation-state to gain legitimacy through 
what Gupta and Ferguson (2002) term as ‘claims of vertical encompassment’ (982). 
Three analytically distinct ideas of “superior spatial scope; supremacy in the hierarchy of 
power; and superior generality of interest, knowledge and moral purpose” (995) – fuse 
into a single figure, the ‘up there’ state. They challenge this binary of the ‘up there’ state 
versus the ‘local’, ‘community’ and ‘grassroots’(990) by displacing the primacy of the 
nation-state frame of analysis. They ask us to visualize state and society on a horizontal 
instead of vertical level to see how both state and society have been transnationalized. 
This move also helps to focus and understand the “transnational apparatus of 
governmentality” of which NGOs and think tanks form an integral part.  
Retreat of the state in the neoliberal era does not imply that it has ceased to 
function. Scholars have shown that the state is far from being eroded and is in fact 
restructured to play a salient role in disseminating neoliberalism and the globalization of 
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capital (McMichael 1993, Kafkalas 1987, Peck 2004, Ong 2006, Harvey 2006). US-
influenced multilateral international agencies play a key role in opening up countries to 
structural adjustment programs that are initiated through the state. In this case however, it 
is not the state, but the Washington Consensus promoted by the World Bank, IMF and 
US Treasury Department, that is taking up the role of the state in forming certain types of 
discourses and influencing practices. Often labeled as “re-colonization” of previously 
colonialized nations, structural adjustment programs not only manage micro-economic 
relations such as currency-exchange rates but also demand states to curtail social 
expenditures.   
  Though many of the NGOs and think tanks that have come up in past two 
decades identify themselves as part of civil society, they can be understood as extensions 
of multilateral agencies like the IMF and World Bank, and funding agencies like 
European church groups and multinational corporate donors. These funding agencies can 
easily bypass the state and provide funds directly to different NGOs and community 
organizations in the global south. These NGOs often seek to proliferate multi-sectorial 
relationships with both the state and capital investors. For example, they seek funds from 
not just corporate affiliated foundations such as Kellogg and Ford but also multinational 
corporations such as Nike, Cisco and Microsoft (Roberts et al. 2005). 
Scholars have well established the fact that the relationships between NGOs and 
their donor agencies are skewed and it becomes difficult for NGOs to maintain autonomy 
when they are so dependent on donors for funds. Not only do NGOs have to follow the 
managerial style of transnational corporations, scholars maintain that their accountability 
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procedures are distorted toward the needs of donors rather than beneficiaries (Mcllwaine 
1998). Studies have shown that NGOs have “little conceptual understanding of how their 
interventions facilitate the empowerment process in a situation of cultural change” (Desai 
2006, 120). Needless to say, many NGOs, especially the ones that are internationally 
funded, employ a highly western notion of development and participation (Kamat 2003, 
Walker et al. 2007). These transnational NGOs operating under the influence of 
international capital and the logic of economic rationality inhibit grassroots movements 
which are so vital for the development of a counter- hegemonic current in civil society. 
On a closer analysis many of the current NGOs and especially the right wing think-tanks 
such as CCS fall in the category of organic intellectuals of neoliberalism (this obviously 
depends on their objectives, their allocation to transnational donors). These NGOs and 
think-tanks are the key for the smooth expansion of a neoliberal working order in many 
countries. Hence, multilateral financial institutions, neoliberal states and NGOs can be 
understood in terms of transnational apparatus of governmentality.  
Think tanks play an important role in this process as part of what Peet (2002) calls 
the academic-institutional-media (AIM) complex. “The center of persuasion” (54) or 
AIM complex influences local politics and disseminates neo-liberal discourse among the 
masses through policy prescriptions, press releases, popular columns, and commentaries. 
The Gramsci-Foucualdian framework enables us to understand that think tanks are 
actively involved in articulating universal discourses with regional ideas to penetrate the 
common sense. The neo-Gramscians view these hegemonic constellations of neoliberal 
ideas, networks, and institutions as a project of transnational capitalists interests (Gill 
1990). With this understanding, I proceed to study CCS. Here I touch upon the 
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conventional line of inquiry—studying its influence in local and regional policy-making. 
Next, I go beyond the traditional approach to think tank analysis by locating the politics 
of CCS on the local, national as well as global stage. Last, I outline various contradictions 
in CCS ideology and offer a geographical critique of their work on hawkers and vendors.  
What Is A Think Tank?  
There are more than 5,000 research institutes of varying character operating in 
163 countries (McGann 2010). However, in this ‘age of experts’ the significance of these 
intellectual institutions or ‘change agents’ has not yet been captured in the critical 
literature and is largely under-theorized as well as under-investigated empirically (Blank 
2003, Stone 2000 a). This lacuna is noticed in two areas. First, although there has been a 
considerable amount of literature on NGOs in the South, most of the studies on think 
tanks address organizations largely in the United States and Britain and to a smaller 
extent Canada, Western Europe, and Australia.
22
 Secondly, the little attention think tanks 
have garnered has only come from political scientists.
23 
Other social scientists like 
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The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think 
Tanks, New Haven: Yale University Press (1993); Richard Cockett “Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter –Revolution, 1931-1983, Fontana 
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sociologists, anthropologist and geographers have rarely tackled think tanks as research 
subjects. My study attends to both these gaps. My work provides a case study of a 
neoliberal think tank in the global south, specifically India, where global demands and 
regional constraints have crystallized a unique think tank namely CCS.  Secondly, I 
analyze CCS from a geographic point of view by situating it in global politics and 
highlighting spatial contradictions in its engagement with street hawkers.  
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Various reasons can be blamed for the lack of critical attention to these 
organizations among scholars. First is the bias of social scientists against the study of 
think tanks (Rich 2004, Stone 2000a), which may have risen from the difficulty in 
defining and categorizing think tanks. Think tanks are often conflated with or treated as a 
form of pressure group or NGO. While defining a think tank numerous questions need 
answers: are think tanks public or private organizations? Do they work for profit? What 
does one mean by “profit”? In order to qualify as a think tank, does the organization have 
to conduct original research or can it simply disseminate research done by others? How 
much autonomy does an organization have to maintain from the state or corporate 
interests in order to qualify as a think tank? 
 Secondly, the late development and characteristic of these organizations (Stone 
2000a) may also have contributed to the way they eluded scholarly attention. Before the 
mid-1970s, these organizations were “low-profile actors seeking to inform policy in a 
detached non-partisan scholarly fashion” (150). These organizations rarely debated about 
their research or findings in public with one another or with other political actors and 
hence attracted little attention. Lastly, it is challenging to evaluate the role of ideas in 
policy and politics. It is equally difficult to gauge success of think tanks, especially when 
their role is limited to advocacy and setting up a climate of opinion. Hence the attention 
given to think tanks is less than what they deserve.  
A part of the reason for the lack of attention to the think tanks in the countries 
other than the US is the fact that think tanks are believed to be a quintessentially 
American phenomenon. Indeed, the exceptional features of American politics – “the 
 64 
 
constitutional separation of powers, party system historically grounded in electrical and 
political ambitions rather than ideology and a civil service tradition that gives leeway to 
numerous political appointees” ( Denham and Garnett 1998, 4-5; Smith  1993, ix)—are 
characteristic of think tanks.  
Because of the relative anonymity of this breed of intellectual influence in critical 
literature, it is important to first define: what are think tanks; where did they come from; 
what the nature of their work is. The term think tank was a military jargon for a private 
room where invasion plans and strategies were discussed during World War II. From 
there it was borrowed to describe contract research organizations set up by the military in 
the 1950s, such as the RAND corporation. It was only in the 1960s that the term became 
popular to describe a variety of private research organizations (Smith 1993). According 
to Stone (2000a), think tanks are independent (often private) policy research institutes 
with people who focus on a particular policy or a broad policy issues with intent to 
educate and influence policy experts or general public.  
Think Tanks: Comparative Analysis of the Evolution of US and Indian Think 
Tanks    
Many scholars define think tanks as policy research institutes but as Abelson 
(2000) emphasizes, it may be more fruitful to classify them based on their central 
function rather than their institutional characteristics. This is because “like chameleon 
constantly changing their complexion to suit new environments, think tanks have altered 
their behavior to compete in the marketplace of ideas” (2000, 216). He recognizes four 
waves of think tanks in American history with distinct motivations and different 
institutional character and functions: policy research institutions, government contractors, 
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advocacy think tanks, and vanity or legacy based think tanks, which are largely an 
American phenomenon. Abelson says that it is important to understand that one wave of 
think tank has not replaced the older one, in fact all coexist. In the remaining of this 
section, I will explain the characteristics of each type of think tanks and outline their 
different waves in India since the early 20
th
 century. While doing this I will discuss the 
circumstances that gave rise to CCS.  
The first wave of think tanks was characterized by policy research institutions that 
arose in the first decades of 20
th
 century as an outgrowth of progressive era reforms 
emphasizing scientific management (Smith 1993, Abelson 2000). A small group of 
private philanthropists established research institutes to fill the gaps that traditional 
universities focusing solely on teaching could not address. The studies produced by these 
institutes met the highest scholarly standards and often prompted the government to 
assume new social responsibilities. The examples are the Brookings Institution in 1927 
and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in 1919. In India, the British 
established the Societies Registration Act (SRA) in 1860 under which NGOs could 
function as a legal entity. Even today all modern think tanks in India are registered under 
this act. It is hard to ascertain if there were any organizations in India that fit the criteria 
of a think tank before Independence. Sudarshan (2001) argues that there were a few 
organizations during pre-independence times—notably the Gokhale Institute of Politics 
and Economics (1930) in Pune, the Indian Statistical Institute (1932) in Calcutta, and the 
Tata Institute of Social Science (1936) in Mumbai—that deserve to be classified as think 
tanks. She further maintains that a notable feature of Indian think tanks was that they 
were involved in both research and training. All the above mentioned organizations, in 
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fact, worked as proxy universities at the time when institutions of modern higher 
education were limited. This is the reason I would not necessarily call these institutions 
“think tanks”. Perhaps All-India Village Industries Association (AIVIA) fits the bill. 
Mohan Das Karamchand Gandhi helped set up AIVIA (Akhil Bharat Gram Udyog 
Sangh) at Wardha in 1934 under the guidance of J.C. Kumarappa, an economist trained 
from Columbia University in the US. This was a self-acting, autonomous, non-political 
organization, which focused on programs and research to reorganize and reconstruct 
Indian villages. Kumarappa was also the principal preceptor of Gandhian economics and 
is considered the founding father of green thought in India ( Govindu & Malghan 2005). 
He published the monthly Gram Udyog Patrika from 1939 to 1956 from AIVIA’s 
office.
24
 In 1935, at AIVIA, Gandhi initiated a movement called Science for people with 
an advisory board of famous scientist and luminaries such as Rabindranath Tagore, J.C. 
Bose, P.C. Ray, C.V. Raman, San Higginbottom, Robert McCarrison, Vallabhbhai Patel, 
B.C. Roy, S. Subbarao, M.A. Ansari, Rajabally, G.D. Birla and Jamal Mohammed Sahib, 
(Gupta 2002, Reddy 2004). However, due to several complications AIVIA was not able 
to deliver much and was far less influential than what was hoped for when founded (see 
Lindley 2007). Ultimately, the conspicuous absence of effective think tanks before 
independence was because the British economic and political dominance restricted 
organized intellectual activities due to the fear of their subversive characteristics.  
 The second wave of think tanks in the US began with the government contractors 
in post-World War II period. In the climate of the cold war and US hegemony, policy 
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In addition to this Kumarappa designed, organized and wrote up three book-length 
studies of economic conditions in various parts of rural India all based on extensive 
household survey (Lindley 2007).  
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makers actively sorted expert advice from engineers, physicist, biologists, statisticians 
and social scientists to formulate domestic and foreign policy and strategy. For example, 
the Rand Corporation (Research and Development) 1948, a product of the cold war 
period, used system analysis, game theory, and simulation models to serve various state 
and federal departments, specifically the Department of Defense.  
Just as the advent of government contractors in the US was a response to the 
growing pressures of the cold war, around the same time numerous contractor think tanks 
also evolved in newly independent India and played a significant role in the nation-
building process enacted through five-year developmental plans. In his study of different 
types of research institutes, Weiner (1979) notes that after independence, the Indian 
government started opening research institutions within different government and state 
departments that could provide the government with basic quantitative and qualitative 
information. Sudarshan (2001) attributes these to the dearth of policy research coming 
from universities, which were primarily engaged in the “business of teaching and 
research without seeking to play an active role in policy making” (87). The Bureau of 
Economics and Statistics was opened within the Planning Departments of the State 
Governments in early 50s. By the1950s, the Central Government started funding research 
institutes outside the government department and ministries. The first such institute to 
come up on the recommendation of Dean Paul H. Appleby, a Consultant with the Ford 
Foundation, was the Indian Institute of Public Administration (1954). It was inaugurated 
by Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, who chose to be at the helm of the 
institute. Other notable examples are Delhi’s National Council of Applied Economic 
Research (1956), Institute of Economic Growth (1958), and Center for Developing 
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Society (1963). In 1968, the Indian government set up Indian Council of Social Science 
Research (ICSSR) to fund the existing research institutes and help nurture new research 
centers in different states that could assist policy makers in regional issues. A few 
organizations that emerged as a result were the Institute for Social and Economic Change 
(1972) in Bangalore, the Centre for Development Studies (1971) in Trivandrum, and the 
Madras Institute of Development Studies (1971) in Chennai. Up until the 1980s, the task 
of different think tanks and research institutes was to fill the existing gaps in the 
information available to policy makers (Sudarshan 2001). In the 1980s, India moved a 
step closer towards liberalization in macro-economic policy and avenues of foreign 
funding opened up. As the state funds were limited, private and international donors 
stepped in and number of institutes arose that focused on development as the central 
concern and stayed out of advocacy. Notable think tanks of this time were the Indian 
Council for Research on International Economic Relations in Delhi (1981) and the Indira 
Gandhi Institute of Development Research in Mumbai (1986).  
Breaking from the nonpartisan approach of the former think tanks, the third wave 
of think tanks in the US in the 1970s were the advocacy think tanks. Institutes such as the 
Heritage Foundation and Institute of Policy Studies do not adhere to the high standards in 
scholarly inquiry and sophisticated research to serve public policy and instead appear 
more like “interest groups and political action community” (Abelson and Carberry 1998, 
537). According to various scholars (Denham and Garnett 1996, Weaver 1989, Arnold 
2007) such think tanks are more concerned with “influencing the public debate, brokering 
political ideas, and especially with mobilizing public and media support”(Arnoldi 2007 
58). These institutes function as lobby groups and seek to influence the electorate rather 
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than the scholarly community. For this they hire staff based on political affiliation instead 
of academic credentials; produce low quality research for already prescribed audience; 
seek funding from politically motivated donors; and spend time and money to gain access 
in media and policy circles (Arnoldi 2007, Denham and Garnett 1996, Stone 2003).  
In India think tanks at different times have engaged in advocacy on numerous 
issues. For example, the International Institute for Population Sciences in Mumbai (1956) 
advocates raising the “positive value of demography and population sciences as a 
developmental tool among political representatives and other strata of society” (IIPS 
2010, “About Us”).
25
 The Indian Institute of Foreign Trade in Delhi (1963) advocating 
for foreign trade, National Institute of Urban Affairs (1976) seeking improvement in 
urban infrastructure and Centre for Women’s Development Studies (1980) advocating 
gender equality are few other examples. In the 90s educated Indians with elite 
backgrounds started joining think tanks with the intent to influence policy and public 
opinion. With increasing globalization and India’s formal entry into IMF-led 
liberalization changes, themes such as liberalization, its progression in various sectors 
and its effect on the general population, growing urban crisis in the cities, defense 
strategy, and diplomacy started being tackled by new think tanks that sought funding 
from government, private donors and big corporations from home and abroad and 
international agencies. For example, the Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations (ICRIER) in Delhi (1981) conducted research and advocacy on trade 
liberalization; Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations in Mumbai (2009) 
brought corporations and other prominent people to engage in foreign policy discussions. 
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 http://www.iipsindia.org/about.htm  
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However, the advocacy think tanks that dotted the US landscape in 1960s and 70s had not 
yet found expression in India.  
In January of 1991, India was running an account deficit of $10 billion. The IMF 
had loaned $1.8 billion that did not resolve the problem and the reserves were down to 
two weeks’ worth of imports. With its credibility low, financial borrowing was out of 
question. The inflation surged to an annual rate of 13 percent with minimal inflow of 
foreign currency from non-resident Indians. That is when India opened to the era of 
market liberalization under the leadership of Narasimah Rao and then Finance Minister 
Manmohan Singh. However, scholars maintain that over the last decade, neoliberal 
changes have been very slow due to the local resistance by the general public and 
politicians alike. India’s slow progress on the neoliberal route could be attributed to 
popular democracy (Chibber and Eldersveld 2003) and limited popular support (Yadav 
1996). Since then, lobbying by an extensive international network –comprised of 
foundations, institutes, research centers, publications, scholars and writers--has sought to 
normalize the neoliberal reforms. One of these constituents, the think tank CCS, is the 
first of its kind to openly embrace market principles and disseminate neoliberal ideas and 
anti-state sentiments through various channels. They do this in a slightly different way 
than their US counterparts. Operating in a popular democracy where a majority of people 
are poor and have voting rights, CCS positions its arguments as pro-poor and pro-
marginalized, and then proposes market-based solutions. In the next section I will briefly 
discuss different approaches that are used to study think tanks. These approaches have 
framed my research questions as well as methodology.  
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Approaches to Study CCS 
According to Abelson (2002) scholars have used three different conceptual 
frameworks to study think tanks. First, they regard think tanks as elite organizations that 
maintain close ties with policymakers to forward their or their sponsors’ agendas. This 
approach helps to discover latent, close ties between the members of think tanks and 
powerful people in business and government. Also, by analyzing boards of directors at 
different times, scholars can interpret why some institutions enjoy more funds or media 
coverage than others. However this approach faces many disadvantages. This conceptual 
framework is well-suited to investigating big think tanks like the Brookings Institution 
and RAND, but many small think tanks do not necessarily represent elite organizations. 
For example, there are many left-leaning think tanks in Washington DC such as the 
Institute for Policy Studies that do not necessarily represent elite interests and work with 
pro-poor agenda. Despite the limitations of this approach, it will be useful for studying 
the impact of CCS in policy circles and success in gathering funds from donors. The CCS 
Board of Trustees and Board of Advisors are filled with high profile names from media 
and corporate worlds, industries, law and private equity firms. These ‘learned 
practitioners’ not only provide ‘institutional access routes’ (explained later in the chapter) 
into various political organizations and government departments, they also act as 
spokespersons in an already staged public theater. For example, when the founder of 
CCS, Parth Shah, moved to India to set up the think tank, he faced the challenges of 
finding a temporary place to live in crowded Delhi, gaining access to a temporary office 
to start the organization, and building credibility to attract funds. Ashok Desai, a famous 
University of Cambridge educated economist, who in 1991 helped then finance minister 
(now Prime Minister as of 2013) Manmohan Singh to kick start market reforms, provided 
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Shah his own apartment to make a home office. Shah describes the initial months of the 
think tank: 
Before and immediately after the formal launch of CCS, our primary focus 
was on identifying individuals who were classical liberal in approach, and respected 
and well known in their areas of expertise. Even though the think tank may be a new 
concept, there are usually several individuals in various walks of life who sympathize 
with classical liberal ideas and policies. We brought them together and created a 
Board of Scholars. Listing the names of these scholars on the letterhead opened many 
doors, provided credibility, and gave us a solid standing in the public arena. They also 
became our advocates when engaging with government bodies, the media and donors 
(Parth Shah 2008). 
 
The second approach scholars use while studying think tanks comes from the 
pluralist tradition, where think tanks are considered as one of the many groups--such as 
trade unions, environmental organizations-- competing in the marketplace of ideas to 
attract attention from political leaders. One advantage of this approach is that it makes 
researchers acknowledge that in spite of the increased visibility of think tanks in policy 
circles and debates, they are just one in many groups that compete for power and 
influence. Also, think tanks sometimes employ strategies similar to other non-
governmental and grass root organizations to gain attention in a market place of ideas. 
This framework provides insights that the think tanks themselves sometimes ignore.  For 
example, CCS started clearly as an advocacy think tank; they openly accepted that they 
simply want to influence ideas and opinions of the people. Ram maintained that for a 
long time, CCS’s motto was “social change through public policies.” But Parth Shah 
admitted that this model was not working in India as both the policy makers and the 
donors wanted to be associated with an organization that demonstrated that the ideas 
could work on the ground-- something NGOs such as Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) and National Association of Street Vendors in India (NASVI) were 
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doing in the case of street hawkers. This constant comparison with NGOs is not 
surprising as according to a government estimate, India had about 3.3 million NGOs 
in 2009. That is one NGO for approximately every 400 people, and many times the 
number of primary schools and primary health centers in India (Shukla 2010). While 
talking about CCS’ initially unsuccessful efforts of pitching different liberal policy ideas 
to policy leaders, Shah maintained that “they (leaders) liked the idea and said that ‘it 
makes sense but we don’t see how it will work on the ground’”. Shah explained that in 
order to gain credibility, “we do things that many US think-tanks may not do. We are not 
just a think-tank that does research on policy issues, brings out publications and seminars, 
we do research, we do advocacy, we run campaigns, we focus on one or two issue 
campaigns like livelihood campaigns, school choice campaigns and we run pilot projects. 
We have even gone beyond that, we help government, help them establish schemes. You 
have to respond to your constraints, to your customers” (2010).  Hence, scholars studying 
think tanks can use this approach to broaden their field of inquiry to analyze complexities 
and contradictions between ideas and practice. For my research on street venders this 
approach enables me to identify the internal politics between different actors-- think 
tanks, NGOs, hawkers associations, resident’s and trader associations. Also, as I will 
discuss later, analyzing the work of CCS on the ground with other NGOs, helps me 
identify various contradictions between their theory and actual practices. 
Even though the pluralist approach is useful, it also suffers from some 
disadvantages. As it dispels the overhyped importance of the think tank in policy debate, 
it does not acknowledge that many think tanks are by their very nature associated with 
intellectual elites and are indeed in a better position to influence the policy debate than 
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NGOs that more often work with marginalized people on the ground. For example, CCS 
tactics to organize and take credit for arranging the executive conference regarding 
implementation of NPSVI in Jaipur were clearly more efficient than those of its 
counterparts like NASVI. NASVI’s coordinator for organizing the conference in Jaipur 
told me:  
I did all the work, met with several hawker’s union heads to arrange the 
conference, took them to the state departments etc, but the final letter from the 
government that was sent to various departments urging planning executives to 
participate in the conference only mentioned CCS as the organizer. My boss shouted 
at me when we saw that our name was not on the letter. But what can I do? This is a 
perfect example where someone reaps the fruits of someone else’s hard work because 
they are at the right place at the right time; they have connections with big people 
(NASVI Staff 2010). 
 
Think tanks that work to influence the climate of opinion through advocacy work 
may not be properly analyzed with this approach as they engage in a war of ideas that 
many NGOs do not. Clearly, this approach is useful only when it is integrated with 
others. 
The third approach is the institutional approach and can also be categorized into 
three subsets. First is the historical approach that focuses on the evaluation of a specific 
think tank or changing role of a think tank in a particular country. The main disadvantage 
of this approach is that it doesn’t provide data to support or deny the claims of any 
specific think tank that it has played a significant role in a particular policy. The second 
institutional approach is that of epistemic or political community, in which the think 
tanks consist of elite experts and organizations and are invited to participate in policy 
discussions with government decision makers. At the beginning, this approach indeed 
appeared helpful to study CCS as its members attend many policy discussions. However 
during my field work on CCS’s street hawking operations, I realized that many of these 
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policy discussions with the government officials were in fact called for and organized by 
CCS itself.  For example, in the Jaipur Conference that I discuss in detail in Chapter 7, 
CCS and NASVI invited other NGOs as well as a few hawkers to discuss implementation 
of NPSV with government officials. In some cases, many campaigns that CCS conducts 
are anti-government in nature and do not particularly involve working with the 
government. For example, my first acquaintance with CCS was during a conference 
called “Delhi Citizens Critique of the City Development Plan,” where participants 
discussed issues such as slums, transportation, water, sanitation, and housing in the 
proposed Master Plan of Delhi 2021. Although the title suggested that it was Delhi 
government’s initiative to hear the concerns of the citizens, the conference was organized 
solely by CCS and the participants were not common citizens, but intellectual elites from 
different organizations that formed part of CCS networks. Although the list of 
participants was narrow, there was a huge audience (including myself), perhaps because 
of the popularity the topic and venue (India Habitat Center). One attendant asked the 
head chair of all the discussion panels Dr Shreekank Gupta, who is a professor at Delhi 
School of Economics and serves in the board of scholars of CCS, why officials of the city 
development plan were not invited. To this he replied “We wanted to keep this a civil 
society event.” He meant that at this point they were trying to avoid any discussions with 
the state or the government officials.  So in this case we see that the epistemic community 
approach is not best suited for the think tanks that seek to change the climate of opinion 
and is relevant for the ones that actively participate in policy debates with government 
officials. Another problem (methodological in nature) with using this approach is that 
when CCS participates in policy discussions, it uses the networks that it has formed with 
 76 
 
other NGOs or experts to raise an issue. For example, in the Jaipur discussion organized 
by CCS, members of at least four other NGOs (including SEWA, NASVI, Nidan) were 
debating with government officials on the issues. As Abelson writes: “ this approach may 
tell us who is sitting at the table when key issues are being discussed, but it does not 
profess to tell us whose voices have struck a responsive chord with those in a position to 
influence policy decisions” (2002, 55). Another issue with this approach is that some 
intellectual elites—including many who are associated with CCS—are also part of many 
different networks such as that of media, academic institutions or corporations and also 
other think tanks. Hence it becomes hard to distinguish which particular position or 
network is providing them more authority to leverage their ideas in a debate. 
Abelson calls his third institutional approach the policy cycle approach and 
maintains that like NGOs, think tanks vary in size, resources and priorities. Thus, the best 
way to study them would be to analyze their efforts in different stages of public policy. 
After all “not all organizations have the desire or the necessary resources to participate at 
each stage of policy cycle” (2002, 57).  
I believe that both Abelson’s elite institution and pluralist approaches provide 
some insights to the study of think tanks, but one should use caution not to impulsively 
label think tanks as either elite or NGO-like organizations as if the two are mutually 
exclusive. Aided by insights from all of the above approaches, the policy cycle approach 
provides the best framework to investigate CCS as a think tank. This approach enables 
me to identify climate of opinion as a part of the policy cycle. The data set used to 
evaluate the success of CCS then can be composed of tangible as well as intangible 
performance indicators. For example, although CCS is not able to influence many 
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policies directly, it is indirectly creating a climate in which policy changes can be pushed 
or readily accepted. The indicators to look for are not just successful media citations, but 
also presentations before government officials, designing and offering workshops to 
further their ideology. According to Stone (2000a), if a think tank wants to impact long 
term government thinking, it may invite politicians and bureaucrats to attend seminars 
rather than reach them through magazines and scholarly research papers. The think tank 
will place higher value on influencing media if it wants to frame the parameters of the 
policy debate.  
These above approaches have helped me to understand the larger political 
economy in which CCS functions. The first part of my analysis of CCS looks into the 
political economy of think tanks while in the second half I do an in-depth analysis of 
CCS discourse on hawkers. While the first part adds to the existing literature on the new 
right think tanks, the second part develops a new line of inquiry of think tanks by 
critically challenging their actual work and ideas.  
Methodology To Study CCS 
While studying CCS, I use discourse analysis to analyze and unravel the process 
through which the global discourse of neoliberalism hegemonizes and articulates with the 
local discourse of civil society. This process cannot be studied in isolation from the 
political-economy of ideas. The credibility of an idea in the market determines its 
potential value and use for different actors (like politicians) and therefore plays a 
significant role in its dissemination in the wider society through policies. Along with 
rhetorical use of language, a set of mutually enforcing networks are important in 
providing credibility to ideas. In order to study the political economy of an idea, I find 
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both discourse analysis and network analysis very helpful. I spoke with two main 
members of CCS during my fieldwork. Parth Shah is the President of CCS, with whom I 
conducted a semi-structured interview that lasted for about 2 hours in their Delhi office. 
The National Coordinator of Jeevika Champaign, whom I call Ram (name changed), had 
worked for CCS for three years as a coordinator to the Youth Program and was the most 
vital subject of my research. After completing a Masters in Social Work, Ram had joined 
CCS and later with the help of Parth Shah went to Canada to get a degree in Think Tank 
MBA from Atlas Economic Research Foundation. During the time of fieldwork, he 
moved to Jaipur to overlook the Jeevika (livelihood) Champaign for the hawkers. Ram, 
after working for CCS for many years came to firmly believe that neoliberal ideas 
provide the only solution to the complex problems that India faces. This he often 
explained in simple sentences and by giving small examples. When I asked why CCS 
picked Jaipur for their hawkers’ project, he explained that their main donor had agreed to 
fund CCS only on the condition that they would set up an office in Jaipur and work in 
partnership with other NGOs that were already working with hawkers. So he had moved 
to Jaipur to figure out in what way the hawkers could be helped.  
England (2002) maintains that gaining access to elites is hard work. But in the 
case of CCS which is an advocacy think tank, more attention means more success, and 
they invite researchers’ attention. Indeed, Shah was pleased to know that a graduate 
student from a US university was interested in writing about their work and interactions 
with the street hawkers. However, I believe that if I had wanted to investigate instead 
some of their other projects, like the controversial School Voucher Campaign, my 
research position and background might have invited more scrutiny and skepticism. But 
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the current work of CCS on street hawkers echoed with many other NGOs and academic 
scholars who were pushing for implementation of NPSV; hence, Shah was probably 
happy that instead of NASVI or SEWA, I chose CCS as my site of inquiry.  
But just because I was welcomed by my research subjects does not mean that my 
actual fieldwork was not ridden with anxieties. On the one hand, my preliminary field 
work in 2008 was a guiltless exercise as I did not realize at the time that CCS was a free 
market think tank. I approached it just like any other research institute and made use of 
their library and reading room to study their work on street hawkers. On the other hand 
my main fieldwork that ran from 2010 to 2011, made me quite nervous because of my 
negative position on the think tank. I felt like an exploiter, albeit an exploiter of the elite 
exploiter. While I spent time with Ram, I was always conscious that the result of my 
research would cast him in a bad light. I also occasionally anticipated CCS’ fierce 
response if they discovered my stance towards their activist work. For that reason, I self-
censored and decided to not ask things that I thought they would not want me to know, 
such as information about funding of the street hawkers project, the demands of the 
funders, and how CCS worked to get that funding. I planned to simply accompany Ram 
during his interactions with street hawkers and do a participant observation. I did ask 
some general questions about what he thought about certain issues, but none of the 
questions required dispensing some hidden or private information. Most of the quotes in 
the dissertation came from group discussions that involved hawkers from Vidhyadhar 
Nagar mandi, members of other NGOs or from the Jaipur conference which was open for 
public.  
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Discourse Analysis  
Discourse can be thought of as a socially constructed set of ideas, or a group of 
statements, that frames our understanding about something. Fairclough (2003) explains 
discourse as “an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other 
elements” ( 3). According to Peet (2002) discourses are symbolic formations that result 
from collective interpretations of historical experience. Rose (2001) maintains that 
“discursive formation is the way meanings are connected together in a particular 
discourse” (137). For Foucault it is a regularity within the systems of dispersions between 
different statements. The rules that govern the dispersion (or regularity between the 
objects, types of statements, concepts or thematic choices) are the rules of formation; that 
of “coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance” (1972, 37-38).  
There are various adaptations of discourse analysis but broadly they can be 
categorized into two mutually overlapping but somewhat different methodological 
emphases (Fairclough 2003, Lees 2004, Rose 2000, Van Dijk 1997). Rose (2003) calls 
them discourse analysis I and II. Discourse analysis I pays close attention to the text and 
images. This kind of analysis is more linguistic and visual, which directs greater attention 
to the structure of the statement. This discourse analysis is more “concerned with 
discourse, discursive formations, and their productivity” (140). Discourse analysis II, a 
methodology more “left implicit” pays attention to the “practices of institutions” and 
takes our attention to issues related to power/knowledge, regimes of truth, institutions and 
technology. Here discourse is synonymous to the ideology itself, it attempts “to conceal 
the power of the vested interests and to induce the consent of the dominated to their own 
domination” (Lees 2004, 102).  Fairclough writes that even though social scientists tend 
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to ignore the first method, there should not be any ‘either/or’ and scientists should try to 
connect these two in their analyses (2003, 3).  
This separation assists to distinguish ways in which I approach both my 
methodological and theoretical argument. Discourse analysis I helps as a methodology to 
do what Foucault asks: disturb the tranquility of the pre-existing categories in the texts 
(1972, 25). For me, these texts are CCS web resources, media coverage, and publications 
by the occasional contributors to CCS. The CCS publication Law liberty and Livelihood 
proved to be the most important text for my project and was analyzed through discourse 
analysis I. Interviews conducted with two CCS members and quotes from two hawker’s 
conferences were also analyzed using this methodology. Discourse analysis II, on the 
other hand, assists in understanding the broader neoliberal changes associated with the 
rise of NGOs, community organizations, hyper-consumerist spaces such as malls, and 
other institutional practices that initiate neoliberal subjection.  
Discourse analysis as a methodology to study CCS  
According to Tonkiss (1998) in discourse analysis “language is viewed as the 
topic of research… rather than gathering accounts or text so as to gain access to people’s 
views and attitudes, or to find out what happened at a particular event, the discourse 
analyst is interested in how people use language to construct their accounts of social 
world” (Tonkiss, 1998, 247-8). Language is considered a social practice that orders and 
shapes people’s identities and their relation to things. Fairclough (2003) maintains that 
textual analysis helps in social analysis where the language or texts are evaluated on the 
basis of their effects on power relations. This method is insightful as it allows me to pay 
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attention towards the choice of words used to convey a particular idea. For example, CCS 
builds a case that presents external regulation of the state as undesirable. If the state 
regulates at all, it should do so based on economic rationality. This idea is communicated 
to the people in the form of a set of discourses selecting particular words like civil 
society, empowerment, liberty, entrepreneurs and self-regulation. This discourse subjects 
consumers of CCS’ ideas as agents with economic rationality. I have already explained 
this concept at length in chapter two.  
Finding the sources to analyze discourse is not difficult, but does require an open 
eye. Fairclough (2003) maintains that while doing textual analysis, not only are written 
and printed text useful, but also the transcripts of conversations and interviews, 
webpages, visual image and sound effects can provide important material for analysis. 
Depending on the project, there can be large variety of sources such as government 
documents, newspaper articles, political speeches, parliamentary debates, personal 
accounts, advocacy pamphlets, and interviews. At the collection stage, Tonkiss (1998) 
maintains that the richness of the textual data matters more than the actual quantity of the 
data. The flexibility in terms of data collection in discourse analysis encouraged me to 
access multiple sources that were listed on the CCS website.  In order to conduct 
discourse analysis of CCS, I looked at :  A) the content and language of posts on the 
website and their printed publications such as Law Liberty and Livelihood: Making a 
living on the streets, and Ward Power: Reforms in Urban Governance  ;B) the 
organization and layout of the CCS website, identification of contributors in its different 
categories, and their situation in terms of intellectual and material affiliations; C) the 
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public image and interactions of CCS in the media; and  D) CCS’s quotes during 
conferences and workshops on street hawking. 
Rose (2001) maintains that sometimes while conducting initial discourse analysis, 
the coding process and content analysis can be helpful to identify the tone of statements. 
According to Tonkiss (1998) even though the coding process involved in discourse 
analysis is similar to qualitative interviewing, the way data is handled in the former is 
different. It involves a “process of shifting, comparing and contrasting the different ways 
in which these themes emerge within the data” (255). This is fitting with Foucault’s 
assertion to let go of conventional categories, “disturb the tranquility” and look for the 
relation between the different statements in a new way while analyzing discourse. By this 
he means that we should forgo “first, the quest for a secret origin behind the discourse, 
and second, the search to identify a deeper and hidden meaning behind the ‘already said’” 
(25). This does not mean that we should forsake the old categories, but rather they should 
be kept in suspension for some time. The point is that we should be able to identify the 
rules of dispersion between different statements. 
Coding and content analysis during preliminary fieldwork in the pre-proposal 
phase framed my research project in unexpected ways. During the initial phase CCS’s 
campaign for street hawkers was intriguing to me for its altruistic tones. Allured by the 
‘civil society as panacea’ maxim, I set out to investigate the role of think tanks as agents 
of civil society to help fight the battle of the deprived. Weeks passed as I followed their 
advocacy work through meetings and conferences that they had arranged. I visited their 
office where they happily offered me some of their publications and directed me to their 
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website which had a copious supply of information. After conducting a visual content 
analysis of their website and coding their various publications, a different theme surfaced. 
Numerous articles on vastly different subjects such as hawking, forest conservation, 
education, wildlife, had the same common theme in the concluding paragraphs-- 
dissatisfaction with the state and showcase of “free market” was the panacea to all the 
problems. Words such as competition, market, liberty, freedom and individual rights 
came up several times. Also, the phrase civil society was always linked to individual 
rights, free market, entrepreneurship, education, etc in such a way that it directed 
attention to state inefficiencies and corruption. 
 Since discourse is socially produced and it is concerned with social modalities of 
the text (Tonkiss 1998, Rose 2000), there is a special need to look at “strategies of 
persuasion” while analyzing such texts. This takes us to the matters of the power of truth. 
A researcher must pay attention to how certain ideas are made to look true. What is it that 
is providing credibility? Tonkiss maintains that one way to find this answer is to pay 
attention to variations in the text. Paying attention to difference in the accounts points to 
the work that is done to weld things together so that they appear smooth (see case study 
B). 
This aspect of discourse analysis also gives flexibility to analyze the layout and 
organization of the CCS website to see what and who (scholars) is included where and 
what are the variations between different categories. Then with the help of network 
analysis, one can determine the reason behind the organization of the website in such a 
fashion (see case study A).  
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According to Foucault, discursive formations are not coherent and hence it is 
important to pay attention to “complexity and contradictions” (Rose 2001, 155). Potter 
(1996) uses the term interpretative repertoire, for something like mini discourses which 
have evolved over history and reside on the level of our “common sense”. With an 
understanding of Gramsci’s idea of common sense and hegemonic discourse, I believe 
that the persuasive hegemonic discourses are the ones that are able to penetrate our 
common sense and make us believe in something that is mediated as natural and in tune 
with our culture. Hence, the interpretative repertoires are local and specific in nature 
where universal discourses get coated with regional understanding (I have discussed in 
chapter 2 how the term civil society is more effective in dissemination neoliberal ideas in 
India than the state and the discourse of free market itself). In a similar vein, Tonkiss 
(1998) maintains that another crucial component of discourse analysis is attending to 
silence. This involves paying attention to gaps and silences and letting our thoughts run 
to the alternative accounts that have not been mentioned or are excluded from the text.  
Network Analysis as a methodology to study Think Tanks 
It is important to be mindful of networks, partnerships and alliances, both vertical 
and horizontal, in the terrain of global hegemonic politics. In methodology, network 
analysis is a subset of discourse analysis that examines the relational embeddedness of 
the speakers. A network can be thought of as consisting of nodes, which are subject 
positions linked to each other through ties such as ideology, vision or funds. People can 
occupy many subject positions in different networks and their different subject positions 
can help them enhance the capacity of all their networks. For this reason, I use network 
analysis, which includes assessment of material, social and intellectual connections of the 
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key actors involved in the functioning of CCS. Fox (1993), using an integrative 
approach
26
 to study state and civil society, provides an excellent framework to analyze 
networks. Institutional access routes are “structurally selective filters in the state 
apparatus that make some institutions especially vulnerable to the concerns of particular 
societal actors” (39). The basic premise of this concept is that various non-state actors 
can get access to different agencies by means such as funds, relationships, and 
ideological associations. While keeping this in mind, it is easy to pay attention to the 
political and social affiliations of CCS and the help they receive from those associations 
to access different state departments and political organizations. Policy currents are the 
coalitions between state and social actors, which become political and ideological bridges 
that run between state and society. These are linked through institutional access routes. 
The different political currents running through the state and society may also form 
objective alliances with each other or individual agents to influence the state. This idea is 
                                                          
26
 For Fox, it is insufficient to describe the state’s power in terms of one way capacity. 
States action is a result of reciprocal interaction with society and therefore the unit of 
analysis of the state needs to be changed to “actors.”  State organizations comprise a 
range of actors with different interests. These state actors form relationships with other 
actors in order to pursue their goals: “Mobilizations provoke counter mobilizations 
among both state and social, and the way these processes unfold are not predetermined by 
a static initial distribution of power resources” (23). State’s actors are motivated by 
varying combinations of goals, for example national interest, rent-seeking, subaltern 
interests. Similarly, for Fox, civil society is not a residual category outside state. Social 
actors influence state in two ways, first they pressure the state for reforms, and second 
their response to the reforms determines the success of the reforms. Collective actions by 
a social group demands two things: “the perception of shared interests or identity 
(represented by class, race, community, gender etc) and the opportunity to act as a 
group.” Collective action does not necessarily mean mass defiance but passive resistance 
and hidden nonconformity also forms a part of collective action (25). When social action 
regularly interacts with the state, whether through defiance or negotiations, they are 
necessarily affected by such interactions. The identities might not change, but the 
negotiations may change them as actors. Social actors are shaped by 1) institutional 
structure of state 2) regime governing electoral politics 3) electoral politics 4) diffuse foot 
dragging 5) mass direct action 6) armed struggle 7) representative leader 
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particularly useful to understand hegemonic politics discussed in chapter two. According 
to Fox, different policy currents in the objective alliance may be each other’s enemy but 
since they may gain from each other’s victory, they join hands. Both institutional access 
routes and policy currents can be local as well as global in nature and hence international 
strategies need special attention when studying a policy change. According to Garth and 
Dezalay (2002) the concept of “international strategies” requires us to study the 
relationship between global influences and state transformations. It refers to the ways in 
which “national actors seek to use foreign capital, such as resources, degrees, contacts, 
legitimacy, and expertise …to build their power at home” (7). The authors maintain that 
national actors build their influences based on competing forms and technologies, which 
are available to them through international capital. This happened in Chile when the 
Pinochet regime came to power with the help of the Chicago boys and also later when 
they were discredited based on international human rights laws. International strategies 
are more often learned strategies. Learned practitioners include not just academic 
scholars but also lawyers, consultants, economists and public administrators. Since 
“learned practitioners play a major role in international transformations”, think tanks and 
independent research institutes need to be part of any analysis of state transformations. 
While analyzing international strategies, one should be wary of the risk of 
decontextualizing international strategies and not paying attention to the “national field of 
power in which they are embedded” (8).  
In order to conduct discourse analysis of networks I find the method of relational 
biography, like the one used by Dezalay and Garth (2002) very helpful. This method 
involves lengthy personal interviews. For my project it assists in conducting network 
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analysis, which includes assessment of the material and intellectual connections of the 
key actors involved in the functioning of CCS. Network analysis helps in identifying the 
AIM complexes, the import and export of ideas as well as funds at various scales. 
According to Dezaly and Garth, “this method helps to overcome the artificial 
segmentation that prevents an understanding of relationships and influences that cut 
across categories and institutions” ( 9). In an attempt to bypass the conspicuous unities, 
this methodology assists in identifying the regularity within systems of dispersion. 
Dezaly and Garth maintain that biographies link categories that have been constructed, in 
part, to hide connections. Using this method it is easy to ascertain how various agents 
mutually reinforce each other’s legitimacy. 
 Interviewing elites such as scholars, however, involves certain difficulties of 
gaining access and attaining information about the personal lives of the subjects. England 
(2002) maintains that as a researcher she has to practice ‘shameless eclecticism’ or 
‘methodological opportunism’ to penetrate this usually inaccessible circle of elites. Some 
scholars working with elites have found that although elite institutes are inaccessible and 
elites are too often elusive, there is usually a large amount of data with which to verify 
statements and triangulate findings (Herod 1999, Cochrane 1998). CCS has a very 
explicit website with publications and biographies of the elite contributors that I used 
frequently.  
Center for Civil Society: Analysis  
Neo-liberal think tanks form the organizational backbone of the new right or 
radical neoliberal movement. Scholars have tracked and accounted for the spread of these 
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neoliberal ideas through the networks of right wing think tanks and associations such as 
the Mont Pelerin Society and the Economics Department at the University of Chicago 
(Bourdie and Wacquant 1999, Cockett 1995). The Center for Civil Society is perhaps one 
of the first few advocacy think tanks in India that openly admits to free market ideologies 
and actively pursues liberal policy changes. But, unlike other liberal think tanks around 
the world, CCS takes a slightly different approach- it first champions for the poor and 
marginalized and then moves on to discuss market-based solutions. During an interview, 
Parth Shah said that this approach highlights “the human face of liberalism” (2010). 
While blaming the State for the hardships faced by the poor, CCS does not shy away 
from taking a pro-rich approach. In their publication Law Liberty and Livelihood, Shah 
and Mandava (2005) maintain that “the reason for the plight of the poor is often depicted 
as exploitation by the rich or callous… (this) is more of a mythology or folklore” (19). 
Dr Parth Shah, a US trained economist, set up CCS in 1996. One of his associates 
recounted a rather quixotic tale of the circumstances that made Shah move to India to set 
up the think tank. Sometime in 1995 or 6, Shah met with a serious accident. At that time 
he promised himself that if he survived the injuries, he would quit his job and go back to 
India to do something for the betterment of his country.  
Shah writes: 
[I]nitially, I wanted to start a think tank soon after I completed my PhD at 
Auburn University. I visited India in the late 1980s and met a large number of people, 
but the level of support was lukewarm. I realized that I needed to learn the roots of 
the think tank trade and, more importantly, save enough money to support my 
personal expenses for at least three years. While studying economics at Auburn 
University, I learned a great deal, first hand, by working at the Mises Institute on the 
campus. Later, while teaching at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, I was 
fortunate enough to be able to attend several excellent workshops hosted by the Atlas 
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Economic Research Foundation
27 
and I was inspired by Leonard Liggio
28
 and Alex 
Chafuen. I was encouraged by the network of like-minded people across the world 
and by the work of institutes such as the Cato institute (Washington DC)
29
, the 
Institute for Human Studies (Arlington, Virginia), the Foundation for Economic 
Education (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York), the Heritage foundation (Washington 
DC) and the Mackinac Center for Public Policy (Midland, Michigan). The key person 
who got me to buy my one-way ticket to India, however, was David Kennedy of the 
Earhart Foundation when he promised to support my institute during its initial years 
(Shah 2008). 
 
In this conversation, Shah names numerous famous individuals who propagate 
neoliberal and free market idea. Shah’s academic and personal connections therefore 
were important for the CCS to start working as a think tank. Not only has Shah taken 
advantage of the international strategies to get support and recognition, over the last 
decade Shah has also been able to identify institutional access routes in various state and 
central departments, and political organizations.  
Organization of CCS website: Case Study A  
The political economy of ideas and think tanks are as important as the ideological 
hegemony of which they are a part. This section pays attention to the political economy 
of the think tank by conducting both network and discourse analysis. Think tanks are a 
useful application for network analysis, as they usually provide lists of their personnel 
and records about their financial contributors, author attributions, etc. on their websites. 
An important first step in web-based think tank analysis is to track down institutional and 
financial affiliations. More than 75 percent of the funding for CCS comes from 
                                                          
27
 Atlas Economic Research foundation is a US based nonprofit organization that 
supports and strengthens about 400 free market think tanks around the globe. 
28
 Leonard Liggio is a classical liberal scholar, professor of law at George Mason 
University and is also the vise- president of Atlas Economic Research Foundation. Atlas 
Economic Research Foundation is a non-profit that has connected a global network of 
400 free market research organizations around the world. 
29
 Ceto institute is a free market think-tank based out of Washington DC. 
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international donors, the names of whom are not mentioned in the audit records, 
unfortunately.  
In the United States, many NGOs and think tanks trace their funding back to the 
Ford Foundation. Historically, funders like the Ford Foundation have been known to be 
called upon by the CIA to wage cold war on cultural fronts in many countries. Anti-left 
intellectuals were specifically recruited to dispel the communist threat. In India, Nehru 
solicited the support of the Ford Foundation to co-opt communist led agrarian struggle 
through community development projects. Since the mid1980s in India, the international 
funding for NGOs has increased 20 times and since then the registered NGOs have also 
increased by 250 percent (Biswas 2006).  
Think tanks are often funded by grants from larger institutes that form a part of 
corporate philanthropy. It is no surprise that these institutions adhere to a model of 
development influenced by the west and dream of a western kind of utopia by imposing 
rational solutions. Part of the funding for CCS can be traced back to two such 
philanthropic institutions --Sir Ratan Tata Trust (SRTT) and Sir Dorabji Tata trust 
(SDTT), both associated with the key industrial groups in India. SRTT was set up in 1919 
to help usher India into the industrial revolution that Europe had already witnessed.  
Affiliations that cross institutional lines can often be discerned by looking at the 
overlap of personnel. One can seek answers to questions such as: are many of the 
researchers affiliated with a particular university; are some of them former World Bank 
employees; or did they all go to the same business school? These are ways to attain 
important information about the intellectual and financial affiliation of the think tanks. If 
a statement or a publication on the website has a name of the author, it is easy find 
 92 
 
something about the speaker’s network position by looking at biographical sketches often 
included on the think tank web sites. With the help of biographical sketch we can also 
determine the institutional access routes of the members within different state 
organizations and various international strategies that they employ. 
Here I have used the method of discourse analysis and network analysis to 
critically examine the divisions and the layout of the CCS website. For example, there are 
separate sections for research and commentaries on CCS website. Why has this 
separation been created? One of the first names that come up during the initial analysis of 
the commentary section is Gurcharan Das, who is a famous writer, a venture capitalist, 
and also consultant to industry as well as the government of India. A Harvard MBA 
alumni, he served as CEO of Procter & Gamble, India, and took an early retirement to 
become a full time writer. In his book India Unbound, Das claims that the period after 
1991, or post liberalization era is the golden period in India’s 200 year history. This book 
has made him a household name in India. Das is a well- connected personality in terms of 
access to the media as well as the industry. But for CCS he is more of a symbolic than 
social and scholarly capital. A closer look at his written contributions for the CCS 
website shows that although he served in the board of directors at one time, he no longer 
writes articles for the think tank specifically. But his articles that are written elsewhere 
such as daily newspapers are picked up and posted on CCS’s website under the 
commentary section. In order to gain legitimacy and readability, which is often linked 
with sell-ability, think tanks can attach themselves with famous names such as Gurcharn 
Das and gain access to the market.  
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Arnoldi maintains that think-tanks often a face dilemma of how to conduct and 
portray their research. On one hand their research should be rigorous to gain academic 
legitimacy, and on the other it should be legible and understandable for the general 
public. And so CCS has thus created two separate sections of commentary and research 
to attract different readerships.  
Public altercations: Case Study B 
Weaver (1989) maintains that advocacy think tanks often “synthesize and put a 
distinctive ‘spin’ on existing research rather than carrying out original research” (567). 
CCS openly admits that it takes the research of other “experts” and uses it to support its 
agenda.  During a conversation Ram explained: “In our network, there are people who 
work at the grass-root level on street vendors, they do exceptionally good work and they 
are emotionally attached to these people. They do good research, articulate great ideas 
and writing papers, so we do not need to do that. We can bring our expertise to their 
work, our expertise is in implementation at the policy level” (2010). 
But that does not mean that the adoption of others’ research is a straightforward 
process. I have used a public controversy between the CCS and another researcher 
concerned with the plight of street vendors to highlight the nature of CCS involvement in 
the case of vendors and hawkers. Public arguments between competing producers of 
discourse are often the most insightful entry points for analyzing hegemonic politics.  
 Tavleen Singh, a famous journalist and political reporter, wrote an article in a 
weekly magazine India Today, disassociating herself from a preface that she had written 
for a book published by CCS called Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the 
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street. She maintained that she only wrote the preface of the book because “some months 
ago a man who identified himself as Parth Shah, called me and pleaded with me to write 
a preface for a book that he said his Centre was bringing out on street vendors and 
rickshaw-pullers…He made it sound as if Madhu Kishwar, Manushi’s driving force was 
associated with the book…”(2005). Madhu Kishwar is the founder of Manushi, a feminist 
journal, the scope of which extends beyond social justice for women to include minorities 
such as peasants, workers, slum dwellers, rickshaw pullers and hawkers. Based on her 
commitment for the rights of street hawkers, Kishwar did experiments with an ideal 
market in which she tried to designate fixed places to hawkers and vendors so that the 
spaces looked aesthetically modern and well organized. 
 Singh further writes “Imagine my horror when Madhu rang me last week to tell 
me that Parth J Shah had plagiarized huge chunks of research and documentation done by 
Manushi and had not bothered to slip in the smallest acknowledgment” ( 2005 ). Singh 
later berates CCS as a “phony center” and condemns “misguided international funding” 
that awarded CCS’s publication with a prize. She said during their conversation Madhu 
maintained that “Not one street vendor or rickshaw-puller or small shop owner would 
endorse CCS’s claims to be the champion of their rights.” Here, Kishwar is basing her 
claim for credibility on her personal relationship with the vendors in her empirical 
research while denouncing CCS on the grounds that they do not have this personal 
connection. 
Shah sent in his response to the newspaper saying:  
Urban livelihoods is one of the six areas of our focus, apart from Education, 
Environment, Governance, Globalisation and Rule of Law. We appreciated Ms 
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Kishwar’s work among street hawkers and cycle rickshaw pullers in Delhi and began 
to develop it further by more detailed case studies and surveys in other cities and 
towns of India with the help of enthusiastic college students as research interns. 
Economic freedom—the freedom to produce and trade—is one of the core principles 
of CCS work. That is the message we want to bring to our current as well as the 
future decision makers. They are our audience, not the actual street hawkers or shop 
keepers. Street hawkers experience everyday the effects of the lack of economic 
freedom—the brutality of the license-inspector raj. It is the decision makers and the 
middle-class mindset that need to be challenged. Therefore our more than 35 student 
seminars over last five years attended by over 2390 students from all over India 
where speakers like P Chidambaram, Swaminathan Aiyar, Ashok Desai, Bibek 
Debroy and many others have discussed these ideas. And the programs for IAS 
officers, professors and teachers, and the CCS Policy Meet for MPs (Shah 2005). 
Naveen Mandava wrote a larger CCS’s response to this article (appended at the 
end of the dissertation) and took a completely different approach than Kishwar to 
claiming credibility. Before refuting the allegations, he included a paragraph, which 
highlighted rational markets and the idea of competition behind CCS' philosophy. First, 
he uses vendors as a metaphor to discuss the intellectual competition between CCS and 
Kishwar, noting that CCS has been more successful at selling ideas derived from 
Kishwar’s research. Like an uncompetitive vendor accusing a successful vendor of 
having shoddy goods, Kishwar is denouncing CCS as the desperate last resort of an 
uncompetitive seller. Later in the article Mandava denounces Kishwar for having no 
understanding of how markets work. Here, a technocratic understanding on the abstract 
model of free market theory is taken as superior to an empirical knowledge of the 
vendors themselves. The use of rational principles of modern science and knowledge of 
the market can be identified as a strategy of persuasion.  
While doing discourse analysis of this response, I have tried to pay attention to 
the silence and gaps within the argument. I realize that one major gap in Mandava’s piece 
is that the urban politics of space in which vendors are involved is not even mentioned. 
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Even Kishwar espouses the principle of empowerment, liberty and free market, and fails 
to realize that the problem of vendors is intricately related to the problem of a bourgeois 
city that is increasingly becoming neoliberalized. Mandava does not mention the Resident 
Welfare Associations and Trader Welfare Associations in his response and directs all the 
attention to the corrupt state agents. The inherent contradiction between the unruliness of 
vendors and the entrepreneurial neoliberal city is silenced in the mind of the readers. In 
Shah’s response, the hawkers are not described as the target audience of CCS’s advocacy. 
The middle class, elite politicians and bureaucrats are targeted as they are the ones who 
will bring about change. In the latter half of this dissertation, I will demonstrate how such 
sentiments are getting translated to NPSV and other policy recommendations that are 
coming from CCS.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I explained the global and local political economy of which think 
tanks form a part. While doing so, I have tried to bring light to the penetration of 
neoliberalism on the level of ideas and opinions. Thank tanks are the backbone of 
neoliberalism and form an important component of a neoliberal bourgeois civil society 
that actively seeks consent for implementing neoliberal policies. Here, I set the stage for 
the remaining chapters by describing different types, models and politics of think tanks. 
The analysis of CCS provides the readers with a background of the organizations and will 
help to contextualize their work and stance on street hawkers within the larger political 
economy of ideas. 
Copyright © Priyanka Jain 2013 
 97 
 
Chapter 4:  Hawkers as Informals: Theoretical Reflections 
Introduction 
A street hawker
30
 is a person who sells goods ranging from clothes, to utensils, to 
cooked food or vegetables and fruits in public space or the city streets. Most street 
hawkers in India are informal: they do not have a legal permit to sell goods and thus work 
illegally. Street vending is characterized by mobility and flexibility, and because of the 
low cost of investment it is relatively easy to enter. According to Bhowmik (2010), 2.5% 
of India’s urban population is involved in street hawking. Out of 10 million street 
hawkers in India, commonly accepted estimates state that approximately 200,000-
250,000 work in the city of Delhi. Some studies suggest that this number could be as high 
as 500,000 (Manushi Trust 2001). Perhaps this concentration in Delhi is so because Delhi 
is the fastest growing city in the country. Between 1991 and 2001, Delhi’s population 
increased by 47.02 % in comparison to Mumbai’s 20.03% (Kumar and Bhowmik 2010).  
Of all these hawkers, only 10% have a formal permit or tehabazari to sell in the city and 
the rest are informal. 
Street vendors are a significant group of informal workers, often surrounded with 
controversy, mostly because of their acute visibility in public space. The state’s 
ambiguous response to hawkers oscillates between violence and protection, from taking 
bribes, carrying out raids, or forcing evictions to tolerance, replacement, and 
                                                          
30
 There are different kinds of street hawkers. There are hawkers that squat on the side of 
the road and sell their goods to passersby. Then there are phere walla or reripatte walla, 
the itinerant hawkers who roam around different neighborhoods in the city during various 
hours of the day. 
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rehabilitation. Even though the number of hawkers and vendors are increasing rapidly 
(Kumar and Bhowmik 2010), there is hardly any substantial research available on this 
issue. Perhaps this is the reason why an anti-hawking policy such as NPSV and a think 
tank that at its very core is anti-hawker and antagonistic to poor people is able to appeal 
to the sensibility of those who wish to help hawkers. On May 1 2013, the Union Cabinet 
of the Government of India passed NPSV as the Protection of Livelihood and Regulation 
of Street Vending Bill and hence the analysis of NPSV and its supporter CCS becomes 
even more of a pressing issue. 
 In this chapter, I create my own theoretical framework through which I 
understand and analyze hawking specifically and informality in general. Then I outline 
how my understanding of street hawking and street hawkers is different from the one 
typically espoused by NGOs and think tanks. I later provide a historiography of the 
Indian state’s response to street hawking since the time of the British and describe how it 
has changed as the Indian nation state and its democratic institutions have matured.  
Finally, I address questions regarding methodology and reflect on my own positionality 
as a researcher. These epistemological discussions not only help me critically analyze 
different policy measures and solutions to tackle problems of street vending that have 
been proposed by CCS and other NGOs, they also enable me to form a substantial 
critique of CCSs knowledge and methodology.  
Informality  
The term informal economy first surfaced in the work of Keith Hart (1973) to 
describe self-employed street based entrepreneurs in Ghana; since then, according to 
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Rakowaski (1994), the research on the informal economy (also called informal sector) 
has diverged into four different paths. In the 1970s, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) - PREALC31 propagated the two sector dichotomy under a structuralist 
framework. They view informality as an antithesis of modernity and as often associated 
with the third world and a traditional economy. Informal activity is seen as a survival 
strategy for the poor who have failed to enter the process of industrialization due to 
structural factors such as excessive supply of labor, worker characterization, and rural to 
urban migration (Cross 1998, AlSayyad 2004, Rakowaski 1994, Whitson 2007). 
Research under this paradigm is no longer relevant in the face of growing informality in 
spite great advancements in industrialization; even so, interpretations that link the 
informal to the traditional or third world is still prevalent in the everyday jargon of the 
NGOs that I interviewed.  
Stepping away from the dualistic framework is the underground economy 
approach comprised mainly of work by neo-marxists. While retaining the structuralist 
approach, they consider informality as integral to the successful working of the capitalist 
economy as it ensures a reserve army of labor (Castells and Portes 1989; Sassen-Koob 
1987).
32 Informal workers are in fact “disguised employees” that form a part of capitalist 
exploitation. Both approaches differ but they still associate informality with poverty and 
                                                          
31
 PREALC or “Programa Regional del Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe” is a 
policy-oriented think tank of Latin America and Caribbean comprised mainly of 
economists.  
32
 Focusing on “exposing class conflict, exploitation of labour, the spread of imperialism, 
through worldwide economic restructuring”, neo-marxists maintain that “infomalization 
is a mechanism to reverse the costly process of proletarianization, weaken the rights of 
workers and unions, and disenfranchise a large sector of the working class- with the 
acquiescence of the state in the interest of renewed economic growth” (Rakowaski 1994, 
503- 4). 
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view it as an expression of the uneven nature of capitalist development where informal 
workers either survive or face the predetermined fate of super exploitation. 
The third approach is a neoliberal-inclined legalist approach that views informal 
workers as entrepreneurs and argues against state intervention. Developed by the 
Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto (1989), here informality is believed to be the 
cause of over-legalization and state regulation. He writes that the “informal economy is 
the people’s spontaneous and creative response to the state’s incapacity to satisfy the 
basic needs of the improvised masses” (Soto 1989, 14). Disagreeing with the neo-marxist 
on the victim status of informal workers, the legalist celebrates their heroism. Although 
more optimistic than the previous two approaches, the legalist approach further 
propagates the dualism between the formal and informal, thereby overlooking how 
informal workers are often disguised employees in the formal enterprise. The fourth 
approach identified by Rakowaski is the micro enterprise development approach, 
comprised mostly of NGOs. These are oriented towards action and do not necessarily 
adhere to a specific conceptual ideology. However, they are typically neoliberal in 
orientation and integrate the ILO approach of assisting informal workers in overcoming 
barriers to growth.
33
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 At first glance, CCS seems to fit the microenterprise approach, but from a closer look it 
is apparent that it follows a strong legalist paradigm. Of course it is the legalist approach 
that assists CCSs main agenda of retreat of state from every sector- not just from the 
informal economy, but also from education, health, water, and electricity. The right of 
hawkers to vend in public space is not the main concern of CCS. The subtle difference 
between the last two approaches became apparent during my interview with other NGOs 
and organizations working on behalf of hawkers. According to members of NASVI they 
did not have a model to understand the problems faced by street vendors.   
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My Theoretical Framework: Entangled Spaces of Informality 
The above approaches tend to equate informality with poverty; attribute 
informality and poverty to informals’ isolation from the global economy; and delegate the 
condition of poverty to the poor themselves. However, the most significant flaw in all but 
one of these approaches is that they actively uphold the dichotomy of formal and 
informal in their conceptualizations. Scholars have maintained that the formal/informal 
dichotomy overlooks complex social relations and strategies (Crichlow 1998, García-
Rincón 2007, Morales 2001, Roy 2005). Although true, I believe the critique of this 
dichotomy must go further.  It has been long debated in social theory that boundaries and 
categories such as self/other, white/black, west/non-west, core/periphery that appear 
natural or neutral are in fact not pre-given (Adorno and Horkheimer 1991) but are 
product of a hegemonic process that favors the former ( Foucault 1970, Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985). It has also been widely recognized that constitutive power of latter or 
other or outside is actively engaged in framing the former (Derrida 1974, Natter & Jones 
1998). In that sense, formal and informal are not innocent categories but are actively 
constructed, sustained and reworked as tools of domination. In addition, the informal 
participates in the construction of the formal; the traces of the informal are always present 
in the formal in order for it to function effectively. Based on these criticisms, recent 
scholarly inquiries denounce this dualism. For example, Tom Angotti (2006) criticizes 
Mike Davis’s (2006) ‘apocalyptic’ Planet of Slums as a kind of ‘urban orientalism’ for 
fomenting simplistic dualisms that ignore the multiple connections between formal and 
informal (Varley 2013). I believe that lack of this understanding encourages misguided 
politics that aims to achieve utopian dreams. My research demonstrates that the most 
direct implication of basing politics on this dichotomy is rather grave. Foremost on the 
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agenda for NGOs and think tanks such as CCS regarding street hawkers is the aim to 
formalize them. Ram asserted that “once the hawkers are formalized their problems will 
naturally get resolved. (2010)” On the contrary, in the next two chapters I will discuss 
why problems of hawkers can never be resolved by merely giving some of them a formal 
status in a so called “hawking zone” or elsewhere.  First, in this chapter, I will outline my 
theoretical understanding of informality.  
Roy (2005) suggests an alternative to bypass the above conceptual shortcomings: 
instead of a sector, informality should be thought of as a mode of urbanization. Roy and 
AlSayyad (2004) use the term urban informality to describe “a series of transactions that 
connect different economies and spaces to one another…(and) indicate an organizing 
logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself” (Roy 
2005148). As a compatible alternative, Saskia Sassen (2005) proposes “a re-reading of 
the city through representations of its post-colonial relationship to topography” (cited in 
Varley 2012, 84). Here ‘topography’ refers to the “approaches that divide informal 
settlements from the rest of the city” (Varley 2012, 5). Elsewhere scholars have begun to 
establish how street vending can be understood as a space of power in which multiple 
actors struggle to negotiate meaning and control through deployment of diverse forms of 
power (Jimu 2005, Whileson 2007). It is safe to say that to a large extent, recent critical 
inquiry on street vending has begun to understand informal activity as a spatial practice. 
These developments exemplify the current geographic tradition influenced by Lefebvre’s 
conception of space which has brought space to the forefront of any social political 
theory (see Gregory 1994, Soja 1996). According to Lefebvre, each mode of production 
has its own organizing logic and creates its own dominant unified space. Following 
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Marx’s concept of abstract labor, Lefebvre calls this the abstract space, homogenized and 
unified by dominant ideology that is prescribed and imposed at all times. This is the 
space of the hegemonizer, and this dominant or abstract space also subsumes subordinate 
forms of the use of space. However, just like hegemony is never complete, hegemonic 
space is replete with uncertainties and contingencies. Lefebvre describes the dialectical 
production of space as a concrete universal just like the Hegelian universal state, which is 
something that is a perceptible and abstract and yet contains particulars such as 
representation, practices and forms that constitute the unity of the abstract. Owing to this 
dialectical production one can say that the space is socially produced and at the same 
time produces the social, i.e. space and society are mutually constituted. Both reformulate 
and reproduce, mediate and transform the other. Low (2000) further divides social 
production of space into two processes. By social production she means production of 
material settings through social, economic, ideological and technological factors that 
include historical emergence and the political/economic formation of urban space. Social 
construction denotes actual spatial transformation through “phenomenological and 
symbolic experience of space as mediated by social processes such as exchange, conflict 
and control...where people’s social exchanges, memories, images, and daily uses of 
material setting” convey meanings (128). This insightful division assists in paying 
attention to a variety of social processes while analyzing space. In this regard, I believe 
that informal activity is an organic part of the production of urban space and in turn is 
framed by it.  
So what exactly does the urban space of the informals look like? Informality 
understood as a space where there is constant struggle over meanings, opens a possibility 
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to recognize multiple actors performing on that site. This urges us not to treat hawkers as 
a uniform and homogenous category. Informality understood as a mode of urbanization 
entails that even if these sites appear disjunctured, they are connected spaces and form a 
continuum that drives urbanization. With this in mind, we can avoid the tendency to view 
hawkers as subjects framed only through their economic practice of hawking on the 
streets. That misleading practice inflicts not just the core understandings of various 
NGOs and think tanks but is also rife among academicians who tend to study hawkers as 
fixed economic subjects within the boundaries of market place or public space. Their 
focus is narrow and only concentrates on hawkers’ interaction with the state or 
customers. I propose to view street hawkers as diverse subjects who are framed by what I 
call entangled spaces of informality where they continuously interact with multiple actors 
in multiple spaces. Within these entwined spaces, in one space they may clash with one 
actor and form strategic alliance with the other while in the same space at a different time 
or different space at the same time they may reverse their relationship. Also, one needs to 
understand that different spaces in the city are connected. As Roy (2011) maintains, 
informality “connects the seemingly separated geographies of slum and suburb” (233). 
 The theory of entangled spaces of informality has implications on the 
understandings of current political struggles and how these struggles are staged or ought 
to be staged. Based on these understandings my work makes contributions on two core 
areas. First, this new way to study informals brings forth the complexities of everyday 
lives of hawkers, which is often ignored by the researchers who study them. Here I view 
hawkers as diverse subjects of a larger political economy. The focus is not restricted to 
their interaction with inefficient government and its corrupt enforcement agents but also 
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includes their interactions with a benevolent state that they often call for and in some 
ways desire. I conceive the space where they operate as much larger than the market 
place or spaces of utility. This space includes Indian streets or “spaces of common” 
which are a part of indigenous public space, private spaces of their homes in slums, as 
well as those of the rural hinterland from where most hawkers come. I contend that a 
study of hawkers will always be incomplete unless it pays attention to the entangled 
spaces of informality. 
Once this is done, it is easy to visualize the everyday life of a hawker who 
navigates the multiple and connected spaces of informality. Imagine a hawker who sells 
her goods illegally on the street and returns home to an illegally constructed slum. In 
order to survive everyday in both spaces, she fights to ward off state enforcement 
officials through multiple tactics. In the last two decades, we have seen how free-market 
NGOs and think tanks like CCS attempt to represent hawkers. They attempt to make the 
hawkers conscious of their rights to hawk on public space and stand up against the state 
and its corrupt enforcement agents. In response, hawkers have started organizing and 
demanding a kind of formalization from the state in the form of property rights in spaces 
of home and work. However, the hawker described above who uses illegally obtained 
water and electricity to cook food may have different aspirations; she would prefer the 
state to ignore these resource overflows and not penetrate and formalize these spaces of 
leakages. Indeed, I’ve learned when some kinds of formalization occur, namely 
neoliberal changes and resultant privatization of basic amenities, slum dwellers are 
particularly unhappy. During my interviews, a common complaint of hawkers was how it 
was better for them when these amenities were state-owned. Private companies do not 
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give any concessions and charge exorbitant prices for simple amenities like water and 
electricity. Similarly, hawkers’ children go to government run schools and get free books, 
stationary and a mid-day meal. In case of a medical emergency, a government hospital, 
which also offers subsidized drugs to the poor, is the best place to go. Hence, despite 
their complaints about inefficiencies and corruption of the state that inflects the hawking 
spaces, hawkers still desire a benevolent state that they believe functions as a provider. 
Here, we suddenly see a reversal in the relationship between hawkers and the 
organizations that claim to have their interests in mind. Free market think tanks such as 
CCS would find themselves standing against hawkers who say no to privatization. 
Similarly, a hawker experiences the politics of the middle class not just when he practices 
hawking, but also when his shack is demolished by bulldozers. At the same time, very 
often it is the middle class which calls upon the services of hawkers. Hence, taking into 
account these entangled spaces of informality, new questions arise about relationship 
between hawkers, the state, wealthy citizens and NGOs that represent hawkers. 
It is important to let different fields of informality speak to one another in political 
space in order to quell deceptive political struggle and claims of illusionary victories. 
This is the area of my second focus in which I create a dialogue between these spaces. I 
dismantle one by one the claims of CCS and other such organizations that have come to 
the forefront of the political struggle of hawkers and wish to represent them in their fight 
against the state. For this I will analyze NPSV and other publications of CCS in chapter 
5, 6 and 7. In the next few sections I will tease out the complex relationships between 
hawkers and other interest groups that they encounter every day. 
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An Overview : Street Hawkers In India 
Hawkers are often considered contested figures in urban modernity (Rajagoplal 
2001). They appear as the ones who defy the desired spatial and visual order of the city 
and hence are portrayed as out-of-place and dirty (Appadurai 2003, Andri Yatmo 2008, 
Popke & Ballard 2004). However, time and again scholars have asserted the importance 
of hawkers by showing how diversity on the streets and in public space brings liveliness 
to the city. Jane Jacobs in her famous study of Greenwich, New York in the 1960s 
showed how the very people who appear disruptive on the streets such as vendors, old 
people and children were in reality important in maintaining the safety and vibrancy of 
the neighborhood. Since then New York has gone through a series of “revitalization” 
projects under the reign of Mayor Roudolph Gulliani (1993 to 2001) whose zero 
tolerance maxim for dealing with any sort of disorder has turned the city into a purified 
neoliberal nightmare for unlicensed peddlers and homeless people. Scholars have shown 
how these New York style neoliberal urban polices travel around the globe and wreak 
devastations of much greater magnitude in countries with already existing deep 
inequalities (Smith 2001, Swanson 2007, Wacquant 2003). Local governments fuse these 
neoliberal polices containing modernist undertones with regional prejudices and 
provincial discriminatory discourse to sanctify public space for unfettered capitalist 
consumption. For example, scholars have shown that urban revival actively engages with 
racial discourses such as mestizasation and the project of blanqueamiento or whitening in 
countries such as Ecuador to drive out street hawkers from popular urban spots (Swanson 
2007). In South Africa, the repression of street vendors has been saturated with the 
apartheid sentiment that constructs black immigrants as ‘temporary sojourners’ in white 
dominated cities (Beavon & Rogerson 1986). Various scholars have documented 
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Operation Sunshine as an Indian version of the revanchist city endeavor (Roy 2004, 
Bandyopadhyay 2009). This drive to clean the streets of Kolkota of dirty street hawkers 
happened on the eve of the visit of Britain’s Prime Minister John Major, when the 
communist state government started making efforts to make the city more investor 
friendly. In total, they removed about 100,000 hawkers from the streets. A few weeks 
after Major’s visit, a bill was passed by the West Bengal Legislative assembly to make 
hawking a “cognizable and nonbailable offence” (Rajagopal 2001). 
Authorities often reclaim public space by relocating hawkers from the city center 
to mall-like complexes where they are meant to cater to tourists rather than local 
customers (Morales 2000; Lewinson 1998). In some cases, hawkers simply choose to 
return to their old location (Cross 1998; Hansen 2004; Stamm 2005). A considerable 
amount of attention has been given to how these relocation projects have been a part of 
overall scheme of tourism promotion (Bromley 2000, Middleton, 2003, Cutsinger, 2000), 
although some scholars have also explored how street vendors contribute to tourism by 
attracting tourists (McGee and Yeung 1977) and are sometimes used by the authorities to 
revive destroyed city centers (Karides 2001). While most studies have investigated the 
politics behind displacements in terms of gentrification and tourism, a few have also 
investigated the implications of such displacement, such as reduced sales and income 
(Donovan 2008, Bromley & Mackie 2009).   
From the above discussions it is apparent that there has been a considerable 
amount of attention given to the rise of the anti-hawking policies, the state’s response, 
and how the policies get translated on the streets. However, there have been few 
discussions on how the hawkers respond, resist and sustain in a neoliberal milieu, that is, 
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the coalition of neoliberal state, neoliberal government and neoliberal citizenry. This gap 
in the research is consistent with the trend that the economic activities of informality get 
more academic attention than its political and cultural activities (Stillerman 2006, 
Whiteson 2007). Through life biographies and ethnographies, my study on hawkers 
contributes to the work that is emerging to fill these gaps. Most importantly, hardly any 
study pays attention to how hawkers are divided and then reorganized and mobilized to 
form a part of global hegemonic discourses of neoliberalism that in turn shape “anti-
hawking laws,” this time with their consent. While filling that gap, my work investigates 
the role of the third sector in the politics of hawking. 
There have been some insightful works that attempt to define the politics of 
informals. According to Scott (1987), mundane survival strategies of poor workers such 
as foot-dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, slander, arson, and sabotage are acts of 
resistance that do not necessarily frame poor people as victims. Bayat (2000), however, 
finds several reasons to differ with Scott’s assessment. First, these acts of resistance by 
poor workers such as hawkers are engaged in not simply to survive, but also to move 
forward. Second, these acts are not just defensive but also “surreptitiously offensive.” 
These kinds of actions differ from both old and new forms of social movements and are 
best described by Bayat as the “quiet encroachments of the ordinary…marked by quiet, 
atomized and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective actions – an open and 
fleeting struggle without clear leadership, ideology or structured organization, one which 
makes significant gains for the actors, eventually placing them as counterpoint vis-à-vis 
the state” (533). Unlike Gramsci’s passive resistance, these activities are not carried out 
with a political intent, rather, they are acts of necessity to survive and live a dignified life. 
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Even so, these quiet acts of resistance do end up shifting the realms of the politics at 
some point. I extend this line of thought to the politics of hawkers in Delhi. At this point, 
I would not call what is happening in the urban areas simply acts of resistance to survive. 
Indeed it is so for majority of hawkers, but the politics of hawkers over all has taken on a 
new visibility with their growing association with various NGOs and think tanks like 
CCS. Hawkers are forming a variety of alliances with other actors to make demands on 
the state. These alliances give them visibility and more power to negotiate. But the same 
is true for the other actors such as CCS, which is also demanding specific things and 
make certain claims while pursuing the politics of hawkers. Even if these agendas 
correspond to the hawkers immediate demands, they may have a completely inimical 
aftermath. In sum, several spatial contradictions are hidden at the site of convergence of 
these similar but multiple agendas. Such internal dynamics of the politics of hawkers 
where multiple actors converge to make claims have not yet been investigated in any of 
the studies of hawkers. My work attempts to analyze this area where hawkers operate as 
political subjects who form multiple alliances in a neoliberal city in order to get by every 
day.  
India: Historiography of the State’s Response to Hawking, 1860s- 1980s 
The British government in its Asian and African colonies considered street 
hawkers as remnants of antiquity, noisy, obstructive, and dirty (Anjoria 2012, McGee 
1973, Robertson 1997), who were also “Low Caste and Born Thieves” (Vahed 1999). 
The Indian state’s punitive action toward street hawkers until the late 1980s was guided 
by numerous sections of colonial Indian Penal Code, 1862 (IPC) and the Indian Police 
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Act of 1861
34
 that sought to criminalize vendors for posing obstructions in public space 
and roads and also acting as hazards to people in a “public way or public line of 
navigation.”  
Box 4. 1 : Sections of Indian Penal Code that work against Street Hawkers 
Section 283 of IPC called “danger or obstruction in public way or public line of 
navigation” states that “whoever, by doing an act or by omitting to take order with any 
property in his possession or under his charge, causes danger, obstruction or injury to any 
person in any public way or public line of navigation, shall be punished with fine which 
may extend to two hundred rupees.”  
Section 431 of IPC called “mischief by injury to public road, bridge, river or 
channel” states that “whoever commits mischief by doing any act which renders or which 
he knows to be likely to render any public road, bridge, navigable river or navigable 
channel, natural or artificial, impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description  for a term which may extend 
to five years, or with fine, or with both.” 
 
 Box 4.2 : Section of Indian Police Act that work against Street Hawkers.  
No Person shall cause obstruction in any street or public space by 
 
- Allowing animals or vehicle. 
- leaving any vehicle standing or fastening any cattle in the street or in the public 
place. 
- Using any part of a street or public place as a halting place for vehicles or cattle. 
-Leaving any box, bale package or other things whatsoever upon a street for an 
unreasonable length of time or contrary to any regulation. 
- By exposing to anything for sale or setting out anything for sale in or upon any 
stall, booth, board, cask, and basket or in any other way, whatsoever.”  
What was the reason behind the colonial government’s stern approach regarding 
streets? For this, it is important to situate the IPC within the wider historiographies of the 
British Empire in relation to control of space and colonial territory in the 19
th
 century. I 
argue that the British colonial government had two reasons to have such a stern stance for 
                                                          
34
 Although, post-independence, some of the states like Delhi, Maharashta, and Kerala 
have enacted their own police act, these are heavily modeled on the Indian Police Act of 
1861. 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/papers/advocacy_paper_police_
act_1861.pdf 
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any kind of street obstruction. First, as Das and Verma (1998) maintain, the Indian police 
system developed by the British was meant more for the maintenance of order than 
prevention and detection of crime and in this way it served the “commercial interests of 
an expanding capitalism in search of new markets and resources” (Brogden, 1987 quoted 
in Das and Verma 1998, 357).
35
 Second, unlike Europe that had Foucault’s elegant 
sovereignty-discipline-government triangle, the Indian colonial state did not develop vis-
à-vis a civil society, and thus did not have the structure to mobilize the capillary forms of 
power (Prakash 1999). For this reason, the colonial Indian police served more as coercive 
agents that disciplined society than did their British counterparts in London, who were 
primarily involved in prevention and detection of actual crime. Of course, the IPC and 
Police Act cannot be separated and were intricately linked to the British modernist vision 
and desire to beautify the colonial cities, especially imperial capital of Delhi (Hosagrahar 
2005 Irvin 1981). After independence, the Indian national government legitimized itself 
through the project of democracy that was emphasized to be a more fitting way to 
represent Indian citizens than the colonial model of dominance without hegemony 
outlined by Ranjit Guha (1998). But as scholars have noted, there was hardly a dramatic 
rupture that marked the beginning of decolonization at that time and definitely 
colonialism did not have a settled ending in 1947. In fact, even though at the time of 
independence it is easy to identify a sharp political discontinuity between colonial and 
nationalist India, economic and social continuities can be traced to a much later time 
(Legg 2006). One example of these continuities is the colonial spatial laws of the IPC and 
                                                          
35 In comparison, the Metropolitan London police model emphasized crime prevention, 
working in cooperation with locals by winning their trust. The police tried to integrate 
themselves into the neighborhoods and advocated restraint on the use of force (Das and 
Verma 1998). 
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Police Act that were seamlessly inherited by the Indian government. These laws 
continued to criminalize marginalized citizens such as street hawkers for inciting 
disorder.  
Most Municipal Corporation laws pertaining specifically to street hawkers, slum 
dwellers and unskilled migrant workers were identical to the Bombay Municipal 
Corporation Act (BMC) of 1882 that drew heavily on laws passed in England. The Delhi 
Municipal Corporation Act of 1957, which in turn was identical to the BMC required 
hawkers to obtain licenses to practice hawking (Bhowmik 2010). The Municipal 
Corporation issued hawking licenses and expected only those with licenses to be on the 
streets. Of course the number of licenses, also called tehbazari, that were given covered a 
fraction of hawkers. Manushi notes that MCD claims that currently there are 300,000- 
500,000 hawkers in Delhi. Of these, less than 3,000 have licenses. So nearly 99 percent 
of existing hawkers “are treated as legal offenders and face daily punishments, 
harassment and penalties. (Kishwar)” 36 
There are several other problems with the Municipal Corporation’s dealings with 
the hawkers and its tehabazari system. First and foremost, instead of a democratically 
elected councillor, an undemocratically appointed Municipal Commissioner has the 
authority to issue licenses or dismantle and destroy any hawking stalls. I spoke with a 
female street vendor near Sufdar Jung hospital in Delhi who claimed to have been evicted 
more than 30 times in the last 9 years by municipal authorities. Besides MCD flaws, 
section 34 of the Police Act of 1951 (see box 4.2), gives the local police the right to 
remove and arrest even licensed hawkers for causing obstructions. The system of 
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 http://www.manushi.in/articles.php?articleId=720&ptype=campaigns 
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tehabazari is so complicated that it is difficult for vendors themselves to understand. In 
addition, the law deals only with existing vendors and makes no provisions for new and 
aspiring vendors. Because of the inconsistencies between different laws and the limited 
number of licenses despite the growing numbers of hawkers, hawking has become a site 
of conflict and corruption in post-independent urban India. In Delhi alone state agents 
take bribes from hawkers that are as high as Rs 600 crore
37 
 annually (Bhowmik 2010).   
The judiciary in post-liberalization India has successfully added itself as another 
layer to sovereign rule over street hawkers and slum dwellers. Besides the MCD and 
Police, now Supreme courts and regional High courts are acting on behalf of middle class 
citizens, and instituting nuisance laws to deal with hawkers and slum dwellers. Nuisance 
literally means something that causes annoyance to other people. In Indian common law, 
nuisance can be public or private and creating a nuisance is a criminal offense. The first 
time slum-related nuisance was invoked in the courts was in 1980 in Ratlam Municipal 
Council vs Vardichan, which blamed the municipality for stagnant and putrid water 
originating from the slums. This was also the first time a nuisance law was used for an 
environmental issue (Sengar 2007). Since then, and lately with the rise of middle class 
environmentalism, nuisance laws have been used with ferocity to deal with slums, 
hawkers (especially food hawkers), and poor people in general.  I will explain how the 
nuisance laws have been mutated and used to remove poor people from urban space in 
the next section, but here let me highlight the section in the legal system that details the 
nuisance laws. 
Box 4.3: Section 133 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
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 Six hundred crores Indian Rupee is approximately one hundred million US dollars 
according to current (July 2013) Rupee-US dollar conversation rate. 
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(1) Whenever a District Magistrate or a Sub- divisional Magistrate or any other 
Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this of behalf by the State Government, on 
receiving the report of a police officer or other information and on taking such evidence 
(if any) as he thinks fit, considers- 
 
(a) that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be removed from any public 
place or from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public; 
or 
 
(b) that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or 
merchandise, is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that in 
consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods or 
merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated; or 
 
(c) that the construction of any building, or, the disposal of any substance, as is 
likely to occasion configuration or explosion, should be prevented or stopped; or 
 
(d) that any building, tent or structure, or any tree is in such a condition that it is 
likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the 
neighborhood or passing by, and that in consequence the removal, repair or support of 
such building, tent or structure, or the removal or support of such tree, is necessary; or 
 
(e) that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such way or public place 
should be fenced in such manner as to prevent danger arising to the public; or 
 
(f) that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined or otherwise disposed 
of, such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such 
obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such 
goods or merchandise, or owning, possessing or controlling such building, tent, structure, 
substance, tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or tree, within a 
time to be fixed in the order- 
 
(i) to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or 
 
(ii) to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be 
directed, such trade or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, or to 
regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or 
 
(iii) to prevent or stop the construction of such building, or to alter the disposal of 
such substance; or 
 
(iv) to remove, repair or support such building, tent or structure, or to remove or 
support such trees; or 
 
(v) to fence such tank, well or excavation; or 
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(vi) to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous animal in the manner 
provided in the said order; or, if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some 
other Executive Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the 
Order, and show cause, in the manner hereinafter provided, why the order should not be 
made absolute.  
 
India: Historiography of Hawkers’ and NGOs Response,  1980’s onwards  
The general understanding towards hawkers changed in the late 1980s after a 
Supreme Court ruling: 
If properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the small 
traders on the sidewalks can considerably add to the comfort and convenience of the 
general public, by making available ordinary articles of everyday use for a 
comparatively lesser price. An ordinary person, not very affluent, while hurrying 
towards his home after a day’s work can pick up these articles without going out of 
his way to find a regular market. The right to carry on trade of business mentioned in 
Article 19(1)(g)of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated cannot 
be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or re-
passing and for no other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary condition as 
otherwise the very object of laying out roads – to facilitate traffic – may be defeated 
(Sodhan Singh vs NDMC, 1989). 
 
 
Although this landmark ruling changed little on the ground as hawkers continued 
to be harassed and evicted, it depicted a subtle and gradual change in political post-
colonial India that can be associated with the development of a mature third world nation-
state outside its western breeding grounds.
38
 It is important here to explain the political 
environment that has produced this change.  According to Nandy (1989), lately the Indian 
elite and middle class have grown impatient with the politics and democratic process 
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 Nandy notes the growth of the nation state over three hundred years in the west, since 
the treaty of Westphalia, particularly since the British and French established their global 
hegemony and Bismark created the nation state in Germany( 1989, 4). But according to 
Chatterjee (2004), the chronological sequence of modern state in India has been short and 
rapid as the governmental technologies that accompany nation-states were applied by the 
colonial government long before the formation of the Indian nation-state.  
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“because these sections have gone too far in empowering the irrational and atavistic 
elements in the society”(11). This dissatisfaction has been concurrent with the growing 
reliance of the poor on democratic institutions and electoral politics. Chatterjee (2004) 
expands this to include the rise of the debate on the rights to entitlement that shape the 
politics of informals. In a larger discussion, he explains that civil society, a product of 
modernity, is essentially a bourgeois society “characterized by modern associational life 
originating from the western society that is based on equality, autonomy, freedom of 
entry and exit, contract, deliberative procedures of decision-making, recognizance rights 
and duties of members, and such other principles” (Chatterjee 2003, 135). Political 
society, on the other hand, is a product of democracy and encompasses the populations 
that have been left out of civil society. Chatterjee identifies this political field as the 
swath where governmental technologies work. To describe this he makes two different 
routes of connections of both civil society and political society to the state-- “one is the 
line connecting civil society to the nation-state founded on popular sovereignty and 
granting equal rights to citizens. The other is the line connecting populations to the 
governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of security and welfare” (2004, 39).  
For many of the groups in political society, including street hawkers, the everyday 
reality of life involves violation of legality, and it is here that Chatterjee’s work provides 
a breakthrough analysis. Why do state authorities let these acts go by? One explanation 
provided by CCS is that the state actors are corrupt and hence they ignore such 
transgressions for personal profit. But I believe that Chatterjee would explain that the 
fundamental reason why corruption practices are organized and rampant is that the state 
authorities “deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens …(as) their activities 
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are often illegal and contrary to good behavior…but as convenient instrument for the 
administration of welfare”(49). This is a response to the “marginal groups and 
underprivileged population… (who) make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a 
matter of right”(49). The dilemma for state authorities is how to reconcile the fact that the 
marginalized groups need help because the welfare programs of the state have not 
reached them, and the awareness that this problem persists, and if tolerated every time, 
can invite further “violation of public property and civic laws”(40). This result in a series 
of negotiations between the marginalized and the state agents on an uncertain political 
terrain. Corruption and evictions are only one aspect of the full story. The other aspect is 
represented by authorities letting hawkers into otherwise restricted and enclosed spaces. 
Benjamin (2004) describes this phenomena as ‘porous bureaucracy’, a space that has 
been created beyond the formal realms of planning to accommodate the demands of poor. 
Public interest litigations such as Sodhan Singh to the Supreme Court-- in which the 
hawker claimed that his fundamental rights, and specifically his right to carry on business 
or trade according to article 19(1) (g), are violated by state authorities each time he is 
evicted from urban space--reify this everyday politics of political society on the national 
stage.
39 As Chatterjee maintains “the field of citizenship, at certain points, overlaps with 
that of governmentality” and hence we can say that this insertion, of course, takes 
advantage of the tactical fact that the marginalized now have voting rights and assert their 
rights of citizenship to demand rights to livelihood. The decades-long confrontation after 
these game changing rulings, according to Bandyopadhyay (2012), has resulted in setting 
                                                          
39
 For more information on various court cases concerning politics of hawking in urban 
space read Sundaram, S (2008), “National Policy for Urban Street Vendors and Its 
Impact” Economic & Political Weekly,  October 25, 2008. 
 119 
 
“the stage for the emergence of a uniform understanding of the categories of ‘urban’ and 
‘street vendor’ at a national scale” that are different than the IPC categorization of street 
hawkers.  
Through the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Lintelo (2010) charts the creation 
of a mass alliance of civil society organizations, mainly NGOs and think tanks that came 
together in the late 1990s to develop NPSV. This coalition started coming together 
through the initiative of the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). Having done 
advocacy work for street hawkers as a part of the larger informal sector, SEWA took the 
issue of street vendors to prominence after its president Ela Bhatt became an independent 
member of Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament of India. Bhatt recognized the 
advantage of strategic alliances between different groups of planners and research 
scholars to lead towards an effective policy for street vendors at the national level. This 
led different groups and organizations such as scholars and planners to come together.     
Some of these were Kolkata Hawkers Sangram Samit that was established in 1996 after 
Operation Sunshine, Manushi headed by Madhu Kishwar that started work on street 
hawkers in 1995, Vasant Kunj Rehri Vapyari Morcha, founded in 2001, and then CCS 
that started working on the livelihood issues in 2001.
40 
 In 2002, various members of the 
coalition helped to draft the National Policy of Street Vendors (NPSV) and the union 
cabinet accepted this policy in 2004. The central government, which saw a change in 
leadership after the initial discussion on the policy, asked the National Commission on 
                                                          
40
 It is important to mention that Manushi is one of the few critics of the NPSV, but it 
also follows the same neoliberal economic and spatial logic regarding vending that is 
followed by many of the other NGOs and think tanks. Many social workers from 
different NGOs who are a part of Hawker’s alliance, maintained that Manushi’s Madhu 
Kishwar was only antagonistic towards NPSV because she was not invited or involved in 
the creation of NPSV.  
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Enterprise in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) to create a revised draft of 2004 version 
and in 2009, after several years of debate, NCEUS came up with a second draft of NPSV 
which was almost identical to the earlier draft. 
41
 Lintelo explains that the reasons behind 
the emergence of the NGO alliance were that the urban informal sector had been rapidly 
growing in recent decades and due to economic reforms there was an increase in the 
state’s repression that needed to be counteracted. However, as I have explained in the 
previous chapters, this growing role of NGOs and think tanks is in fact an indicator of the 
growing presence of multilateral organizations that initiated the economic reforms in the 
first place. As mentioned in previous chapters, many of the NGOs that have arisen in 
recent times can be identified as organic intellectuals of neoliberalism and are the key for 
the smooth expansion of the neoliberal working order. Because of this fact, the National 
Policy of Street Vending has strong neoliberal undertones. In the next three chapters, I 
will discuss how NPSV is a neoliberal spatial plan to discipline hawkers and create an 
ordered urban space for the transition to a neoliberal city. CCS has taken an active role in 
this alliance of activists and has supported the development of NPSV. Through its intense 
media focus and strong advocacy ties, CCS continues to support the adoption of NPSV in 
different states. Hence, a critique of NPSV is also a critique of CCS’s ideas concerning 
street vending. Also, one should not forget that some of CCS’s policy ideas are even 
more anti-hawker than the ones outlined by NPSV, so I will highlight this fact by looking 
at different publications of CCS.  
It is important to mention here that the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty 
Alleviation (MHUPA) was asked to frame a Model Act inspired by NCEUS’s 2009 bill 
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 From now on NPSV refers to National Policy of Street Vending 2009 
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that could be implemented nationwide. The Model Act MHUPA became known as Street 
Vendors (protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vendors) Bill, 2009. This bill 
has been a source of discontent among the national alliance for street vendors that 
includes different NGOs and think tanks. Bhowmik, the leading scholar and researcher on 
street vendors and one of the key members of the National Alliance, outlines a few points 
on how this bill disregards the issues that were key concerns in NPSV. In subsequent 
sections, I will bring up these points to discuss the complexities and contradictions in 
NPSV, its conflicts with its nearly identical and equally problematic Model Act, and 
CCS’s own muted versions of the solution of street vendors laid out elsewhere. After an 
outcry from the alliance, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India made small 
changes in the model bill and passed it as the Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of 
Street Vending Bill on 1 May, 2013. CCS and other NGOs are now involved in various 
states to oversee the execution of this bill. They maintain that their work from now on 
will focus on training officials to help execute the reforms.  
Questions Of Epistemology And Methodology 
During an informal conversation, I asked Ram, the CCS representative for the 
Livelihood Champaign, about the fact that hawkers are often seen as a vote bank. He 
replied “I’ve wondered that although hawkers are huge in number, we’ve never really 
been used as vote banks and the reasons again is because we are illegal and 
informal...like say I set up a business here, I’m a person from rural area and I live on the 
street side…I don’t have my identity here… legal identity, and that is why I can never be 
seen as a vote bank…the same happens with a big chunk of street vendors. (2010)”  
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This response by Ram was intriguing. Not because he failed to acknowledge the 
fact that in many instances poor and marginalized are mobilized for political gains -- 
appeased by local politicians only during the time of elections to obtain votes, and 
seldom provided any long-term benefit with this association. What I want to point out 
here instead is that while putting his stance forwards, very quickly Ram switched from a 
second person description to a first person narration even before he finished his first 
sentence. During these conversations he would often use “we” instead of “them” to talk 
about hawkers, even though he has always been an advocate and never actually sold 
goods on the street. This instance captures the complexities of representations. As a 
researcher, I attempt to study the interactions between CCS and hawkers and in the 
process critically examine CCS’s rhetoric which implies that its political interests and the 
political desire of hawkers are identical. CCS claims to represent hawkers, but 
representation, as Spivak (1988) maintains, is often violent where it destroys the ability 
of the one who is represented ( i.e the subaltern) to speak. Spivak (1988) has taken 
western intellectuals such as Foucault and Deleuze, the “best prophets of heterogeneity 
and the Other” (67), to task by pointing out how they tend to conflate darstellen (re-
presentation which is representation as aesthetic portrait) and vertreten (representation by 
proxy or to fill in for or to stand in the place of) while talking about a subject. She writes-
- “these two senses of representation—within state formation and the law, on the one 
hand, and in subject-prediction, on the other--are related but irreducibly discontinuous” 
(70). Marx, according to Spivak, tried to address this textuality seriously. In The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, he explains that the peasants cannot represent 
themselves and have to be represented. Here by representation, Marx means vertreten and 
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acknowledges the mechanics of agency in formation of the subject. Deleuze, on the other 
hand, collapses both when he declares that “there is no more representation; there’s 
nothing but action” - “action of theory and action of practice which relate to each other as 
relays and form networks” and hence theory is practice (70).  Foucault also mis-identifies 
agency in his ‘metaphorics of power’ and thereby “masquerade(ing) as the absent non-
represented who lets the oppressed speak for themselves (87).” Both poststructuralist 
theorists end up working with a positivist essentialist assumption and create a universal 
subject of Europe. I agree with Spivak when she says that the failure to recognize one’s 
own complicity in the process of representation results in “essentialist, utopian politics.” 
So instead of helping the subaltern speak, the intellectuals become complicit in creating a 
Eurocentric homogenous subject – thereby silencing the subaltern altogether. The idea of 
politics of representation developed by Spivak is helpful in developing a critique of the 
work of CCS. Ram in the above quote did exactly what Spivak disavows- he spoke for 
hawkers as if he and they were identical. This is perhaps the reason why he demonstrated 
no awareness of such a common cause of frustration among hawkers as noted by 
Bhowmik (2005) – hawkers are promised certain things at the times of the elections but 
get no benefit once the elections are over. Throughout the next few chapters, I will 
demonstrate how the subaltern, here the hawkers, are silenced repeatedly through CCS 
representations. These representations not only essentialize them as a homogenous and 
closed subject but also romanticize their politics.  
According to Roy (2011) Spivak’s work asks us “to study how the subaltern is 
constituted as an object of representation and knowledge — in lieu of the conscientious 
ethnography that claims to speak for the authentic subaltern”(229). Researchers should 
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first deconstruct how the universal subject of Europe is created. Let me show how to do 
this by analyzing the work of Hernando de Soto. I find that his interpretation of informals 
as petty entrepreneurs produces a heroic subaltern. For hawkers, this gross 
romanticization disavows the obstacles that they face not just in the place of their work 
but elsewhere as well. Also, here hawkers are inscribed with single and ahistoric 
consciousness. The historic and structural causes of their position are suddenly removed 
and they are only understood as the legal or nonlegal subjects of the state. Here, the 
subaltern is also considered anything but heterogeneous. When de Soto demands 
legalization of informals as the core solution to their problems, their differential positions 
in terms of caste, gender, and income are fused into one. This is contrary to the reality. 
For example, through my interviews, I have found that most female hawkers face much 
more hardship than their male counterparts. Those who treat hawkers as a uniform 
homogenous group often support faulty ideas and deleterious policies. In chapter 7, I will 
discuss this point further in relation to NPSV, which advocates unionization of hawkers. 
Even though I use Spivak’s work to analyze CCS’s discourse, I note that often 
times Spivak has a paralyzing effect on researchers who wish to study subalterns. After 
all, she never acknowledges varying degree of complicity and leaves everyone equally 
guilty of silencing. In light of this guilt, what is the best way to move past paralysis in 
order to do research that does not silence the subaltern? Spivak herself answers this by 
saying that we are all ‘subject-effects’, and in order to study subalterns meaningfully we 
first need to understand our institutional positioning and accept our complicity in 
constructing the other. We need to unlearn and then learn again from below. So as a 
“native informant” let me first acknowledge my privileged position. I come from a fairly 
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wealthy and upper class family in the metropolitan city of Delhi. I have graduate degrees 
from premier universities of India and the US. I am married to a similarly privileged 
Indian man who has a lucrative corporate job in the US. In the academic world, I have 
been influenced by the Marxist tradition and hence have a proclivity towards issues of 
social justice and politics of resistance. With such a privileged background, matched with 
a strong desire to help, I arrive at the politics of the subaltern with lot of baggage. But I 
feel that trying to tell a story is better than not attempting to tell one. While I am aware 
that my own social and institutional positioning can taint my understandings of various 
issues, I believe that it is still possible to do meaningful research in which the researcher 
learns from below by simply observing and paying attention to discrepancies and 
awkward moments. Because of the very nature of my project, it became essential for me 
to question my own assumptions and learned knowledge. When I started getting 
interested in studying hawkers, my own ideas were not much different from the ones 
followed by CCS. For example, my first inclination was to do something that could help 
hawkers fight corrupt state agents. As my own research project developed and I began 
focusing on the interactions between the think tank and hawkers, to my chagrin I realized 
that I shared many of the assumptions followed by this extreme free market think tank. I 
learned over time that these assumptions were clearly western centric and followed a 
distorted model of the urban utopia, modernity and development. So if my own project 
had not involved the analysis of the interaction between the think tank and hawkers, I 
might have fallen prey to the same claims and generalizations about hawkers that are 
made by various NGOs and think tanks. For my project I did what Spivak asks us to do -- 
rather than make the silences speak, focus on what the text cannot say. To do that, I do 
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not propose any broad claims, policy ideas or solutions to the “problem” of hawkers. I am 
simply not in a position to do so. What I do is to create a dialogue between what CCS 
says and my own observations.  
Methods 
Because of the sheer number of interfaces between hawkers, the state, and 
neoliberal changes, a closed study would not yield meaningful results. There are certain 
methodological implications of raising research questions that demand a spatial analysis 
of entangled spaces of informality. Here an extensive statistical data or complete 
ethnography or an absolute survey of a target group of hawkers of a small section of a 
particular city may not always be rewarding. Ethnography has a tendency to focus too 
much on the subjective experience. While I’m looking for that, I’m also interested in 
different discursive formations and historical contexts, which create hawkers as a subject 
as well as an object. So instead, life biographies of a few hawkers provide a glimpse of 
the entire economic, social and political landscape as well as provide their historical 
contextuality of different spatial conflicts. Life biography is one of the most useful 
methods to build a kaleidoscopic view of street hawkers in a city where neoliberal 
changes have been rolled out. I had numerous formal and informal exchanges with about 
70 hawkers from different parts of Delhi and Jaipur. Some discussions lasted several 
hours while others finished in just few minutes. But each interaction provided a new 
perspective, and that enables me to provide a tale has not been told by the NGOs and 
think tanks such as CCS.  
In order to make entangled spaces of informality speak to each other, I audio and 
video recorded some of the meetings and conferences that CCS had arranged for 
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hawkers. Various government officials, state agents, and urban developers attended these 
conferences. Here I was able to observe first hand the power dynamics between hawkers 
and various groups claiming to represent them during the times of negotiations.  
I also conducted focus group interviews where groups of 4-8 hawkers were asked 
questions. Most of these meetings occurred in natural settings, meaning that hawkers 
were interviewed while they were squatting and selling wares, or when they were taking 
a break.S Since focus groups put these hawkers into a group setting, the interactions 
between them gave me more room to construct their social and environmental issues. 
Here these hawkers formed conversations in which they shared knowledge, challenged 
and contested different perceptions, prejudices, and views while making sense of their 
own. Gloss (1996, 118) maintains that it is this dialogic characteristic in focus group 
interviews that gives a researcher access to ‘multiple and transpersonal understanding’ 
thereby reflecting the discourse that emerges in original context. This methodology also 
allows examination of the process of social meaning-creation in action, as members of 
the groups negotiate (Pratt 2002). When a set of unrelated questions are asked, they might 
not provoke definite answers. In such instances, the discussions between the groups of 
people raise multiple statements that are easily analyzed discursively. For example, even 
though it is evident that the state is hostile to vendors and hawkers, it would be 
interesting to discursively analyze their discussion as a group about their opinions on the 
role of the state. Issues like what areas they think the government should be active in and 
what areas from which the government should withdraw are complex and vendors I 
spoke with had never even thought about such issues actively. Hence, a focus group 
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discussion provided environment for such questions to be discussed in an interactive 
manner.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed how the artificial dualism constructed between formal 
and informal by NGOs and think tanks leads to skewed political practices. In order to 
bypass this dualism, I developed the concept of entangled spaces of informality, where 
different actors and different connected spaces drive informality as a mode of urbanism.  
I explained how understanding hawkers as one of the multiple actors who struggle to 
negotiate meaning and control in the spaces of power can bring new insights to the issues 
surrounding street hawking. It is important to problematize the presence of NGOs and 
think tanks in advocacy campaigns of hawkers and for that reason I have presented the 
differences in epistemology and methodology between their and my own research. I have 
also outlined a historiography of street hawking and the state’s contradictory response to 
it vis-à-vis the development of a democratic Indian nation state. These discussions set the 
stage for the remainder of the chapters, where I analyzed CCS’s stance towards hawking 
and the anti- hawking characteristics of NPSV. 
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Chapter 5:  Public Space: The Transformation of Streets into a Capitalist 
Commodity 
Introduction 
The premise of this chapter is that a neoliberal approach treats space as a capitalist 
commodity. Space as a commodity should be accessible through a service-delivery 
system that should be based on the market mechanism. According to neoliberal 
proponents, the optimal distribution of space is only possible when it is justly bought and 
sold on the market. Those who can afford it are entitled to it, and those who cannot-- such 
as street hawkers--should leave. CCS extends this line of thought to urban vending space 
and hence, all pro-hawking ideas or solutions that come from their direction require 
analysis. Most of CCS’s ideas of space as a capitalist commodity find expression in the 
so called “pro-hawking” National Policy of Street Vendors, 2009 and hence it becomes 
critical to analyze that as well. On deeper analysis, we see that NPSV engages in the 
rearrangement of space with a neoliberal rationality. As Bandyopadhya et al (2012) note, 
the NPSV is a part of a larger strategy to discipline and document the Indian retail 
structure as a realm in which corporate and foreign multinational entry in retail is sought 
after and hence the presence of hawkers is deemed pre-modern and undesirable. In this 
chapter, first I will discuss CCS’s version of public space and their vision of hawkers in 
it. Second, I will show how the creation of hawking and no hawking zones which CCS 
demands through enactment of NPSV is a neoliberal rearrangement of space that disrupts 
the social culture of Indian streets.  
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Public Space 
Different facets of the politics of street vending boil down to one core issue–the 
contestation of public space (Yatomo 2008, Cross 1998a &b, Hansen 2004, Hunt 2009, 
García- Rincón 2007). Yet, scholars have noted that the access to public space by street 
vendors has not been given its scholarly due (Pratt 2002, García- Rincón 2007). When 
talking about the conflict of public space one has to pay attention to two things. First, 
understanding that the conflict over who controls public space, the “street”, in part stems 
from inherent contradictions and confusions in defining what the “public” means in 
“public space.” There are various interpretations of “public” that work for or against each 
other, often enabling or stifling one another. Second, the popularized versions of public 
space are western constructs and need to be problematized when applied to the Indian 
context (Kaviraj 1997, Favero 2003). The act of imprinting the western concept of public 
space onto Indian ‘spaces of  common’ lies at the heart of the current contestations over 
public space in India. So what exactly is public space? Gulick (1998) maintains that the 
literature on public space and its disappearance concentrates on three overarching 
connotations. I will discuss each of these connotations at length in the context of India 
and then move on to show how CCS takes part in diminishing the openness of the public 
character of public space, something that particularly hurts street vendors. 
In my research, I find that public space is a good entry point to discuss and 
analyze the ideas of CCS regarding streets hawkers and the solutions they prescribe to the 
problems of street hawking in urban space. In order to analyze CCS’s stance on hawkers 
in public space, it is important to understand exactly how CCS visualizes hawkers in 
urban public space. I have found that instead of promoting one unified vision of hawkers’ 
presence in space, CCS proposes different and conflicting visions. In their publications, 
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such as Law, Liberty and Livelihood and Ward Power, they vacillate between advocating 
ward-level governance of streets or public space and favoring complete private 
ownership of these spaces. In public conferences, seminars and meetings with NGOs and 
hawkers, they ask specifically for two things: street hawking zones and formal 
legalization of all the existing hawkers (i.e giving permits to all of them instead of a 
select few). These parallel and incongruous stances help CCS achieve different goals and 
success with different audiences. Arnoldi (2007) asks us to look at a small advocacy 
think tank as a “nodal statement disseminator, and ‘impartational hub” (62), which tend 
to focus less on generating large-scale research and more on picking discrete ideas and 
brokering them in mass media. While the idea of private ownership of public space may 
sound appealing to free market sympathetic media, multilateral agencies like the World 
Bank and big corporations, ward level governance find friends in the emerging new urban 
middle class, elite Citizen Groups, and Resident Welfare Associations. The model of 
creating hawking and no hawking zones is advanced by other NGOs like NASVI, and 
here instead of facing the danger of being “ignored or dis-counted because the institution 
is perceived as rigid and predictable” (Weaver, 1989, 568), CCS changes its demand and 
asks for the designation of hawking zones that have been proposed by others.  This is a 
move to adapt and form a place within the bigger NGO network. CCS representatives, 
only in front of hawkers, would mention legalization of hawkers, i.e giving all existing 
hawkers the legal right to practice their livelihood. Arnoldi (2007) rightly maintains that 
the discrete ideas of think tanks should not be seen simply as reproducing certain 
discursive formations or ideologies. There is one more logic at work here-- the logic of 
attention (62). CCS’s different and conflicting ideas are promoted where ever they are 
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suited best to garner as much attention as possible. These insights are essential for 
understanding the hegemonic politics of neo-liberal think tanks. 
Public space: From unruly streets to private roads 
Gulick’s first connotation identifies public spaces as those “properties where right 
of a private person to exclude another person from ‘habitation’ is suspended” (136). In 
Delhi, this notion of public space has its origins after the first Indian rebellion for 
freedom in 1857 when the British assumed power by overthrowing the last Mughal 
emperor. Prior to this era in the Mughal city of Delhi, the society was studded by 
different races, castes, communities, and religions, where bazaars, streets, squares 
primarily were “a male domain, were spaces of anonymity, identity, display, and 
interaction” (Chakrabarty 2002, Ballhatchet 1980, Kaviraj 1997, Hosagrahar 2005). 
Kaviraj (1997) maintains that the public/private division is a result of western concepts of 
modernity and is often conflated with traditional Indian cultural concepts of inside/ 
outside, own/others, self/not-self. He further calls Indian open areas ‘spaces of common’ 
instead of public space. Unlike western public spaces, which are based on the notion of 
universality of access, these spaces of common had their own inherent norms of 
inclusion. These space of common or indigenous public space were regulated by “a 
traditional logic of strict nonuniversalism” and “ by logic of segregation and a strict 
doctrine of appropriateness and title”(90). However when the British took over, they 
deemed such spaces of common not only dirty, unhealthy, and unsafe, but also as spaces 
of opportunity where they could create “a secular publicness that aimed to celebrate the 
libertarian ideas of benevolent government” (Hosagrahar 2005, 55). Gradually, some 
public spaces (like newly constructed parks) in Indian cities became modern private 
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property of the state, accessible to all, irrespective of differences. This universal 
character, however, always was and is misleading as, instead of Hindu traditional logics 
of inclusion and exclusion, now it is the bourgeois state that formulates laws governing 
the use of its property. As Kilian (1998) writes, “such laws have usefully vague wordings 
[that] can be used and are enforced quite selectively…(may) legalize the practice of 
spatial segregation that developed independently of a law and that subsequently came to 
be seen as proper” (119-20). The disappearance of public space with regards to the 
conception of property would mean closure of property to “only those marginal social 
groups –street hawkers, sex workers, the homeless- who rely on it for their material 
maintenance” (Gulick 1998, 136). To explain it further, in pre-capitalist Indian societies, 
“the rich repertoire of concepts of common responsibility, obligation, and action” deemed 
beggars, homeless, and even street hawkers appropriate in the public space (Kaviraj 
1997, 89). But in neoliberal Indian cities, instead of the traditional logic of inclusion and 
the doctrine of appropriateness, market rationalities frame the laws that define the terms 
of access to public space. For example, although CCS works for the cause of street 
hawkers, bemoans their eviction from public spaces, and often says that hawkers have a 
right to be in public spaces,42 they outline a contradictory understanding of public space 
in Law, Liberty, and Livelihood: “This “factor of production”, that is, the space used by 
the street vendors is often not designated or intended for their use, but has been paid for 
by the tax-payers’ money and designated for other uses—streets or pavements for 
example. By using these spaces to hawk their wares, a “public good” is getting diverted 
to private use and a rent is being charged by those who have not invested in the public 
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 During my ethnography and interviews Amit rhetorically declared several times that 
hawkers have the right to be in the public space. 
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goods. This represents a diversion and deprivation of the tax payer’s right” (Shah and 
Mandava 2005, 74). 
Here CCS implies that the actual owners of public space, which at present 
unfortunately functions as a “factor of production” in the informal economy, are neither 
hawkers nor the State but the tax-paying citizens. By doing this CCS outlines its vision of 
who is qualified to be an actual citizen and who is not. Spaces, more particularly public 
space, have been known to be one of the important sites where “citizenship is forged, 
given meaning, contested, and changed” and yet the role of these sites in citizenship 
formation is overlooked (Marston and Mitchell 2005, Staeheli 2009). In the cities where 
neoliberal rationalities are just starting to penetrate into policy making, streets as public 
space become sites of intense upheaval where the meaning of citizenship is constantly 
rearticulated. Hunt (2009) describes how in Columbia, public space was recovered from 
street vendors in order to preserve it as a privileged site for citizenship. Here public space 
is conceived as an exclusive site “for citizens, thus intimately linking space and 
citizenship to a political space other than the national territory” (Gledhill 2005, Hunt 
2006). Ong (2006) explains this further, saying that the “components formerly tied to 
citizenship- rights, entitlements, as well as nation and territoriality- are becoming 
disarticulated from one another and rearticulated with governing strategies that promote 
an economic logic in defining, evaluating, and protecting certain categories of subject and 
not others” (16). Of course, geographies of consumption have established how a certain 
kind of public space is produced in order to create the ideal consumer citizen. I will delve 
into this detail while discussing the next connotation of public space. First, here I want to 
bring attention to how CCS, through quotes like above, promotes the ideas of bourgeois 
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ownership of public space thereby rearticulating citizenship in terms of proprietorship. 
Urban governance and the state in many Indian cities are going through a wave of 
restructuring influenced by the changing conception of public space, and I will go into 
the details of this further while talking about the bhagidari system in the next chapter.  
In the above quote, the “other uses” or the more appropriate use refers to the use 
of streets as roads that are meant only for commuting and fast transportation. CCS’s 
version of streets is akin to Lefebvre’s ideal “representation of space”--the space of 
planners, scientists, urbanists etc. Shetty (2012) writes that in the discipline of planning, 
the language of cartography is employed to plan urban areas. Here the streets are straight 
lines between polygons that represent private properties. The planners conceive of this 
space between polygons for passing through and nothing else. Anjaria (2012), agreeing 
with this view, maintains that “the street is an object of spatio-legal regimes and a 
technocratic gaze – of policy makers’, planners’ and engineers’ visions” (8/13). However, 
it is important to note that CCS’s notion of streets takes the view of government-
sponsored planners one step further. CCS, in their publication Law Liberty and 
Livelihood book chapter called “Urban Land Management Plans: Master plan for 
Disaster” writes: “Planning tools think of the community as a static concept, which is 
why it is presumed that the future can be determined reliably and controlled by local and 
regional governments…the zonal plans prepared at the local levels and also land-use 
regulations don’t integrate development as a fundamental element of the plan or planning 
process” (Shah and Mandava 2005, 173). 
Indeed, the problem with planners is that they conceive of streets as public space 
with a functional value where they only serve as roads for commuting. CCS too 
 136 
 
vehemently criticizes this sort of planning mechanism but only because the planners here 
don’t give preference to the community. CCS bemoans how the community is treated as 
static, when in a real sense it is dynamic. What does CCS mean by dynamic? One may be 
led to believe that dynamic community should encompass all the actors that are present 
on the streets, for example, the upper and middle income propertied residents, lower 
income households, slums and informal houses that mushroom in and around formal 
neighborhoods, street performers who survive by creating scenes of spectacle, itinerant 
yogis and sadhus
43
 who take refuge under a big street tree for many weeks at a time, 
gardeners and street sweepers who mingle with the local crowd at specific hours of the 
day, local paan 
44
 and cigarettes shops that attract idle urban onlookers, household help, 
maids, hawkers and vendors, rickshaw pullers. But unfortunately many of these people 
find no place in CCS’s so-called dynamic community. CCS’s community is one that 
knows how to “adapt and grow as per the changing needs and preference of the time” 
(173), i.e the neoliberal time. It is a community represented by the people who own the 
polygons along the streets and those who have adapted to the neoliberal rationalities and 
desire an ordered and neat public space. This community that is constituted solely of the 
propertied class has a bigger function to perform: 
In view of the performance-nuisance conflict inherent to the issue, a 
framework involving private property rights offers us the most effective policy 
solutions. Remember that most encroachments that happen- from hawkers to 
slums- are usually on public space owned by the government, spaces not vested as 
private property. Anything other than property rights based approach will not 
                                                          
43
 Yogis and sadhus are hermits belonging to various sects of Hinduism, who are often 
found roaming on the streets and taking refuge under big shady trees on the roadside to 
meditate or talk to their followers.  
44
 Betel leaf stuffed with a variety of things such as addictives like betel nut, tobacco or 
coconut, and fruit preserves is smoked and consumed widely in South and South- East 
Asia.   
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work in the long term and will serve only as a temporary solution. It is only 
private parties that have every incentive to seek negotiable and voluntary 
solutions for unforeseen problems (Shah and Mandava 2005, 85). 
 
Here not only does CCS imply that the tax paying citizens should have more 
control over the streets than those who do not pay, they declare that the only solution to 
the problem of street vending is legal privatization of public space, that is, the streets. If 
the community owns public space wherever it exists, encroachment is not an issue. Here 
for CCS, the “right to be there” is exchanged with the language of “encroachment”. In 
this regard, elsewhere CCS has called for the repeal of the Urban Land Ceiling Act 
(discussed in chapter 7).
45 Let me take a moment here to tie this vision of a private public 
space to my earlier argument on civil society and the state in the context of neoliberal 
India.  
As discussed earlier, Chatterjee (1986) has described the Indian struggle for 
independence as a kind of passive revolution that after its success did nothing to eradicate 
colonial institutional structures or the pre-capitalist dominant class. This passivity was 
due to the relative weakness of modernizing the bourgeoisie who after independence 
were forced to form an alliance with the rich peasantry and the state’s planning elite in 
order to lead the transformation. It was the state’s planning elite or ‘the body of expert’ 
that were to helm Nehru’s modernist nationalist vision via planned development, 
maintaining the relative autonomy and managing the competing interest of the bourgeois 
and other dominant classes. Gradually their relative autonomy started eroding and they 
began forming an alliance with the pre-capitalist forces in order to survive (Kaviraj 1984, 
233). However, this state bureaucratic agency, which was still based on the colonial 
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 The Land Ceiling Act of 1976 prohibited concentration of urban land in the hands 
of a few people, aimed to avoid speculation of land and profiteering, and intended 
to bring about an equitable distribution of land to serve the common good. 
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institutional infrastructure, practiced domination through the non-discursive politics of 
command (225). Yet another important feature of this agency was that it “had feet of 
vernacular clay (227).” Fullar and Harriss (2000) explain this further-- “as the state 
expanded, a profound gap developed too between the bureaucratic elite, at home with the 
‘modernist discourse’ which often corresponded fairly well with Weberian rationality, 
and the personnel at a lower level, whose ‘vernacular everyday discourse’ was not 
structured around the principle of formal rationality at all” (8). By the time policies are 
transferred to those “very low in the bureaucracy, they are reinterpreted beyond 
recognition” ( Kaviraj 1991, 91).  
CCS understands this phenomenon when it says “remember that most 
encroachments that happen- from hawkers to slums- are usually on public space owned 
by the government, spaces not vested as private property (Shah and Mandava 2005, 85).” 
What CCS through its advocacy politics is trying to do is get rid of the lower level of 
bureaucracy that has ‘feet of vernacular clay’ and readily give concessions to poor. In 
that way they are attempting to make encroachment of public space impossible. Instead 
of the lower level of bureaucracy controlling public space, CCS believes that private 
individuals with rich bank accounts should both manage and own public space. I will 
explain this phenomenon in more detail in the section on Resident Welfare Associations 
and the Bhagidar System in chapter 6.  
Semiotic Public Space: From Streets to Shopping Spaces 
The privatization of public space in the simplest sense means an exchange of 
entitlement to the use of public space from the hands of the government to private parties. 
But it does not end there. Free market ideology demands a certain type of public space in 
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which privatization results in actually changing the physical character of the space. 
Privatizing public space means developing a certain character in space that sheds the 
public nature, the open character that enables people to interpret it in their own subjective 
way. CCS explains its vision for privately owned public spaces: 
That streets can be developed and owned privately is not too far-fetched 
an idea. There are already numerous real world examples of private streets, which 
functions highly effectively. Like the private streets of St. Louis, the streets of 
shopping malls and shopping centers (even the aisles of groceries and department 
stores may be considered), gated communities or towns world-wide, and the rural 
roads owned by associations of property owners in Finland and Sweden (Shah and 
Mandava 2005 180-1). 
 
In order to explain the implications of the privatization of public space or streets, 
let me introduce the second definition of public space by Gulick-- a “democratic semiotic 
space.” Semiotic spaces are those in which artifacts correspond to a sign system that 
make them open to visual consumption and sensual experience. These are the places 
“where the meanings are mediated by the intentions of [three variants] - landscape 
architects, the practices of landscape inhabitants, and the latent ‘systems’ (such as a 
capitalist economy, imperial state or a modern totalitarian state) that govern the 
landscape’s development” (Gulick 1998, 137). Perhaps inspired by Arendt’s distinction 
between public space and social space, Gulick declares that the more one-dimensional 
and ahistoric the nature of the landscape, the less democratic or public is the character of 
the public space. For Arendt, the public sphere signifies “a world that is common to us… 
accommodating the political life, the life of freedom from bare necessities” (Arendt 1973 
quoted in Donohoe 2003, 239). The private sphere, on the other hand, accommodates the 
necessities of life. In addition to the public and private sphere is the social sphere, where 
members of the society behave in adherence to shared norms. Social behaviors such as 
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shaking hands or standing neatly in a line are deemed proper. “The social realm is often 
confused with the public realm, but it in fact is exclusive of political action that is 
characteristic of the public realm” (Arendt 1973 quoted in Donohoe 2003, 239); the 
social sphere dismisses the multiplicity of perspectives and follows a common norm 
while the public comprises numerous perspectives of the ones who experience it and all 
who participate in it. A democratic semiotic public space in effect would be that space 
that lets itself be experienced and consumed “without exchanging in the formal process 
of commodity exchange ( Gulick 1998, 135).” These urban sign systems are public 
because they do not govern, produce or surveil the desire of its subjects. 
 The semiotics of public space has been a dominant character in constructing 
Delhi. In 1863, the British established the Delhi Municipal Committee with an aim to 
reinvent the old city and make the changes not just appreciable but also aesthetically 
modern. They were soon disabused of any hopes to control and modernize the dense old 
city with its long history of settlement and the population’s growing disobedience, open 
protests, legal appeals, subversive construction, delays, and feigned ignorance 
(Hosagrahar 2005). With the transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi, the British 
realized a need to restore to Delhi its lost ancient grandeur. Outside the old walled city 
they started building a city called New Delhi, a symbol of imperial power and peaceful 
domination. The non-democratic symbolic nature of the new capital of Delhi built by the 
British has not gone unnoticed by scholars (Irvin 1981, Jain 1990, Volwahsen 2002). 
Irvin (1981) compares Rajpath, then called King’s Way, with Grand Trunk Road (2600 
Km) built by Sher Shah Suri in the 16
th
 century, a major symbol of authority and 
administration: “The mile-and –a-half King’s Way, too, embodied an image of 
 141 
 
disciplined action and achievement, recalling those straight roads that betokened 
authority over India” (251). 
Post-independent Delhi’s Master Plan follows the same interventionist 
biopolitical rationality, western modernist vision, and politics of segregation through 
arbitrary laws as well as semiotics that exclude the marginalized. Delhi Development 
Authority (DDA) was constituted in 1957 to manage the space of Delhi and its major task 
was to avoid any haphazard and unplanned growth. Baviskar (2003) notes that the Delhi 
Master Plan “envisaged a modern city, prosperous, hygienic and orderly, but failed to 
recognize that this construction could only be realized by the labors of large numbers of 
the working class poor, for whom no provision had been made in the plan”(91). During 
the 1970s, in the wake of the upcoming Asian games in 1981, a massive construction 
project was taken up to build flyovers and luxury apartments, and in these projects DDA 
violated many of its own regulations for creating symbols of national prestige. Delhi later 
hosted the Commonwealth Games in October 2010, which gave the government a good 
reason to push for and legitimize many infrastructure and urban-renewal projects (Dupont 
2011) that could “finally put the city, and the country, on the world map” (Vinayak and 
Ghosh, 2006, 24). Bhan (2009) has noted how a series of media campaigns--such as the 
one by a leading newspaper Times of India called the transformation of Delhi from the 
“Walled city to World city”-- justified a ban on street food hawkers and vendors from the 
major areas of South Delhi.  
Ironically, in one of the CCS research papers, Viniak and Ghosh (2006) 
acknowledge that the facelift of the city, that is, the aestheticization of the streets of Delhi 
has harsh consequences for the poor and marginalized. They explain how in an effort to 
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rise to global standards “there are numerous steps being taken to transform the face of the 
city, from better street lighting, to sleeker bus shelters to upgrading the airport. This 
effort is resulting in over Rs. 100 Crore
46 
being spent on street furniture and landscaping 
alone (Roy 2006). This will give the city a much needed facelift in terms of utilities like 
bus shelters, dust bins, street lighting and park benches” (Viniak and Ghosh 2006,  26). 
However, the authors question this and shows suspicion that such “developments may be 
anti-poor, badly planned and ecologically unsound” (7).  
With this let me direct attention to the unpublicness of specific public spaces that 
CCS aspires to create. Scholarly research shows that the privately owned public spaces of 
music halls, multiplexes, restaurants, clubs, tourist sites, shopping malls, gated residential 
communities and, more importantly, privately owned streets, are spaces of consumption 
that elevate leisure as a structural realm of everyday life ( Mansvelt 2005, Ritzer 1999, 
Sorkin 1992,  Zukin 1998). The coercive measures that regulate these semi-private public 
spaces such as video surveillance and security guards generally work well to exclude 
undesirable elements, but as Rose (1999) notes, “where consumption is the objective, 
coercive security would be a reminder of the fragility and futility of attempts to consume 
one’s way to pleasure. Hence control must be designed- embedded in the very structuring 
of time, space and environment…artifacts such as flowerbeds, fountains, and street 
sculpture are both aesthetic objects, designed to manifest and induce civility in those who 
pass” (251-252).  
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 This amount converts to about $150 million. 
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The landscape of Delhi epitomizes ‘India’s mall boom’47 with scores of shopping 
malls being constructed every year. Detilleux (2007) describes these spaces as the ‘new 
temples of India,’ dedicated to consumption and leisure where foreign retail chains, 
cinemas, and restaurants invite only the exclusive customers for whom these shopping 
delights are designed. “Window shopping and hanging out in the air-conditioned 
postmodernist environment” promote leisure as a new activity that can only be afforded 
and sustained by the upcoming middle class. Also, this kind of mall culture “promotes 
‘foreign’ as superior to the ‘domestic’ and in turn, reflects and creates aspirations of 
‘success’ as being embedded in global identities” (Dupont 2011, 543). 
The Public Sphere: From Street Bazaars to No Hawking Zones 
Indian streets defy the conception of streets as merely roads for commuters and 
pedestrians. Indian streets have functioned as part of the public sphere since time 
immemorial. A public sphere, according to Gulick (1998), is a place where citizens 
gather and engage in rational critical discourse to outline a common good, and also, 
where one experiences a sentiment of social solidarity. This third conception of public 
space is influenced by Habermas’ and Arendt’s work on the public sphere. Both maintain 
that the public sphere transcends the private realm where one is motivated by personal 
benefits. The public sphere is thus a springboard where the issues for the common good 
of society acquire public relevance (Calhoun 1992, 8). There is a deep relationship 
between the public sphere and civil society, as the former is an important component of 
the latter, a space where citizens can address each other openly. For Habermas, this 
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 See Anuj Kumar’s and Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty’s article ‘In the pursuit of 
pleasure’, The Hindu,20 April 2008. (cited in Dupont 2011) 
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manifestation of the public sphere occurs via rational critical discourses where the public, 
or civil society, confronts the state, which before that had been an “impersonal locus of 
authority” (Habermas 1989).  For Arendt (1973), however, this transformation happens 
when human beings act together in a space of appearance,
48
 the public realm, a field of 
presentation and beginning, not necessarily discursive as in the case of Habermas (Curtis 
2004). So for Arendt the space of appearance is like a public theater, a space of freedom 
in which human beings disclose themselves (Curtis 2004). Influenced by Arendt’s ideas, I 
critique Habermas’ notion of the ideal public sphere for privileging rational discourses in 
the public space. First, this often implies that the bourgeois public spaces must be open 
and orderly in order to facilitate rational discourse. Under this logic, in order to make an 
ideal public sphere for rational discourse, anything disorderly in the space must be tamed. 
I will discuss these disciplining techniques and their spatial implications in detail in the 
section on hawking and no hawking zones. First I explore the problem with giving 
primacy to rational discourse instead of alternate indigenous discourses that are based on 
native knowledge, sometimes influenced by religious beliefs and ideas of kinship. I 
believe that the traditional Indian bazaars, which served as spaces of openness (public 
space) were more politically discursive than CCS’ closed and ordered public spaces such 
as malls and shopping centers. Chakrabarty (2002) writes how the sacred spaces of the 
inside were clean and secure as opposed to the outside spaces of the bazaar or ‘chowk’ 
which were dirty and ridden with ambiguity. The constant risk of a rebellion 
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 For Arendt the spaces of appearance are the spaces of freedom in which human beings 
are disclosed. (Curtis 2004) 
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demonstrated the political nature of public space. Similarly, Guha (1983) highlights the 
importance of rumors in the bazaar in the political mobilization of peasants during 
colonial rule. Attention has also been drawn to the tradition of folklore in public space 
that is not necessarily rational but is sympathetic to the logic of the culture 
(Muthukumaraswamy & Kaushal 2004). These works lead to the second critique of 
Habermas: he constructs a homogenous public sphere. Feminist theorists have recently 
brought attention to something Habermas failed to identify-- the “mulitpulicity of 
publics” or “counterpublics” and their role in democracy. For example, Franser (1992) 
explains:  
The point is that in stratified societies, subaltern counterpublics have dual 
character. On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and 
regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds 
for agitational activities directed towards wider publics. It is precisely in the 
dialectic between these two functions that their emancipatory potential resides. 
This dialectics enables subaltern counterpublics partially to offset, although not 
wholly eradicate, the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by members of 
dominant social groups in stratified society (124). 
 
Indian streets have acted as spaces of appearances where multiple public and 
subaltern counterpublics exist at the same time. Hence, CCS’ ideal public spaces such as 
shopping malls, entertainment parks and private streets lack the most essential character 
that makes a space public – multiplicity of political discourse. 
Hawking And No Hawking Zones 
The rationale behind a pro-hawker’s NPSV is the contribution of street vendors to 
the growth of the urban economy. It states: 
Accordingly, the starting point for this policy is the recognition of the 
positive role of street vendors in providing essential commodities to people at 
affordable prices and at convenient places. It also recognizes the need for 
regulation of street vending by way of designated ‘Restriction-free Vending’, 
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‘Restricted vending’ and ‘No vending’ zones based on certain objective 
principles. Such regulation is consistent with the imperative to ensure free flow of 
traffic, smooth movement of pedestrians and maintenance of cleanliness and 
public hygiene while facilitating vendors/hawkers to sell goods/services at 
convenient locations frequented by the public (NPSV 2009, 2).  
 
There are two key takeaways from the above statement. First, NPSV and its 
creators acknowledge the primacy of the services provided by hawkers rather than 
emphasizing the value of hawkers themselves. This rationale is ultimately anti-hawker 
because if the service value of hawkers is diminished in the future, the supporters of 
NPSV may withdraw their support for hawkers. Second, importance is given to fast-
moving traffic, pedestrians, cleanliness and hygiene over hawkers.  
Having highlighted how these inherent contradictions make NPSV’s pro-hawking 
pursuits anti-hawking in nature, now I will problematize the idea of creating hawking and 
non- hawking zones. For this, Timothy Mitchell’s (1988) concept of enframing, which he 
used to describe colonial spatial “acts of confinement, regulation and supervision of the 
population” (34) in 19th century Egypt, provides an excellent framework.  
Containing Life in Abstract Space 
Mitchell describes enframing as a “method of dividing up and containing, as in 
the construction of barracks or the rebuilding of villages, which operates by conjuring up 
a neutral surface or volume called space” (44). This kind of planning of the space-
segmenting it and putting definite dimensions, introduces it as “abstract and neutral, a 
series of inert frames or containers” (45). Reading from Lefebvre (1991), I understand 
this abstract and neutral space as a space of instrumental rationality, something that is 
fragmented, commodified and homogenized by state planners, capitalists, and technocrats 
for profit. Altering the indigenous “order without framework” arrangement and creating 
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an abstract space makes space relate negatively to “that which perceives and underpins it- 
namely, the historical and religio- political sphere”(1991,50). These enframing practices 
of the city are an attempt to eradicate concrete or lived space, replace spaces of 
representation with the representations of space, and take away local space histories to 
create a hollow container where subjects become more visible and productive. Drawing 
on Foucault’s work, Mitchell indicates that such enframing techniques are the 
panoptification of urban space. The new container space envisaged by the zoning 
practices are easily represented in plans, thereby putting in place a specific kind of spatial 
order. This kind of spatial order as Mitchell notes also produce and codify a “visible 
hierarchy.”  
So what is the Indian street culture and local history of urban street bazzaars that 
NPSV’s zoning recommendations as an enframing practice encroach upon? Appadurai 
declares that “streets and their culture lie at the heart of public life of contemporary life of 
India … they encompass a huge range of activities from worship to business, from 
political protests to funeral and marriage processions” (1987, 13). Modern street culture 
has its origins in the pre-modern thoroughfares and small alleys. This rather cosmopolitan 
street culture emerged in the historical context of pilgrimage and religious travel.  
Traditional Indian bazaars in modern times include roadside shrines and trees as 
sites of worship. A myriad of street actors such as barbers, ear cleaners, tea stall owners, 
knife sharpeners, cobblers, ice candy sellers, and balloon sellers roam the streets at 
different times of day. Streets are also stages of spectacle where various kinds of street 
performers, fortune tellers, snake charmers often attract passerby. There are hawkers who 
sell fruits, vegetables, cooked food, textiles, utensils, magazines, juices.  Private acts, 
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such as brushing teeth, taking a bath, and washing clothes spill over from crowded houses 
onto the streets in densely packed neighborhoods. Also, Indian streets much like 19
th
 
century Parisian arcades are site of a kind of flaneurie, or to be more precise, sites of 
what Appadurai calls “organized idealness” (discussed later in the chapter). People, 
wealthy or poor, who have some time to spare during any part of the day come to hang 
out at the local paan and beedi49 corner simply gazing at the passersby. Encompassing 
this variety of actors, the overarching characteristics of Indian street culture in the words 
of Appadurai are that “there is something shared, which justifies the use of singular. Two 
most important features of what is shared are the great range of activities that occur on 
Indian streets and give them their ambiance and the way that which street culture blurs 
the line between private and public life” (17). What he means is that the streets are 
“spaces of common” where life unfolds and every subjective expression is acceptable. 
This range of activates and multiplicity of subjective experiences form the basis of Indian 
street culture and public culture in general that zoning practices desire to order and 
segment.  
Chandu, an itinerant vendor whose life biography I documented, let me follow 
him during the days to document his time spent on the street. While selling vegetables on 
the streets, Chandu manages to do all sorts of other activities. He practically lives on the 
streets, although he has a small shack in the nearby slum that he built with the help of 
loans taken from his wealthy customers, including my mother. While selling on the 
streets, he eats from nearby food stalls, listens to news on the radio while taking an 
afternoon nap on the pavement, plays cards and board games with fellow hawkers during 
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 Beedi is a type of indigenous cigarette. 
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non-peak times, and assists countless lost travelers and passersby with directions. During 
these lazy hours of the afternoon, Chandu mingles with not just other vendors but also 
with the nearby household help, plays street cricket with them and the rich kids, and 
sometimes helps them fulfill certain household tasks. Sometimes, even the female heads 
of household from the nearby residences call him to do work in their homes by changing 
a light bulb, helping in an upcoming wedding celebration, or fetching a locally made 
mortar and pestle from the nearby industrial district.  
There is a specific kind of sociability associated with the streets, shared by lower-
income hawkers, street sweepers, gardeners and upper or middle income residents that 
zoning practices of segmenting and abstraction erodes; in this way, the regulations are 
more anti-hawker than pro hawker. As mentioned above, these spatial orders produce and 
enforce a spatial hierarchy as the politics of zoning involves not just creation of abstract 
space but also the politics of outlining such spaces. Deciding which neighborhoods or 
roads should have a hawking zone and which should not, is not an a-political decision. 
For example, Ashok Vihar, a wealthy neighborhood in northwest Delhi, has forty-six 
Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs). In an interview with the treasurer of Ashok 
Vihar’s main RWA that encompass all the smaller ones, I was told that members of 
different RWAs constantly fight with each other on various issues. One such issue is 
where to demarcate hawking zones. Each RWA wants a hawking zone in close proximity 
but not within its own territory. Also, wealthy households try to get their streets to be 
“hawker free.” The president of the same RWA mentioned that people want to buy 
vegetables on the way home from the office. They don’t want hawkers to be squatting 
near their own homes, but they don’t mind if the hawkers are in a residential area as long 
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as they are near someone else’s home. The city of Mumbai saw similar disagreements in 
1998 when Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), the Municipal Corporation of 
Greater Mumbai, started allotting hawking and non-hawking zones. Rajagopal (2001) 
describes how residents of various neighborhoods revolted against hawking zones being 
placed in their neighborhoods. Some were powerful enough to send petitions to the courts 
requesting that the locations of hawking zones be moved. BMC reacted to these petitions 
excluding hawking zones from those neighborhoods. In fact, Rajagopal notes that every 
important hawking venue of the city of Mumbai was made into a non-hawking zone on 
the pretext of protecting public thoroughfares, parks, gardens and other entertainment 
attractions. Pertinent here is the discussion on the issue of the natural market that NPSV 
seeks to preserve. Bhowmik (2010) complains how the model act ignores the concept of 
natural markets. He writes: 
These markets spring up in places where the consumers find them useful. 
Hence there will be street vendors outside railway stations and bus depots. People 
returning from a tiring day at work would rather purchase their necessities from 
these vendors rather than make a detour and go to the market situated a few 
kilometres away. Similarly, there will be fruit sellers, food vendors, etc, outside 
public hospitals and fruit sellers and flower sellers outside temples. Hence natural 
markets serve the interests of the people and they are convenient. The national 
policy suggests that instead of forcibly removing such markets the municipalities 
should try to regularize them by allotting space. Unfortunately the model law on 
the other hand completely ignores the issue of natural markets (13). 
 
Through support of NPSV, CCS accepts the importance of preservation of natural 
markets. In an interview, Ram mentioned that CCS is demanding the creation of a 
hawking zone in the natural markets--“We advocated the idea called the natural 
market…so that’s why CCS has asked while demarcating hawking zones, the idea of the 
natural market also be considered. Let’s say we have a temple, on a cross section. People 
go to the temple and while there, they can buy their groceries. There are streets that are 
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busy, where people while returning from work can buy the vegetables without taking a 
detour.”  
In this quote, Ram mentions the importance of natural markets and demands 
creation of permanent hawking zones in the spaces of natural markets. But the above 
discussion on the politics of enframing shows how the creation of hawking zones in the 
natural markets can be controversial because of the presence of RWAs. CCS itself in 
their publication Law Liberty and Livelihood describes the problems with the creation of 
zones in the natural markets because of commonly ensuing corruption. Shah and 
Mandava (2005) write that “invariably, some of the most profitable zones for hawking 
will lie within the no-hawking zones. And the hawker will keep returning there and will 
be willing to pay requisite amounts in the form of illegal payments to the regulatory 
authorities to enable them to start or continue their trade” (78-9). Of course, the solution 
that CCS gives to this problem is privatization of urban space and handing the Ward 
Committee, which is comprised of wealthy residents, the authority to delineate hawking 
zones. They argue that the residents or private interests will regulate the streets better 
than the government because they will not permit unlawful encroachment. This move is 
the most anti-hawker in the long term. I will discuss this further in the section on the 
politics of RWAs in the next chapter. 
Dividing Space to Bifurcate the Social 
The second feature of street culture that Appadurai discusses is the blurred 
boundary of public and private life. This very characteristic is eroded by the second 
spatial strategy of enframing described by Mitchell. Enframing creates a fixed distinction 
between the outside and inside, between the bourgeois interior and the public exterior. 
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Mitchell describes how colonialism in Africa tried to create fixed boundaries between 
inside and outside via domestic architecture and urban design, thereby codifying 
community, family, and gender relations in a manner alien to the African system of 
domestic order. In a similar vein Grover (2007) notes the development of public space as 
a discourse during British colonial rule in India. The new public spaces, although visibly 
not much different than the indigenous spaces of common, included some subtle and 
invisible differences that were significant. “By naming certain urban properties and 
spaces ‘public,’ drafting rules governing what activities could take place there, and 
enforcing these rules through new urban institutions, the colonial government created 
both a concept and a corporeal substance – public space - that had no prior history in 
Indian cities” (Grover 2007, 212). Also, unlike the western outside that was subject to 
control, surveillance and discipline, the indigenous outside is “not amenable to control. 
The exterior is abandoned to an intrinsic disorderliness. No order, rules, restraints can be 
expected there” (Kaviraj 1997, 99). Although the sensibilities of neoliberal India have 
changed and private acts such as bathing or urinating or sleeping are deemed improper in 
public space, these acts do not simply cease to happen. We can identify the creation of 
zones and enforcement of the boundary of inside and outside as part of a new wave of 
enframing practices, the first being the introduction of the concept of public space in 
India.  
Initiating a Tourist Gaze 
The last spatial strategy of enframing is to provide a place from which the 
individual can observe. The individual could survey the city, as a means of “abstracting 
and objectifying the built environment” (Myers 2003). This strategy forwards the idea of 
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the world as an exhibition and initiates a tourist gaze. This strategy through which the 
character of Indian streets that has been marked by a “profusion of personal encounters” 
(Ahuja 1997) is changed to not just cater to tourists and wealthy clientele but also turn an 
ordinary customer into an observer who is both inside and outside at the same time.  One 
such hawking zone that I studied was Vidhyadhar Nagar mandi in Jaipur. The head of 
CCS, Parth Shah, invited me to study CCS’s work for street hawkers, by spending time 
with Ram, the national coordinator of their Livelihood Campaign. Ram at that time had 
moved to Jaipur on request of the corporate funder for their project of street hawkers. The 
corporate funder wanted CCS to partner with another NGO which had already been 
working on street hawkers. Also, the state of Rajasthan, of which Jaipur is the capital, 
was perceived to be somewhat receptive and open to implement NPSV. Ram through his 
contacts with the other NGO learned of a model hawking zone which had been created 
about 8 years prior in a fairly wealthy, newly developed colony called Vidhyadhar Nagar. 
The hawkers of the mandi were resettled from a busy road near the city center which had 
been declared a non-hawking zone. Along with a six by six meter spot in which to hawk, 
the hawkers were given small subsidized residential plots just behind the mandi. They 
were strictly asked not to hawk outside the hawking zones if they wanted to retain their 
spots and residential plots. Although the mandi was not part of the street, it is important 
to study it as a hawking zone because most of the proposals for hawking zones by NGOs 
ask for spaces that could be constructed like a mandi, where hawkers squat in multiple 
rows between which the customers can navigate. Generally mandis sell only fruits and 
vegetables but occasionally one would find hawkers selling household supplies like 
utensils. Ram took me to the mandi with him on the very first day of my fieldwork. He 
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immediately assumed that I had come to him to help in his work for street hawkers and if 
I needed information from him, it was only appropriate that I help him in his work. 
Vidhyadhar Nagar mandi was indeed cleaner than any other mandi I had ever visited. I 
was introduced to the head of the mandi’s hawkers association, a man called Ghyan 
Shyam. Over the course of one month, I became friends with Ghyan Shyam, and had 
many opportunities to study Ram’s interactions with Ghyan Shyam. Ram, when 
introducing me to Ghyan Shyam, explained how was trying to help him and the mandi 
conduct better sales. Ghyan Shyam mentioned that although the hawkers had proper 
spaces to squat and had licenses, they were not making enough money. In fact their sales 
had gone down in the previous 5 years and few customers came to the mandi.  
Ghayn Shyam explained: 
“When we moved here we were very happy as we had our own fixed 
space to hawk. But looking back we regret it because we were doing much better 
business before. When we moved here this area was still being developed. Now 
there are so many posh colonies. A number of departmental stores have opened 
here like Reliance Fresh, Sudiksha, Handloom, More and people prefer to get 
their vegetables from there…within a few days of the opening of these stores, our 
sales went down. Now we cannot go back to our previous spots because there is 
no space to hawk there and even that place has all these departmental stores.  
 
 Another big problem is that even though we have fixed hawking spaces in 
this mandi, we have a kind of secluded location. People cannot even see the 
mandi from the street as the gate is located in the back street. They have to go out 
of their way to make a visit to the mandi...and nowadays everyone is busy. They 
don’t have time to make a special trip to the mandi…they would rather stop some 
place on their way to work or way to home to buy groceries. So for us one good 
solution is to relocate this mandi to a better location that has more accessibility 
and lesser number of departmental stores. Also we need basic amenities in the 
mandi like toilets. The government should provide help in keeping the mandi 
clean. Right now we are doing it ourselves with very limited resources that we 
have but if the government has made us settle here…than they should provide 
some kind of amenities (2010).”  
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Although Vidhyadhar Nagar was a fairly dense colony, wealthy residents didn’t 
come to the mandi. Ghayn Shyam asked my help to understand the reason behind it. 
Meanwhile Ram proposed that I conduct a survey of 40 upper-income households to find 
out the reason they avoid the mandi. I was asked to prepare a questionnaire that would 
ask questions about the cleanliness of the mandi, behaviors of hawkers, and the quality of 
time spent in the mandi.  
Before conducting the survey, I asked Ram what he thought the reasons were 
behind the reduced clientele of the mandi and what his suggestions were for increasing it. 
Over a month’s time Ram outlined the reasons he thought the mandi had low clientele 
and discussed a number of suggestions that he thought of implementing in order to tackle 
the problem. During his explanations, he constantly compared the mandi with the newly 
opened department stores that were taking away the mandi’s clients.  
The first problem identified by Ram was that the mandi is dirty. Although this 
mandi was cleaner than others, he maintained that it cannot compete with the modern 
department stores where great efforts are put into cleanliness, order and symmetry. Some 
of the customers agreed that department stores were cleaner than the mandi and that was 
the reason they liked to shop there. Ram suggested multiple solutions to revamp the 
appearance of the mandi to attract middle income groups. He said that the mandi should 
be cleaned twice a day. Sometimes the entrance is clogged by a herd of cows or group of 
stray dogs who feed on the refuse from the mandi, so care should be taken to keep stray 
animals out at all times. The items that are sold should be properly washed or cleaned if 
possible. The pavement used to display the products should be covered with clean cloths 
instead of old drab material. Measures should be taken to avoid dust blowing in the wind. 
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For example, water can be sprinkled twice a day to settle the dust already in the air or 
avoid further dust from accumulating. The vendors should make sure to bathe everyday 
and wear clean clothes. Ram never acknowledged that these measures could be expensive 
and laborious and never explained how the poor vendors would find funds to accomplish 
these tasks. Many people surveyed mentioned that mandis are generally dirty but they did 
not say that this deterred them from going. In fact some did not even know that there was 
a mandi nearby, as it was hidden behind a temple and the mandi was no allowed to put 
any sings on the busy main road. Also the entrance to the mandi was located on the side 
street where the lower income neighborhood starts and hence none of the residents from 
the wealthier areas were drawn there.  
Another issue that Ram discussed was that very often people go to department 
stores to eat. Some of the retail department stores in Jaipur, such as Handloom, have a 
separate snack section where a variety of snacks such pav bhaji, chawmine, chaat, chole 
bhature are available for hungry customers. Many people go to the departmental stores 
for a quick meal or evening snack and end up buying their groceries in the same location. 
In order to attract these customers to the mandi, Ram believed that the character of the 
mandi should undergo massive change. It should function not as specialized vegetable 
market, but more like a fair or carnival. Mandis should not only allow snack vendors to 
put up stalls on their premises, they should also encourage people from their nearby 
community to put out stalls for traditional Rajasthani food like dal bati churma, Sangar 
sabzi and bajra roti, halwa and badaam milk. Also some games kiosks should be opened 
to keep the children entertained. Again, mandis should be cleaned daily so that they have 
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hygienic surroundings for people who want to enjoy a snack while they shop for their 
groceries. 
All the above suggestions made by Ram imply that the wholesale vegetable 
mandis which have functioned as natural markets are no longer relevant in the age of 
retail stores and malls. These mandis now have to function like tourist spots, where the 
attraction does not end at buying. Spending time in the mandi should be a complete 
experience to the customers, where they are not just buying produce but observing the 
scene, and enjoying while observing. With this technique of enframing, Mitchell (1988) 
describes how “the relation of a person to the world (is) changed from being ‘natural’ to a 
‘careful and curious construction’. The subject (is) set up outside the facades, like the 
visitor to an exhibition, and yet (is) surrounded and contained by them. It (is) a position at 
once both of outside and inside…The world is set up before an observing subject as 
though it were the picture of something”(60). This artificial enframing attempts to create 
a space of representation dominated by commodity entertainment instead of other forms 
of social practices and relations. The subject here also undergoes change. As I mentioned 
before, the Indian street scene, maintains Appadurai (1987), is a site of organized idleness 
where people just gather and simply watch the activities of the street or random 
passersby. In fact, organized idleness or “hanging around is a highly cultivated aspect of 
Indian street culture, and here certain settings like paan and cigarettes shops are the key 
backdrops” (20). During the hours of hustle and bustle, “there is always a steady audience 
of those who are in no hurry to go anywhere” and can simple sit and gaze on the streets 
for hours while consuming numerous cups of tea and cigarettes from the local vendors. 
Enframing as a technique attempts to change this organized idleness into Flânerie.      
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In order to understand the difference between organized idleness and Flânerie, let 
me first explain what a Flâneur or Flânerie signifies. Western literature on shopping malls 
explains them as sites of collective dreaming, pleasure and diversion (Backes 1970). 
Malls are often believed to be characterized by a certain kind of strolling by the Flâneur. 
In his famous work on the 19
th
 century Paris arcades in The Arcades Project, Walter 
Benjamin (1999) theorizes the Flâneur as a cultural being who took pleasure in strolling 
through the arcades where luxury goods and people were displayed for visual 
consumption. 
Benjamin highlights the functional nature of the Flâneur as the consumer of the 
phantasmagoria, or the fantastic display of malls. I believe that the Flâneur is also a 
producer, for without him there would be no need for the phantasmagoria. Flânerie, an 
activity of the Flâneur, is strolling in the city, observing the landscape, people, their 
behavior, noticing small ephemeral things, and reading the city as text. Flânerie for 
Benjamin involved a dialectical image of the landscape: “We know that, in the course of 
Flânerie, far–off times and places interpenetrate the landscape and the present moment” 
(1999, M 2,4). It is possible to recognize a similar cultural identity as a near embodiment 
of the Flâneur in modern times and in completely different landscapes. According to 
Gluck (2003), the modern day Flâneur can assume diverse roles such as a privileged 
bourgeois male with a destabilized masculinity (Wolff 1990) or a detective investigating 
social space (Frisby 1994) or an urban consumer participating in mass culture (Schwartz 
1998). However, in my opinion there is a subtle difference in the basic characteristics of 
the Flâneur and any other kind of observer, as the identity of Flâneur is tied to a specific 
kind of visual consumption that is only related to phantasmagoria and capitalistic 
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commodity culture. The figure of the Flâneur is believed to have disappeared from the 
streets of Paris. But Buck- Morris (1986) maintains that “if the Flâneur has disappeared 
as a specific figure, it is because the perceptive attitude which he embodied saturates 
modern existence, specifically, the society of mass consumption… and the Flâneur, thus, 
becomes extinct only by exploding into myriads of forms, the phenomenological 
character of which, no matter how new they may appear, continue to bear his traces” 
(104- 105). What this enframing technique attempts to do is change the indigenous 
observer, the one who participates in organized idleness, into a Flâneur who is active 
observer of nothing else but commodity culture and capitalistic display. 
Another issue brought up by Ram during our conversations was how essential it 
was for the mandi vendors to trade their traditional scales for electronic machines. He 
maintained that these antiquated scales are sometimes faulty and create mistrust among 
the customers. Some vendors even use stones that they pick from the streets instead of 
weights. Ram also mentioned that the vendors should put fixed price placards in front of 
their produce in order to gain the trust of customers. According to him, customers get 
frustrated with the invariable bickering on the rates of products at the mandi. This was 
intriguing considering the fact that during the survey many of residents maintained that 
sometimes the department stores are more expensive than the mandi. Also, hardly any 
customers showed any concern about the weighting stones and scales and there was a 
general feeling of trust towards the poor vendors in comparison to the big retail stores. 
Two questions arise from this conversation. Why did Ram feel that changes in the 
weighing techniques from traditional to modern were essential in making the mandi 
successful, even though customers didn’t note this as a deterrent? Why did the customers 
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prefer the big departmental stores in comparison to the traditional mandi, even though the 
mandi was often cheaper?  
To answer these questions let me point to an observation made by Rajagopal 
(2001), who calls the hawker a contested figure in Indian modernity. This contestation is 
evident in conversations with Ram, who though tasked with helping hawkers, believes 
that the fact that the hawkers use pre-capitalist modes and technologies to sell their 
products makes them ancient in the circuits of the modern global consumerist world. 
Haggling, though not a big cause of concern in the eyes of the customers, appears 
disruptive to Ram. He maintains that it is important to avoid haggling and instead 
approximate more standard capitalistic exchange through fixed placards. This shift 
thereby changes the sensory experience between the seller and the customer from an 
auditory interaction to a fixed, visual, and disembodied mode of communication. Since 
hawkers change their rates for different customers, especially by charging more money 
for the same product when that are dealing with a wealthy customer, Ram argues that this 
change of communication will ensure customers trust. 
Ghayn Shyam, however, did not seem to agree with the Ram on the issue of 
weights and scales. One day while explaining how the mandi is a better place to shop for 
vegetables, he explained the benefit to customers of having traditional weights and scales 
versus electronic ones:  
“These malls have electronic balances but we have traditional balances. So 
we end up giving 10-20 grams extra to the customers. You will ask how? Let me 
explain it. Here in the mandi, we first weigh the produce, then put it in the bags, 
but in the malls, they put things…like even 2-3 green chilies in the bag and then 
weigh it. Since the price is all electronic, you can’t change it.  Also, if the produce 
is 1kg 10 grams, they will charge for that same quantity, but with us if the 
produce is 1kg and 50 grams, we will only charge for 1 Kg. So we always round 
off. The malls cannot round off as they have electronic scales. Also with us if the 
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customer has purchased vegetables worth 105 rupees, they will only hand us a 
100 rupee bill and tell us to forget about the rest...we are totally comfortable with 
that. Can you do that in a mall? Absolutely not! (2010).” 
 
 This fact was confirmed during the customer survey. Many customers maintained 
that the mandi had cheaper produce than the supermarkets. One customer said that “it 
does not mean that they are poor so they will be thieves.  In fact they have more morals 
than the rich people in department stores. And let’s say they make a rupee or two more, 
because of the weights…but they quickly adjust it. They’ll give us free cilantro, garlic 
and green chili with other vegetables. What’s the harm in that?” There were a handful of 
customers who did acknowledge the practice of differential rates and faulty scales used 
by hawkers but they were quick to point that that it did not bother them much. According 
to most customers a different kind of capitalist seduction is taking them away from the 
mandi and to the retail stores. 
Rajagopal (2001) discusses these seductions in an essay on the violence of 
commodity aesthetics on the lives of hawkers. The department stores employ aesthetics 
in display of products for consumer seduction and meticulously control the points of 
purchase in order to increase the power of sellers. Systematic display of goods, proper 
labeling and stamping of produce, and seemingly standardized pricing of the products on 
placards build layers of meanings to the act of purchasing. In contrast, the pherewalas has 
only himself and his limited produce as the mediating agent. And in this process he 
reminds the modern customer of something pre-modern and pre-capatalist with no formal 
display of pricing system and no formal contract.   
 Secondly, when a customer buys from a vendor, he or she makes auditory as well 
as visionary interactions evoking “multiple registers of accent, cadency, pitch and tone” 
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(Rajagopal 2001, 98). In contrast, in modern department stores, vision is the only sensory 
interaction allowed and the customer makes a decision based in what he or she sees is on 
display. Thus the power of the seller increases as the customers are only allowed to 
employ their gaze to make decisions on what to purchase. In an odd way this order makes 
the customers falsely believe in their own power as subjects. Here again the world is set 
up as a picture of something. This enframing technique, according to Mitchell (1988), 
creates a picture where “its order occurs as the relationship between observer and picture, 
appearing and experienced in terms of the relationship between the picture and the plan 
or meaning it represents. It follows that the appearance of order is at the same time an 
order of appearance, a hierarchy. The world appears to the observer as a relationship 
between picture and reality, the one present but secondary, a mere representation, the 
other only represented, but prior, more original, more real” (60). Ram wants this kind of 
relationship between seller and customer in the mandis too. He suggests that the vendors 
of the mandi should be given an etiquette tutorial where they are taught not to haggle, and 
be extremely polite with the customers. “Speak only when you are required. Don’t go on 
to telling your life story…my mother is sick and my children are hungry.” As the 
customers become tourists, vendors are asked to become absent negotiators who like 
department stores should only using display or an appearance of order to communicate.  
But is this transformation actually possible? During the survey, a customer eloquently 
proclaimed “mandis can never become malls!” In Chapter 7, I will discuss the politics of 
department stores and malls and the stance taken by CCS to deal with the conflict 
between mandis and department stores. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed how CCS and NPSV aim to transform the rich 
social spaces of the Indian street into the compartmentalized and segmented space of 
capitalist production and consumption. I have discussed this phenomenon using three 
connotations of public space in the context of India. First, public space is a public 
property owned by the state, second it is a democratic semiotic landscape, and third it is a 
sphere of rational critical discourse where citizens “experience sentiments of social 
solidarity in public sphere.” I showed how CCS’s recommendations on managing public 
space dissolve the public character of each of these three connotations.  In the second half 
of the chapter, with the help of the concept of enframing developed by Timothy Mitchell 
(1988) I problematized NPSV’s proposal to divide the Indian city into hawking and non-
hawking zones. Mitchell developed the concept of enframing to describe the 19
th
 century 
imperial practice of colonizing Egypt through dividing, segmenting and 
compartmentalizing social space. Through my ethnographic fieldwork I show how NPSV 
and NGOs and think tanks such as CCS practice enframing techniques to colonize the 
social space of Indian cities for the global capitalist economy.  
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Chapter 6: Analyzing NPSV as Passive Revolution: Problems with 
Participation 
Introduction 
Gramsci referred to the adjustments made in the historical process to reproduce 
capitalism as passive revolution. This technique of statecraft involves two discrete but 
interrelated processes both working towards the same goal (Gray 2010)--the survival of 
the capitalist state. The first process involves the “historical fact of absence of popular 
initiative” and refers to “a revolution without mass participation, or a ‘revolution from 
above’, involving elite-engineered social and political reform that draws on foreign 
capital and associated ideas while lacking a national popular base” (Morton 2007, 41). 
The second process, is related to the reproduction of hegemony by “seeking to both 
forestall and at the same time adopt subaltern demands, yet without bringing those 
subaltern groups into the ruling historical bloc” (Gray 2010, 454). 
NPSV represents both of these processes. On the macro level, the formation of 
NPSV represents a historical necessity that has been created with the advent of neoliberal 
policies that have brought foreign and corporate funded NGOs and think tanks to the 
forefront. The aim of this “third sector” is to take up the role of governance while seeking 
to reorganize the state, society and space. But this reorganization is accomplished in the 
face of mass deprivation of the poor due to growing disparities of income and access to 
basic amenities. At the same time, poor are attaining class consciousness which has been 
brought about by the voting rights associated with the democratic process and the 
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promise of citizenship. Hence, NPSV’s true purpose is also to sedate the growing 
demands of street hawkers.  
NPSV is touted by its proponents as a participatory development strategy through 
which street vendors would become empowered. It asks for the creation of Town 
Vending Committees or Ward Vending Committees with active participation of hawkers 
to take care of the issues associated with street vending. NPSV as passive revolution 
represents “a type of politics in historical moments that are full of possibility for radical 
change, but that ultimately takes the initiative away from radical social forces” (Gray 
2010, 43). I believe that this participatory discourse is a kind of passive revolution that 
fortifies the existing systems of marginalization and exploitation and actively creates new 
ones that intensify stratification of society. The discourse of participation in NPSV hides 
“donor-driven, predetermined categories of people and activities that do not allow much 
flexibility for changing existing power imbalances” (O’Reilly 2006, 1082). Just as Nash 
(2013) has shown in the case of municipal participation in South Africa, in this chapter I 
will show how the current model of participation envisaged by NPSV speaks to 
Gramsci’s passive revolution theory because it allows only forms of participation which 
elite NGOs and the capitalist state deem acceptable. NPSV falls short of ensuring that 
hawkers have the opportunity to fundamentally shape their own politics. In the following 
pages, I will analyze the nature and role of the TVC or WVC that is laid out in NPSV and 
while doing so, I will describe how this kind of “invited space” in effect is anti-hawker 
and anti-hawking. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to Resident Welfare 
Associations that form a part of the TVC. I will discuss how their modernist and elite 
urban imaginations have created an environment of distress for hawkers and so including 
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them in the participatory process to achieve hawking solutions for vendors can actually 
attain the reverse result. Lastly, I will discuss the entangled space of informality that 
hawkers confront every day in order to prove that reforms like NPSV will do little to 
solve anything on the ground.  
Structural problems with Town/Ward Vending Committee 
NPSV describes the nature, constitution and role of Town Vending Committees: 
Box 6.1: NPSV directive of Town/ Ward Vending Committee. 
 
a) Designation or demarcation of ‘Restriction-free Vending Zones’/’Restricted 
Vending Zones’/No Vending Zones’ and Vending Markets should be carried out in a 
participatory manner by the Town Vending Committee, to be established at town/city 
level. A TVC should consist of the Municipal commissioner. Executive Officer of the 
urban local body as Chairperson and such member of members as may be prescribed by 
the appropriate Government, representing firstly, local authorities; planning authority and 
police and such other interests as it deems proper; secondly, associations of street 
vendors; thirdly, resident welfare associations and Community Based Organizations 
(CBOs) (rwa and cbos don’t include lower income residents); and fourthly, other civil 
society organizations such as NGOs, representatives of professional groups (such as 
lawyers, doctors, town planners, architects etc, representatives of trade and commerce, 
representatives of scheduled banks and eminent citizens. 
 
This Policy suggests that the representatives of street vendors’ associations may 
constitute forty percent of the number of the members of the TVC and the other three 
categories may be represented in equal proportion of twenty per cent each. At least one 
third of the representatives of categories of street vendors, resident welfare associations 
and other civil society organizations should be women to provide a gender focus in the 
TVC. Adequate/reasonable representation should also be provided to the physically 
challenged in TVC. The process for selection of street vendors’ representatives should be 
based on the following criteria: 
 
- Participation in membership- based organization; and 
- Demonstration of financial accountability and civic discipline. 
 
As mentioned in NPSV, Town Vending Committees (TVC) need to be constituted 
at the City/Town level. NPSV further states that the TVCs may constitute, in such a 
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manner, and for such purposes as it deems fit, Ward Vending Committees (WVC), if 
required. Let me take a moment to describe wards as administrative units. Often called 
the third tier of democratization, electoral wards are the smallest unit of government, 
represented by locally elected councillors, brought together by the city council. After the 
1991 economic liberalization, in an effort to decentralize urban governance, the 74th 
Constitutional Amendment laid down a list of activities that different state governments 
could delineate for ward committees. In my opinion, NPSV’s demand to create TVCs and 
WVCs based on the administrative unit of wards poses many problems. To begin with, 
the very provision for creation of TVCs is ambiguous and unspecified. What is supposed 
to be the size of the TVC in a big town with no wards? Or for that matter, how many 
TVCs or WVCs can exist in a big city with multiple wards? For example, Delhi has 134 
wards. Will each ward have its own WVC? If yes, who will arbitrate disputes between 
different WVCs? How much authority does each WVC or TVC have within the larger 
Ward Committees? If WVCs and TVCs are supposed to function as a component of the 
larger ward committee, shouldn’t the level of success or failure of the ward committees in 
general be evaluated first? Further, even though CCS supports the creation of TVCs and 
WVCs through its support for NPSV in front of the larger NGO community, it does not 
mention vending committees at all in its publication Law, Liberty and Livelihood and 
maintains that the larger ward committees alone should manage hawkers. To quote: “In 
advocating ward-based ownership of public space, we build on the Draft National Policy 
on Street Vendors’ recommendations of regulating hawkers by Ward committee” (85). 
Also on their Jeeevika webpage in an essay called Livelihood Freedom Campaign, CCS 
writes: 
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Centralized decision-making can never accommodate preference of all 
members of a community. In this context, it is important that the locus of 
decision-making regarding the use of public space be changed from a single 
municipal body to multiple wards. The ward committees are a good example of 
decentralized, local, participatory government. Comprising of elected members 
representative of a hawkers union, RWAs, MTAs, Housing/Cooperatives etc. and 
citizens of that ward who elect the members of Ward Committee, they enable 
people of a specific ward to know its problems, to identity its need and priorities 
them and take decisions on subjects which can best be handled at that level. The 
ward committee can collectively take decisions, among other things on where and 
how many hawkers and rickshaw pullers they want in their area. This is a much 
better option that decisions based on bureaucratic whims that arbitrarily decide 
which market comprises encroachers who need to be evicted. 
50
 
 
Various studies and research undertakings, including one conducted by CCS, have 
concluded that the functioning of the Ward committee is ridden with many problems. The 
fact is that the provision in the 74
th
 Constitutional Amendment (CAA) to set up ward 
committees across all states of India has had limited acceptance and enactment. 
According to Kundu (2011), there are many cities in India where ward committees don’t 
even exist. Moreover, in some cities where they do exist, committees are non-functional 
or structurally flawed. This is perhaps because of the fact that CAA never clearly laid out 
the specifications of the scope and functions or compositions of the ward committees, and 
every ward committee is different. Scholars have also noted that the sizes of the wards in 
some cities are too large to manage (Tava Lama-Rewal 2007, Ghertner 2010, Kundu 
2011). Often several wards are included together to create one ward committee. Tava  
Lama-Rewal (2007) maintains that ward committees often operate on a scale defying the 
very notion of proximity. When several wards are grouped together, the size and 
population become difficult to manage. For example, in the case of Delhi, only 12 ward 
committees have been created to manage 134 wards. The average population represented 
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by each ward committee is slightly more than a million (Mathur et al 2006), a number too 
big to handle. Mathur et al, participants in the CCS held workshop Ward Power: Reforms 
in Urban Governance and contributing authors in a CCS publication of the same name 
write “barring WCs in Kerala and West Bengal, urban decentralization has not actually 
meant devaluation- the transfer of responsibilities as well as power and finance- but 
mostly it has been deconcentration: the half-hearted creation of new bodies which are 
more like field offices controlled by the central city. They have very limited tasks, 
powers and funds, hence little autonomy, and are dependent on and accountable to central 
city corporations” (Wit 2005,12-14 cited in Mathur et al 2006, 20). The inability of ward 
committees to start the decentralization process is further aggravated by the growth of 
middle class activities through Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs). In the case of 
Bangalore, Smitha (2010) has noted how RWAs tend to undermine “conventional 
democratic channels” by playing in opposition to local leaders such as incorporators, 
members of wards. Gherthner (2011) found that in Delhi some RWAs in the Bhagidari 
system tend to get as much money as the elected councillors of particular wards through a 
fund called “My Delhi, I Care.” In this way, RWAs have increasingly started functioning 
as “de facto representatives of wards and neighborhoods and bestow official sanctions on 
middle-class urban development norms” (525).  
When the successful creation and functioning of WCs is a halted process, why 
does CCS ask ward level management of street hawkers for the solution to the problem of 
hawking? In a similar vein I question the assumption by proponents of NPSV that the 
creation of TVCs and WVCs will be an easy, quick and efficient process when the larger 
Ward Committees have failed to materialize in many cities.  
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Another problem with NPSV is that it seems to limit the democratic process in 
many ways. For example, the head or the Chief Executive Officer of each TVC/WVC is a 
commissioner and not a councillor. While a councillor is a locally elected representative, 
a commissioner is a senior IAS officer who is nominated by the state (or the center, in the 
case of Delhi) and is in charge of framing policies and drafting budgets. This kind of 
internal structuring of TVCs and WVCs mimics the organization of the larger Municipal 
Corporations in most Indian cities with the exception of Kolkata. To explain this further, 
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has two wings. The “deliberative wing” is headed by 
the Mayor, who is selected by the elected councillor and has limited financial controls, 
and mainly performs a consultative role that frames thematic committees. The 
Commissioner is the head of the executive wing, and is actually in charge of framing 
policy and drafting the budget. In Delhi, because of the presence of a strong central 
government, the Government of India controls most important decisions through the 
Ministry of Urban Development and elected councillor do not have direct input towards 
urban planning. Since the local population elects councillor, they are suited to represent 
people’s needs and demands Commissioners, on the other hand, are extremely educated 
individuals who have earned their entry into administrative services through highly 
competitive Civil Services exams designed along the lines of the British Civil Services 
exam. The commissioners in most cases have a modernist vision emanating from the 
western centric model of modern education that views urban poor such as hawkers and 
rickshaw pullers as deviant from the modernist urban utopia. Locally elected 
representatives or Member of Legislative Assembly, however, have to heed the demands 
of residents including the urban poor--even if they do so solely for electoral gains. This 
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imbalance of power between the elected members and selected executive members within 
MCD is apparent when we look at the numbers. A Municipal councillor has an annual 
budget of approximately 7.5 million (USD 150.00) and each MLA about 20 million 
rupees (USD 400.00) to spend on development projects in their area. However, these 
projects must be approved not only by the executive wings of MCD, but also by the 
Government of Delhi constituted by the commissioner and deputy commissioners and 
other state and center appointed executives. For this reason, much of the funds go unused 
before the end of the fiscal year (Ghertner 2010). Hence building TVCs or WVCs on the 
model of the MCD, with an elected commissioner at the helm, undermines the 
democratic participation of thousands of poor who vote to elect the councillors to 
represent their interest in urban planning. Now NPSV also states that: “other participants 
of TVC include local authorities; planning authority and police and such other interests as 
it deems proper.” As one can see, this group of highly educated and accomplished people 
is also mostly constituted of non-elected members of the urban elite. In the next section, I 
will explain how the elite politics of the new middle class is a growing threat to the 
livelihood of hawkers and other marginalized groups and how the structure of TVCs 
limits democratic potential. 
Politics of RWAs: The New Middle Class and the Bhagidari System 
One significant group involved in TVCs is supposed to be the elite Residential 
Welfare Associations. Scholars have started to give increased attention to the politics of 
the Bhagidari scheme that calls for citizen participation in governance in Delhi, the 
growing power of RWAs, and the fact that slum dwellers and urban poor have been 
adversely affected by such changes. The next level of scholarship should demand an 
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inquiry of how these new developments and policy changes are getting translated into 
secondary policies on the use of urban space. It is especially important to analyze these 
connections with regards to secondary policies that are created for the advancement of 
the very people who have been marginalized by the first set of policy changes. And in 
these cases, scholarship should attempt to identify connections between these two levels 
of policy spaces and investigate if and how the former predetermines and dictates the 
terms of the latter. I start my analysis with a brief discussion on the evolution of new 
middle class and then move on show how the Bhagidari scheme and the rise in the power 
of RWAs are representations of the new middle class. I will then explain how the 
Bhagidari scheme is attempting to transform Delhi into an entrepreneurial city. 
Evolution of New-Middle Class 
The rise of new middle class, its politics and practices, is a subject that is 
increasing being dealt with by scholars who study urban India. Fernandes (2004, 2006) in 
her brilliant analysis of Mumbai discusses the spatial politics associated with the rise of 
the new middle class and how changes in the cultural practices of consumption and 
lifestyle are associated with the restructuring of urban space. The “politics of forgetting” 
refers to “a political-discursive process in which specific marginalized social groups are 
rendered invisible and forgotten within the dominant national political culture” (2416).  
The new middle class, maintains Fernandes, arose with the economic policies 
associated with liberalization. This social class is identified more for its culture of 
consumerism than on the basis of its income. An income-based definition would include 
additional groups in the middle class, such as rural farmers, shopkeepers, and small 
traders. However, the members of this new middle class work for foreign banks, 
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multinational companies, speak English, and consume modern day commodities such as 
cars, televisions, and cell phones. This does not mean that the social groups within the 
broader middle class are excluded. In fact, the new middle class serving as an ideal social 
class with fluid boundaries tempts other groups to adapt in terms of lifestyle and cultural 
practices in order to get access to this new category.  
Fernandes maintains that this new middle class has distinctive cultural practices 
and lifestyles and hence they are involved in an urban politics that demands spatial 
restructuring according to their desires. For example, the urban landscape has come to be 
dominated by a) service-sector-related industries and b) entertainment industries such as 
malls, clubs and bars, bowling alleys, games parlors, and ice-skating rinks. This kind of 
landscape is also actively guarded by the state to keep the poor and unwanted out. 
The state’s role involves not only maintenance of the space that is being 
constructed by the desire of the middle class. In fact, the desire, attitudes and preferences 
of the middle class are related to the wider global restructuring that has been unfolded 
through economic liberalization. This state-led liberalization has rendered many laborers 
from organized sectors and previous manufacturing industries jobless and marginalized 
from the economic benefits of the new structural changes. So the miserable condition of 
the marginalized in many cases owes its existence to state-led reforms. Hence, the state is 
actively involved in the politics of visibility and forgetting. 
 In the next few pages, I will explain the emergence and politics of RWAs in 
Delhi through the evolution of the new middle class. While I concentrate my analysis on 
Delhi, the rise of RWAs is a nationwide phenomenon
51
 through which the new middle 
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class organizes itself and attains class consciousness. Although NPSV requires RWAs to 
be only a small percentage of TWAs, I will make apparent that the presence of RWAs 
and other non-elected members of the new middle class will undermine the participation 
of street hawkers in the committee by swaying the general tone of the conversation 
towards the interest of the urban middle class. 
 As in its publications, CCS demands that RWAs should take a greater and more 
active role in not only vending committees, but also over all urban planning. Through my 
ethnographic fieldwork and interviews, I will demonstrate how this move is going to be 
anti-hawking since the politics of RWAs affects hawkers adversely, both directly as well 
as indirectly. 
 
The rise of RWAs can be traced back to the introduction of the Bhagidari system 
in Delhi. The conception and hatching of Bhagidari took place in an environment of 
economic liberalization that actively produced and enlisted vigorous debates on good 
governance, citizens’ participation, deepening democracy and most important of all civil 
society initiatives. Literally meaning “partnership”, Bhagidari signifies “citizens-
government partnership” and was introduced by Delhi’s Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit in 
2000. The initiative was created under the guidance of the Asian Centre for Organization 
Research and Development (ACORD), a for-profit consulting organization with expertise 
in “change management, strategic planning and the human development” (ACORD 2006, 
cited in Ghertner 2011). Three main participants of Bhagidari are the Resident Welfare 
Associations, Markets and Traders, as well as Industrial Associations and Municipal, 
State and Central government bureaucrats. Only associations of authorized colonies are 
granted affiliation to the Bhagidari scheme. According to Dikshit, by 2007 the scheme 
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included around 1,600 elite citizens groups representing about three million of Delhi’s 
population (Ghertner 2010). Through a series of workshops organized according to 
administrative zones, the scheme attempts to create a space where participating citizens 
interact with state bureaucrats from different government departments. Under the good 
governance rhetoric, the citizens discuss and come up with demands surrounding water, 
sanitation, electricity, environment and security. As we can see, association and 
participation to Bhagidari is only granted to propertied citizens, while the unauthorized 
colonies or slums are given no space in this partnership. In this way Bhagidari is creating 
its own spaces of legality/illegality through inclusion and exclusion. It is easy to draw 
parallels here with the anti-corruption movement led by Anna Hazari that I discussed in 
Chapter 2. Relying too heavily on the associational characteristic of civil society, both the 
movement downplay democracy and social inclusion. Also, both movements are 
undemocratic and hegemonic. Srivastava (2009) maintains that “bhagidari produces its 
own version of urban citizenship and space” (343). Like many other civil society 
movements, this movement is hegemonic as it too drives the project of neoliberalism in 
urban space. In fact, I believe that Bhagidari and RWAs epitomize civil society 
movements that have very serious implications for how urban state and space are 
accessed by the poor. In the next few pages, I will discuss this while drawing on 
geographical scholarship on the neoliberal city. 
Bhagidari can be seen as assisting what Brenner and Theodore (2002) call 
weakening of the “taken for granted primacy of national scale” and increasing the 
importance of urban scale so that cities instead of the nation are producing social 
identities (20). According to Leitner et al (2007) a neoliberal city is conceptualized in 
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terms of three characteristics. First, it is an entrepreneurial city, competing with other 
cities for foreign investment, innovations and the “creative class” (Florida, 2002; Leitner 
1990). Second, the municipal bureaucracies involved in the mission of social progress are 
being replaced by quasi-public agencies that incite inter-city competition and promote 
economic development instead of social wellbeing. (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, Leitner 
& Sheppard 2002, Smith 2002). Third, its citizens are neo-liberal subjects, an 
“entrepreneur of himself or herself” (Gordon 1991, Ong 2006, Isin 1998, Keil 2002, 
Larner 1997). In next few pages, I will show how Bhagidari and the rise of RWAs are a 
product as well as enforcer of these changes.  
Before I begin my analysis, I want to describe the sentiment of RWAs towards 
street hawkers in their own words. Vignette A will provide a background to various 
discussions in this entire chapter. In an interview, the head of Ashok Vihar’s main 
federation of Resident Welfare Associations, described his views of street hawkers: 
 
Box 6.2: Vignette A  
Obviously, hawkers pose a lot of problems for the residents and they are in fact 
involved in all sorts of crimes. Big crimes, small crimes- you name it, all types of crimes! 
They roam around here and they know who is present in the house, what time he goes 
and what time he comes back and so they commit theft. Actually they should be banned, 
government should take very strong steps and say there should be no hawkers and 
vendors. If at all they have to come, there should be some kind of authenticity with the 
RWA, and they should be verified by the police for their credentials. The police should 
give a certificate that this hawker is identified as such and such person, and this is his 
home address. So at our end what we have done is that we have fixed times when they 
can enter our neighborhoods. We try that these times are such that there are male 
members in the houses...so that the hawkers cannot indulge in any kind of criminal 
activities. We have also filed public litigations against the slums that surround our 
neighborhoods. We won the case in high court some years back and we constructed a 
wall separating us from the slums. These slum people try to break the wall and enter our 
neighborhoods. A few years back, an entire family of 4 people was murdered one night of 
Diwali. Fortunately for us, we have won the case again and contempt has been admitted, 
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the departments have been taken to task, and something will be done very soon about the 
slums. 
 
The problem with giving license to hawkers is that suppose there are 100 hawkers 
and you give license to 20 and you are not able to give license to the other 80 because 
you are not able to find out where they live, what will happen then is… because of the 
limited competition, those 20 hawkers will sell potatoes for Rs 30 instead of the earlier 
price of Rs 20. 
 
 Let’s talk about the sweepers and gardeners. All the street sweepers and 
gardeners are employees of MCD. Earlier they used to come and go on their own will. 
Now government has introduced a biometric system. Sweepers and gardeners have to 
come and put their thumb imprint or sign in the morning and at the time they leave in the 
evening. But what has happened is that they sleep in the park even with they are on duty. 
Now what we are telling the government is that we have so many senior citizens in our 
RWAs. These people are retired and are at home all the time. Why not give the 
accountability of the street sweepers and gardeners to us. These people should be 
accountable to the citizens and not MCD because we can do a better job of making them 
work. In this way the whole of Delhi is going to be neat and clean. This is what we are 
asking and our demands have come in the newspapers many times...in Hindustan Times, 
Times of India etc. 
Secondly, MCD should let us set the priorities of the money that is supposed to be 
spent... let’s say Ashok Vihar. Right now they don’t do a good job in allocating money for 
different projects. Like recently MCD people stated ripping out the signs from the road 
dividers and putting new ones in. No one does that in the US. I’ve traveled in the US for 
2-3 months and no one does that. It only happens in India. If we are in charge, we won’t 
let it happen. The third issue is that the payment to any government contractor can only 
be made by the government once RWA has given a certificate of satisfactory execution of 
their work. 
 
The Competitive City: The Making of a World Class City 
The entrepreneurial city is a city which is involved in urban competition to attract 
the flow of people and capital and hence embarks on the route to liberalization, 
privatization and “demunicipalization and recommodification of social and economic 
life”( Harvey 1989, Leitner 1990, Macleod 2002, Prytherch 2002). Also, in order to 
promote growth, the city must be sellable and so “marketing and urban imaginary are 
fused with the economic and cultural dynamics of urban entrepreneurship” (Zukin 1998 
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as sited in Prytherch 2002, 117). This urban imaginary is actively propagated through 
terms like world class city and global city, which according to Birkinshaw and Harris 
(2009) “further manufactures and normalizes the idea that the neoliberal urban 
development model is replicable and sustainable” (cited in Ellis 2012, 4). 
 In a study conducted by the Confederation of Indian Industries, Delhi was ranked 
the most favored business destination in India (Ahmed 2011). Since 2000, the National 
Capital Region, which includes Delhi and its satellite towns acts as a “strategic node to 
the global economy” by attracting as much as USD 35.66 billion (19% of total) of 
Foreign Direct Investment, second only to Maharashtra.
52 
In light of these developments, 
scholars have started to document the transformation of Delhi from “walled city to the 
world-class city” (Baviskar 2006, Bhan 2009, Ghertner 2010, 2011, Dupont 2008, 2011, 
Ahmed 2011). Lately in anticipation of the Commonwealth Games, this transformation 
has been very rapid with major newspapers and city government taking part in active 
media campaigns built on this rhetoric. These narratives are predominant in Bhagidari 
workshops where all of the members - elite citizens, government officers, and executives 
participate amidst the language of the world class city. Ghertner (2011) quotes a speech 
made by a director of a Bhagidari cell during a workshop that was inaugurated by Chief 
minister Sheila Dikshit.   
 
It is time to showcase the city, to showcase the country in the city. The 
Beijing Games are coming before the Commonwealth Games in Delhi, and you 
can count on China showcasing its economic and military power. This is what 
countries do. The 1986 Asiad Games [hosted in Delhi, in 1982 not 1986] did this 
for Delhi. The city’s first two flyovers came then. Color TV first came to India 
then. Now, we will construct 24 new flyovers before the Commonwealth Games . 
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. . Sports offer a stimulus to get any upgradation done: wider roads, the Metro, 
new stadiums — improving the city. We are here today to make sure this happens, 
to help make Delhi the best city, a world-class city (Director of Bhagidari cell 
2006 quoted in Ghertner 2011, 184).” 
 
The competitive edge of the city, according to Harvey (1989), involves creation of 
an attractive urban imaginary. Bhagidari advocates urban entrepreneurialism that is 
premised upon the marketing of a green and clean Delhi. Its workshops often begin with 
the ‘bhagidari song’: Hawa sudhar gayi, sadak sudhar gayi…har mushkil ki hal mikali, 
Bhagidari se bhagidari nikali..Meri Dilli main hi sanwaroo…officer aye, etc (“the air is 
cleaner, the streets are better…a solution has been found for every problem, Bhagidari 
has led to sharing…I will nurture my Delhi….Officers visited, etc”). Srivastava (2009) 
mentions that this folk song is based upon a village folk tune, encouraging the urban 
citizenry to imitate close bonds of rural community in order to improve their city. Indeed 
this song is very telling of the urban “citizens movement”, labeled by scholars as 
“middle-class environmentalism” that Delhi has witnessed with the introduction of 
neoliberal policies. As scholars have noted elsewhere, long standing forms of 
socialization in the city have faced assaults from neoliberalism, however Gough (2002) 
debates that socialization has not been completely erased but reconfigured by 
neoliberalism. In fact, “new forms of socialization in production and reproduction” have 
emerged which are stamped by neoliberal logic (59). Bhagidari is a new form of 
communitarianism that seeks to create its own version of urban space and environment, 
where the poor like street hawkers and slum dwellers have no say.  
This has happened through a series of environmental disputes that position the 
urban middle class as victims. In the last 15 years, in response to various Public Interest 
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Litigations the Supreme Court of India has given judicial orders that have changed 
Delhi’s urban landscape for the urban poor (Bavaskar, 2002, Dembowski 2000, Gadgil 
2001, Mawdsley 2004, Bhan 2009). Some of these measures are 1) the Industries 
Relocation Case of 1996, which meant closure of all polluting and non-conforming 
industries in the city, and in that process displacing about two million workers from their 
daily jobs in and around 98,000 industrial units (Bavaskar 2002, Ramanathan 2006);
53
 2) 
conversion of all public transport and private commercial transport from diesel to the use 
of less polluting compressed natural gas (CNG);
54 
3) measures taken to manage solid 
waste disposal;
55
 4) and sealing all unauthorized commercial properties in the residential 
neighborhoods in order to avoid congestion (Bhan 2009).
56 
Since these changes happen in 
entangled spaces of informality, they affect many groups of informals, some of them in 
less obvious fashions than others. In the next few pages, I will explain these how these 
changes affect marginalized groups such as hawkers using the story of Asha that forms 
Vignette B. While describing her everyday life, Asha touches upon various issues that 
affect her and her family. I will come back to her story in different discussions of this 
chapter. 
 
Box 6.3: Vignette B 
 
At a T intersection of two main roads in Ashok Vihar, Asha has been selling tea 
for the last 20 years. In the center of the T junction, there is a large board that says: Let’s 
make our Delhi a World Class City. The roads next to Asha’s enclosure are always busy 
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as it is the main junction from where people enter Ashok Vihar. She and her husband 
Sriram came to Delhi from a village near Gorahkpur in UP because there was no work for 
them. Their ancestral land was not very productive and was too small, as it had been 
divided among 4 brothers. The first 5 years of their life in Delhi was miserable. They 
were often very lonely and missed their extend family, neighbors and village kinship. 
Sriram initially worked in a factory but life was tough at work, he would get injuries and 
cuts from working with machines and sharp tools. Also, the pay was not enough to 
sustain a big family. He later started work as a rickshaw puller, which he continues to do 
even today but makes a meager earning. At some point they were able to make a small 
jhuggi in the nearby slum but that was demolished. They lost all their belongings and 
papers including proofs of identity and ration cards that were important to secure any 
future benefits or resettlement housing from the state. Now they both have 6 children and 
a small open space on the footpath by the boundary wall of middle-income apartment to 
live. In order to shield her family from sun and rain, they have tried to cover some part of 
it using long tree branches, a cloth and a torn plastic sheet. But Asha says that it does not 
help: “When it rains we are always drenched.” The family sleeps in the open, on the 
broken pavement along the road. Asha obtains water illegally from Delhi Jalboard that is 
located on the opposite side of the street. Although their family is below the poverty line, 
new ration cards have not been issued to them as their older ones were lost during 
demolition. They do not get even subsidized food meant for people below the poverty 
line. Instead of paying Rs 5 for one kilogram of Rice they pay Rs 25. They don’t have 
any electricity and sometimes use the light from the cooking stove at night. Only one of 
their children goes to school. When anyone falls sick, they go to the government 
dispensary for free treatment. But these are often so crowded and many times out of 
medicine. As she greeted me, she made me sit on a couple of large stones that she uses as 
benches for her customers. At the time we started talking, Asha was cooking food for her 
children. I asked her about how much money is she able to make from selling tea. She 
complained “hardly any.”  In the last few years, her sales have gone down and there are 
hardly any people who come for tea. I asked her what was the reason. She explained that 
her main clients had been the workers from the nearby factory who were thrown out of 
jobs as the factories were closed or relocated. Some people from the nearby slums used to 
come too, but since they too have been demolished, there are no clients. I asked her then 
why she was still there. “We don’t have money, we don’t have any flats and that’s why 
we sit in this small corner and sleep on the foot path.” I asked her if she had ever been 
asked to move from there. To this she replied, “yes, the people (MCD) are coming with 
bulldozers to remove my family.” When? I asked. Taking a moment while chopping 
onions, Asha scanned the adjoining main roads and casually replied “in an hour or so”. 
“In one hour!” I exclaimed. She said yes and explained that she will find another footpath 
like this one for some time. I asked if this has happened before. She said “not really”. I 
wanted to understand why this was happening the same day I had come to interview her. 
But instead, Sriram started explaining that they did not get the flats like the other people: 
“We did not have proof like our very old ration card, and other identity card and we did 
not even have money to apply. Also, now we don’t have an address. Footpath does not 
have any address. But it does not matter, even the people who got flats keep coming back 
here as there is no means of livelihood where they were relocated. Of course, if we had 
received a flat, we could use it in times like these when the MCD van can come anytime 
 182 
 
to demolish our little shack. We have lived our entire lives on the pavement. These kids 
were born on the pavement too.” At this point a few other people started gathering around 
our group. They empathized with the family and started waiting for the MCD van to 
arrive. Somehow, the word had gotten out. I later found out from one of the people that 
the reason for demolition that particular day was that the Commonwealth Games were 
soon to be held in Delhi. Along with many of the slums, these kind of individual 
makeshift footpath shacks were being demolished. A man who had come to have tea, 
explained how creating a Ration card or Below Poverty Line card (BPL cards) is tough 
for people like Sriram. Since private companies have been given the contract of creating 
cards, the work is seldom done properly. A private company in Ashok Vihar itself got the 
contract to make BPL cards for many people around Delhi. They have done a miserable 
job as only 10% of the people have received their cards. 
 
Slum Demolition and the Role of the Middle Class  
At the time I met Asha and her family, the biggest problem they faced was being 
displaced from the temporary shack that they had built on a footpath. Asha had 
mentioned that earlier her family was forced to move when their jhuggi was demolished 
by MCD. In the earlier conversation, the Head of Federations of RWAs of Ashok Vihar 
had proudly described how his federation of RWAs was responsible for the removal of 
the slums where Asha and Sriram used to live. A brief history of slum politics in Delhi is 
pertinent here to show how RWA’s middle-class politics, elite aestheticization of space 
and neoliberal speculation and privatization of land is affecting poor slums dwellers and 
hawkers like Asha in the post-liberal decades.  
According to the Economic Survey of Delhi of 2002-03, the city can broadly be 
divided into four types of settlements. There are planned colonies that account for 23.7% 
of Delhi’s population. Then there are unplanned but legal colonies designated as “slums” 
under the Slum Areas Act of 1956 (also ratified in 1973), where about 19% of the lower 
income and poverty stricken population resides. According to the act, “slums” or Jhuggi 
Jhopdi, are those areas where buildings are unfit for human habitation because of 
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dilapidation, overcrowding, and lack of ventilation, light and proper sanitary facilities. 
However, these slums are legal and are eligible for improvement in basic amenities such 
as water, electricity and sanitation. Also, they do not face the threat of eviction without 
resettlement. There is about 5.3% and 17.75 of the non-poor population that resides in the 
unauthorized colonies and regularized unauthorized colonies respectively. Of the 
remaining, 14.8 % percent live in unauthorized Jhuggi Jhopdi or JJ clusters, which mean 
a makeshift shack for the poor, and 12.7% live in JJ resettlement colonies.  
Despite the Delhi Development Authority’s earlier objectives to “integrate urban 
poor into the fabric of the city,” its lackluster attempts did little to resolve the problem of 
housing in Delhi (DDA 1957, 1962 cited in Dupont 2008, Bhan 2007). This 
“implementation backlog,” acknowledged by DDA’s own study, led to a rapid increase in 
slums in the city (Dupont 2008, Ramanathan 2006, Bhan 2006, Ghertnther 2012). While 
the entire population of Delhi rose six fold during 1951–92, the slum population 
increased more than 20 times and in 1992, 259,000 Delhi households lived in slums (Jha 
et al 2007). As the Delhi master plan since its conception allowed the urban poor 25% of 
the residential land in the city, state officials and politicians let lower-income people 
squat informally in the undeveloped lands acquired by DDA to house low-income 
housing (Gherthner 2012). According to a report by the Delhi Urban Environment and 
Infrastructure Improvement Project (DUEIIP) about 84.7 % of the land occupied by the 
slums is owned by DDA. While slum dwellers have always been at the mercy of the 
authorities, prior to the1990s, through different tactics like  “patronage and protection in 
exchange of votes by the local politicians, negotiations with local administrations, 
temporary stay orders from the courts” (Bavaskar 2006) and even bribes, many slums 
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avoided demolition. Slums, even the ones that were not notified by the Slum Area Act for 
resettlement, when demolished were compensated and resettled in colonies that are now 
called JJ resettlement colonies. Of course this very exercise in itself has been a 
“technique of dividing poor” for those who are eligible to gain a plot under resettlement 
policy do not want to jeopardize their chances to that by resisting eviction (Baviskar 
2006). The ones who get relocation plots are driven to resettlement colonies in peripheral 
areas, where difficulty in finding jobs and long commutes to older workplaces create their 
own set of problems. It is a common practice for the resettled slum dwellers to sell or rent 
their quarters, even when it’s illegal and move back to the empty lands from which they 
were earlier evicted, often to be evicted again. While studies have conducted benefit-cost 
analysis to prove that the option of relocation in not economically viable (Khosla and Jha 
2005 cited in Dupont 2008), at least some of the evicted slum dwellers find temporary 
shelter and could use the property rights of the resettled house to gain entry into the urban 
property market. Another advantage of a strong resettlement policy was that many slums 
could avert demolitions till the authorities had found a suitable resettlement site for them. 
 
As the slum population is rising, the importance of improving current slums and 
relocating evicted slum dwellers continues to find space in slum policies and the goals of 
both MCD and DDA. For example Dupont (2008, 80) points out that in the slum policy 
of 1990-91, the government of Delhi and DDA both approved a “three-pronged strategy” 
for dealing with squatter settlements:   
-in situ upgradation for the clusters whose “encroached land pockets are not 
required by the concerned landowning agencies for another 15 to 20 years for any project 
implementation’; 
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-relocation of jhuggi-jhopri cluster that are located on land required to implement 
projects in the “larger public interest”  
- environmental improvement of urban slums, based on the provision of basic 
amenities for community use, in other clusters irrespective of status of the encroached 
land. (MCD 2000 cited in Dupont 2008, pg 80) 
 
 Then in 2000, the cut-off date and eligibility criterion for resettlement was 
extended from January 1990 to December 1998, which needed ration cards as proof”  
(Dupont 2008). 
However, the fate of slum dwellers and hawkers who live and squat on public 
space has changed dramatically with the advent of neoliberal reforms and cultural 
changes that followed. In the 1990s, changes in the Judiciary enabled the Supreme Court 
and regional high courts to add their own layer of sovereignty over the policies regarding 
slums and hawking. It started with a landmark case, S P Gupta vs. Union of India (1985) 
in which Justice Bhagwati in the hope of letting the poor and marginalized gain access to 
the justice of the court, started accepting Public Interest Litigation from the common 
man, the public. This ushered in an era of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that started 
flooding into the courts from the late 1980s. Soon, instead of the poor, RWAs represented 
by educated elites and wealthy middle-class that had attained a kind of class 
consciousness under the Bhagidari scheme started finding ways to use the PILs against 
the very people it was created for. It is here the nuisance laws that I mentioned briefly in 
chapter 4, were summoned. Gherthner (2008) very brilliantly sketches how the nuisance 
laws were employed against MCD and such authorities at the beginning, and then later 
flipped over and mutated to form an anti-poor discourse in a period of 10-15 years. Initial 
RWAs’ PILs did not go directly after the poor and instead blamed MCD for not fulfilling 
its role in providing housing and sanitation to slums, which made the poor come into 
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public space and create filth. The Judiciary backed such PILs and asked MCD to improve 
sanitation and find resettlements for the slums. These discourses created the poor as dirty 
and fitly but not as the “party responsible to the nuisance.” For example, in KK 
Manchanda vs the Union of India, the RWA of Ashok Vihar that appeared before the 
court regularly until 2002, complained that they were distressed because of the squalid 
condition of the empty plot in front of their colony. The people residing in the nearby 
Jhuggi Jhopri had made this space that was supposed to be a beautiful green-belt into an 
“open public lavatory.” The petition further explained that this had “transgressed their 
right to very living” as “thousands of people easing themselves pose such uncultured 
scene, besides no young girl can dare to come to their own balcony throughout the day, 
[because] obnoxious smells pollute the atmosphere [,thus] the entire environment is 
unconducive to public health and morality” (cited in Ghertner 2008).
57 
 
As Baviskar (2003) has noted elsewhere, this particular jhuggi jhopri outside 
Ashok Vihar at that time had more than 10,000 households and effectively one toilet per 
2083 persons. The slum residents were mentioned in the petitions but authorities were 
blamed both by the PIL and Judiciary for not being able to prevent nuisance, and in 1992 
the court disposed the petition asking the respondents to prevent the slum residents from 
defecating in the park. Instead of the upgrade of sanitary conditions in the slums, 
authorities were simply asked to prevent the act of defecation in the public park. This 
case was followed by an extremely violent backlash by the residents in later years. In 
January 1995, a young man from the nearby jhuggi was beaten to death by angry 
residents and two police constables in the same empty lot for attempting to defecate.   
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It was in the famous case, Almrita Patel vs the Union of India that the judiciary 
started equating slums with nuisance. The wording of the court ruling was particularly 
interesting as it is here, for the first time, we see certain kinds of imagination of the city 
building up in the minds of the elite. The ruling maintained that Delhi being the capital 
“should be the “…show piece of the country” but “instead of ‘slum clearance’ there is 
‘slum creation’ in Delhi”: 
“This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land in 
and around the slums. This can best be controlled at least, in the first instance, by 
preventing the growth of slums. The authorities must realise that there is a limit to 
which the population of a city can be increased, without enlarging its size. In 
other words the density of population per square kilometre cannot be allowed to 
increase beyond the sustainable limit. Creation of slums resulting in increase in 
density has to be prevented… It is the garbage and solid waste generated by these 
slums which require to be dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of 
priority”58 
 
Ghrenter (2008) maintains that this was the first time when the nuisance was 
blamed on over-population and slums instead of the authorities. Also, instead of equating 
nuisance to an activity, here it is related to a group of people. Slums represented “large 
areas of public land….usurped for private use free of cost.” The provision of resettlement 
was also attacked here when the court declared that the “promise of free land, at the 
taxpayers’ cost, in place of a jhuggi” is “a proposal which attracts more land grabbers. 
Rewarding an encroacher on public land with an alternative free site is like giving a 
reward to a pickpocket” (Ramanathan 2006). Hence in this judgment we witness for the 
first time the criminalization of the poor.  
The Almirita case set the grounds for various RWAs of Delhi to file PILs with a 
general feeling of that they were the victims of slum related nuisance. In 1999, the court 
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lumped about 63 petitions filed by various RWAs under the lead petitions of Pitiampura 
Sudhar Samiti and KK Manchanda, to deal with the “larger issue of removal of 
unauthorized JJ clusters from public land which were in the vicinity of various residential 
colonies” (cited in Ghretner 2008). Ghertner identifies an unusual uncoupling that the 
judgment did in this case “one is the removal of JJ clusters and the other is their 
rehabilitation.” Since the latter issue was being dealt with on a different bench of the high 
court, in these proceedings the focus was put only on the former. Now since the question 
of entitlement was bracketed off, the poor who are in theory entitled to 25% of the urban 
land suddenly become encroachers on public land who come from other states. Blaming 
JJ clusters for  
The welfare of the residents of these [RWAs’] colonies is also in the 
realm of public interest which cannot be overlooked. After all, these residential 
colonies were developed first. The slums have been created afterwards which is 
the cause of nuisance and brooding ground of so many ills. The welfare, health, 
maintenance of law and order, safety and sanitation of these residents cannot be 
sacrificed and their right under Article 21 is violated in the name of social justice 
to the slum dwellers.  Even if the government and civic authorities move at snails 
pace and take time at their own leisure for the rehabilitation of these clusters, this 
is no excuse for continuing them at the given places (ibid.). 
  
Here we see how RWA’s right to clean the environment outweighs the poor’s 
right to shelter and livelihood because these neighborhoods existed before slums. Also, 
the poor are treated as abject aliens that pose a threat to the decent living of the true 
citizens of the city. This petition and the others that followed mainly used the nuisance 
discourse instead of illegality to target slums. In fact, in some of the petitions, the slums 
were not even mentioned. Citizens’ deprivation to a clean environment and civic 
amenities are created as the violation of the right to live. In almost all of the judgments, 
neighborhood slums were found the culprit and demolished with no guarantee of 
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rehabilitation. As Bhan (2009) notes, while around 50,000 houses in the slums were 
demolished between 1990-2003, about 45,000 more have been demolished in just the 
three years that followed without any hope of rehabilitation. So one might wonder why is 
nuisance discourse more successful in the demolition of slums than the discourse of 
illegality? I believe that the idea of nuisance only takes form when there is an aggrieved 
party involved. Here the aggrieved parties are the RWAs which have grand visions of 
living in a world class city.  
The somewhat quasi pro-poor element in slum evection and relocation too 
changed in 1993, when in Lawyers’ Corporation Group Housing Society vs Union of 
India, Justice B N Kirpal declared: “It appears that the public exchequer has to be 
burdened with crores of rupees for providing alternative accommodations to juggi 
dwellers who are trespassers on public land” (B N Kirpal
59
 quoted in Ramanathan 2006) 
This was followed by the direction to change the property rights of resettlement sites 
from lease to license.   
 
 
Box 6.4: Draft annual plan of the Slum and JJ development of Delhi 
The draft annual plan of the Slum and JJ development of Delhi now say 
- “(4) The licensee shall have no ownership rights. They shall not be allowed to 
sell Or rent the plot. If it is sold/rented, the plot will be taken back. 
-(5) No one other than the licensee and her/his family may stay in the 
house/allotted plots… 
-(8) If an adequate house is not constructed within six months of allotment, the 
license shall be terminated… 
- (12) If the licensee has taken a loan from HUDCO (for construction of the 
house), and has not been able to pay back the loan installments for a period of six 
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months, the license will be automatically cancelled, and the license will be evicted from 
the plot.  
- (13) Warning: selling or buying the plot against the law. In accordance with the 
direction of the Delhi high Court in CMP No 267 and 464 of 1993, the licensee does not 
have ownership rights. If anyone other than the licensee or his/her family is staying on 
the plot, license will be cancelled and the person will be evicted without notices or 
without assigning any reason” 
 
Source: Ramanthan 2006(3194) 
Criminalization Of The Poor 
In order to promote growth, entrepreneurial cities often engage in a massive 
makeover after the roll-back of neoliberalism and take the shape of what Soja (2000, 299) 
calls “splintering post-metropolitan”, where gated communities, high rent seeking malls 
and other protected areas from real and imagined dangers have proliferated (MacLeod 
2002). According to Bernner and Theodore (2002), the architectural and institutional 
practices are aimed to discipline the entrepreneurial city. This involves management of 
poor and marginalized in such a way that they are not visible and do not pose any kind of 
symbolic or material threat to order. The entrepreneurial city is hence closely related to 
the “revanchist city”, where “revench” is a French translation of English word revenge. A 
revanchist city is the one that is hard on the people who defy law and order. Smith (1998, 
2002) explains how the infrastructural changes related to roll-out neoliberalism in New 
York were also marked by “zero tolerance” for groups that posed a threat to the city. In 
such cases the city gets divided between wealth and poverty. The “victors” become 
increasingly defensive of their property while the other half are not only neglected but 
also criminalized. As mentioned before, scholars have shown how New York style 
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neoliberal urban polices travel around the globe and wreak devastations of much greater 
magnitude in countries with already existing deep inequalities (Smith 2001, Swanson 
2007, Wacquant 2003). Local governments fuse these neoliberal polices containing 
modernist undertones with regional prejudices and provincial discriminatory discourse to 
sanctify public space for unfettered capitalist consumption. Such is the case of Delhi and 
other large cities in India. The Bhagidari scheme, which appears to be a participatory 
civil society endeavor, in reality is extremely class biased and is one such local discourse 
that integrates revanchist city ideas with its goals. The Head of Ashok Vihar federations 
of RWAs equate hawkers to thieves who commit “all sorts of crimes.” At one point he 
takes an extreme stance of demanding the ban on street hawkers. But understanding that 
it’s impossible to do so at present circumstances, he goes on to say that if there have to be 
hawkers, they should be properly verified by the government. These sentiments resonate 
across various RWAs that participate in Bhagidari schemes and hence fear of the poor 
and equating them with criminals has shaped some of the agendas of Bhagidari. A list of 
issues discussed in workshops of Bhagidari are “(1) Police and RWA cooperation; (2) 
servant verication; (3) RWAs informing police about those houses where both husband 
and wife went out to work (i.e, where houses are vacant during the day), and “inspection” 
of all unoccupied houses; (4) drawing up lists of maid, hawkers, plumbers, etc, in order to 
only allow “authorized” people and (5) surprise checks (by the police) on the private 
security personnel employed by the RWAs” (Srivastave, 2009, 335).  
Quasi-Public Agencies 
The second element of an entrepreneurial city involves replacement of municipal 
bureaucracies that have the mission of social progress with quasi-public agencies that 
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promote economic development instead of social wellbeing and incite inter-city 
competition (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, Leitner & Sheppard, 2002, Smith 2003). These 
changes are achieved by an increase in public-private partnership (PPP) or mass 
privatization of the municipal public sector and collective infrastructure. But Larner 
(2003) has called for a more nuanced analysis of specific neo-liberal projects: “we need a 
more careful tracing of the intellectual, policy, and practitioner networks that underpin 
the global expansion of neoliberal ideas, and their subsequent manifestation in 
government policies and programmers” (Larner 2003). Geographers and others have 
attended to this by studying the development of neo-liberal trajectories through localized 
practices in different parts of the world (Walker et al 2008, Brenner & Theodore 2002, 
Barnett 2004, Harvey 2005, Massey 2007, Peck 2004). For example, Brenner and 
Theodore (2002), contrast their approach to that of neo-liberal ideology, in which market 
forces are assumed to operate universally as fixed and rigid laws. They emphasize 
studying contextual embeddedness of “actually existing neoliberalism” and seek to 
explore “the path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited 
regulatory landscapes and emergent neo-liberal, market-oriented restructuring projects at 
the broad range of geographical scale” (2).  
As mentioned before, the neoliberal reforms in India, especially in urban 
infrastructure, have been gradual. For example, in 2002, Delhi Jal Board (DJB), the 
agency responsible for supplying water in Delhi, commissioned the “Delhi Water Supply 
and Sewerage Project Preparation Study” to Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) with the 
assistance of the World Bank. However, rigorous opposition and strong campaign from 
various citizens groups exposed the hand of World Bank behind the granting of the 
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contract to PWC and found flaws in the design and cost of the project proposed by PWC. 
In addition, they uncovered a proposal to hire private management consultants to improve 
service delivery efficiency, which would have simultaneously increased water tariffs 
across the city. Finally, in 2005, DJB had to shelve the project. 
But that does not mean that privatization of services is not taking place. It is 
important to identify specific forms of public/private partnership that are muted and 
hybridized versions of the ideal model. Even though PPP is gradually being introduced 
into the public distribution system and urban infrastructure, I see Bhagidari scheme as a 
hybridized form of PPP where elite of the city are encouraged to form networks and 
direct associations with government agencies that are responsible for the provision of 
basic infrastructure. Instead of national and multinational private corporations, it is the 
citizens owning private property in the city who are encouraged to seek partnerships with 
the government. Mr Kholi, the treasurer of Federation of RWAs in Ashok Vihar, 
explained the tactics RWAs used to get their neighborhood demands fulfilled: 
“Oh yes! We meet these executives during the Bhagidari workshops and remain 
in touch with them. We also keep writing to various departments and have 
meetings with them regularly. Most of the time, they listen to us and do their 
work. For example we had a meeting with Delhi Jal board about two months 
back. We asked them to do something because the water pressure was very low in 
our neighborhood. They did complete that work. One of the very respectable 
residents of Ashok Vihar has a relative who is very high up in Delhi Jal board...so 
it was very easy. Sometimes NDPL (North Delhi Power Limited) invites us and 
asks us to report our issues. Many times, these agencies listen to what we say and 
do our work but sometimes when they don’t, we use other ways. For example, 
right now we are trying to talk to the MCD about the construction of roads. They 
dig up the good roads and don’t take care of the ones that are already broken. 
Then Delhi police does not do their job in removing the vendors from the 
pavement. Last year two kids from our neighborhood were killed by a bus while 
they were going to school because they were walking on the road. Of course, 
there was no walking space for them on the pavement since the hawkers were 
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illegally squatting there. After the accident all hawkers ran away otherwise they 
would be arrested. Now look at the irony, just 2 months after this tragic incident I 
got a call from a higher up police officer asking me to let the hawkers come back 
to their previous spots. See these hawkers have such connections. It is very much 
possible that one of the hawkers has a wife who works in the police officer’s 
house as maid and she asked him to call me and make this request. He said, sir 
now the kids who died cannot come back but the hawkers are dying out of 
hunger…think about their families. It’s like this, someday a minister will call 
saying please let the hawkers sit where they used to.  But we are very strict…we 
don’t cater to these people who are involved in vote bank politics. We did not let 
the hawkers in for one year but now they are back and police is not doing their 
job in removing them even after the accident. But we don’t give up. We have a 
large interview set up with Sahara TV tomorrow at our green belt (public park). 
You should also come to attend it. There will be some 40 people from the Ashok 
Vihar RWAs to discuss the issues such as these and how we are not being heard 
by various government agencies like MCD, Delhi Jal board, Delhi police. Sahara 
TV is going to air our interview on their national broadcast. That is going to put 
more pressure on these departments to do the work that we are asking for. 
Sometimes if the departments don’t listen to us we also ask our local MLAs to talk 
to the departments. We are apolitical, i.e we don’t support any political parties 
but we won’t spare anyone who does not do our work”. 
 
When Mr Kholi mentions “but we are very strict…we don’t cater to these people 
who are involved in vote bank politics”, not only is he showing his disenchantment with 
the democratic process that lets marginalized participate in decision-making politics but 
he is also confirming the successful privatization of the state by the RWAs. As explained 
before, the Bhagidari system is destroying the “feet of vernacular clay” and creating a 
form of parallel governance that is only accessible to the rich of the city. Ghertner (2011) 
calls this phenomenon “gentrification of the state” where the spaces held formerly by 
lower-class people such as hawkers and slum dwellers through electoral politics is 
usurped by the upper class. The RWAs are able to achieve this through various methods.  
From the above dialogue with Mr Kholi, it is easy to comprehend the intensity of the 
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media’s support for this project. Another way of privatization of state is by finding 
“institutional access routes.”  According to Fox (1993), institutional access routes are 
“structurally selective filters in the state apparatus that make some institutions especially 
vulnerable to the concerns of particular societal actors” (39). Mr Kholi describes how it 
was easy to make Delhi Jal board attend to their problems because of their internal 
connections. It is important here to also understand that when a non-democratically 
selected elite holds a position within state, his or her elitist ideas, visions and connections 
get imprinted in the decision making process. As Fox explains, the state actors in reality 
“have their own views on how to respond to challenges from both inside and outside the 
state, and their control over state organization often gives them the capacity to put these 
ideas into practice” (15). As the middle class matures and the presence of marginalized 
erodes, this phenomenon of privatization of the state by citizen groups such as RWAs 
will enable further corporatization of state. 
Entangled Spaces of Informality 
The earlier dialogue with Asha captures the everyday life of one street hawker. 
The problems and struggles of Asha’s family are multiple and have numerous reasons 
that are entangled with one another. The entirety of her sufferings can only be understood 
when we recognize entangled spaces of informality. For example, Asha’s story adds 
another dimension to how neoliberal changes such as industrial restructuring and the 
adoption of a middle-class urban imaginary are adversely affecting the poor. The reason 
behind her declined income as a hawker is closely related to the closure of industries to 
create Clean Delhi. 
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 In an interview with Raghu, a food hawker in a Jahangir Puri, a low-income 
neighborhood, I found out how neoliberal industrial changes have made his daily income 
decrease as well. Raghu sells Chaat, Indian snacks, on the side of a dirty road. His clients 
included factory workers who worked at the nearby industrial plants. At first, I assumed 
that his clients stopped coming as the industries were closed down as per the Clean Delhi 
rhetoric but he told me that since Jahangir Puri is a low income neighborhood, the 
factories were not touched. Instead, I found out that there were other post-liberalization 
changes in industrial labor laws and policies that adversely affected his clients, the 
factory workers. To explain this let me give a small background of industrial laws in 
India. Since independence, several liberal economists and developmentalist global 
financial institutions had been criticizing India’s strong and rigid labor laws for muting 
the growth rate and repelling private investments. Kanwal Rekhi, an Indian-American 
businessman who is a former chairman of CCS, wrote in a commentary for CCS: 
“draconian labor laws have provided extreme protection to the organized labor sector at 
the expense of everybody else. These laws have been a huge disincentive for businesses 
to hire people.”
60
 After the 1991 reforms, voices such as Rekhi’s have become 
vociferous, and in 2005, the Prime Minister’s office proposed to introduce amendments 
to Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 and the Contract Labor Act 
of 1970. Although these amendments have not formally been adopted, they have started 
being practiced widely. They aim to give greater freedom to the employers to lay off 
permanent workers and let employers seek contractual or casual labor in larger numbers 
for regular work. In a study, Sunanda Sen et al (2006) have shown that the ratio of non-
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permanent workers to the total number of workers for most of the manufacturing sectors 
at the three-digit level have gone up during the 1990s. Also, the proportion of contractual 
workers to total number of workers in all the sectors taken together has gone up from 
9.89% in 1992-93 to 23% in 2000-01. These policy changes have also shifted the 
responsibility of managing workers’ welfare from the state to the individual employers. 
Since there is no provision of equal pay for equal work, these changes in the increase of 
labor flexibility and casualization of the labor market have reduced pay and increased job 
insecurity of the work force. As the paying capacity of labor goes down, they stop buying 
or spending. Hence, we have cases like that of Asha, who is affected by industrial 
restructuring in urban space, and that of Raghu, who is affected by labor restructuring in 
industrial space. 
Another topic of conversation with Asha and Sriram was the inflated food prices 
and their inability to obtain subsidized food, grains, and other products. Considering the 
fact that the government of India’s largest welfare scheme is the Public Distribution 
System (TPDS) that aims to provide food to both rural and urban poor households, these 
complaints seem surprising. However, statistics show that the average purchase of grains 
in urban areas is almost half of the average purchase in rural areas. Although the inability 
of the urban poor to access PDS like their rural counterpart needs further research, the 
case of Asha demonstrates one of the reasons that urbanization affects the ability to 
access subsidized goods-- the lack of a proper residence or house address for the urban 
poor. Many urban poor live in slums or are homeless who are often evicted from the 
places where they have been settled for some time when a need arises. Since the ration 
card is only valid for the shop that is specified on the card, evicted poor are unable to 
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access their grains. And then there are few like Asha, who tell the horrors of losing their 
belongings, including all their documents and cards, during demolition drives. Another 
reason for the inability of the urban poor to access subsidized goods is the lack of proper 
identification cards. For example, there are thousands of undocumented immigrants from 
neighboring Bangladesh who have been living in many parts of the country as de facto 
citizens. Ramachandran (2003) notes that since 1991-92, the attitude of the government 
towards them has been rather hostile; for example, in 1992 Operation Pushback was 
launched to remove many undocumented immigrants from New Delhi. Rather than 
associating the hostility towards undocumented Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh 
with the rise of Hindu nationalism, I find that it is related to the neoliberal urban 
restructuring reforms. As mentioned earlier, the general tone of the Supreme Court and 
Delhi government towards slums changed during 1991-92 and it is easy to imagine that 
the undocumented immigrants would be the first ones to take a blow. Recent factors such 
as those identified above are responsible for the decreased reliance on PDI. Bhan (2009) 
shows that the access of essential food grains by the people in Delhi has drastically 
decreased since the advent of neoliberal changes. 
Box 6:5: Access of public distribution food grains by people in Delhi 
Item 1999-2000 2004-2005 
Rice 32.8 3.5 
Wheat 25.4 2.7 
Sugar 15.2 3.6 
 199 
 
Kerosene Oil 46.9 29 
 
Source: Government of India (2006), Employment and Unemployment Situation 
among Social Groups in India, 61st Round, Department of Statistics, New Delhi. Cited in 
Bhan 2009 
On a lucky day, Asha obtains water illegally from Delhi Jal Board, the agency 
responsible for supplying water across Delhi. The main headquarters for Ashok Vihar 
and a few other surrounding neighborhoods fortunately is located right in front of her 
small make-shift shack. Some days her luck does not work and there is a guard in front of 
the water tank. But things may be about to change for her. As mentioned before, 
privatization of water has been a highly controversial issue for the past decade.  
Ironically, the people against privatization are not the poor from the slums who had been 
promised some basic water supply through various government programs but have 
received none. According to Pande and Agarwal (2013) the eleventh five year plan had 
proposed an inadequate sum of Rs 73 crore towards the supply of drinking water to 
approximately 32 lacking slum populations through implementation of two plan schemes- 
“Grant-in-Aid for Augmentation of water supply in Jhuggi-Jhopri (JJ) Clusters” and 
“Water Supply in Resettlement Colonies”.  But even from this meager amount, about 20 
crores still remain unutilized. Slum residents however are able to obtain water through 
illegal connections somehow. The section against privatization in last few years have 
been the elite citizens groups who fear that their water tariffs would go up after 
privatization. But Delhi Jal Board in last two years has been promising low prices of 
water through developing a public-private partnership that will attempt to eradicate the 
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supply of illegal and free water. There were already hawkers that I spoke to who 
complained how they will have to pay money for the water that they had been getting for 
free. According to Knoonan and Sampat (2013), the PPPs are designed in such a way that 
they reduce the non-revenue water in Delhi from the current 65% to 15% in five to eight 
years.  
Finally, just as the geographies of slums and the sub-urban are connected (Roy 
2003); the geographies of the urban and rural are also linked. Asha mourns her lack of 
community and family support in the city. Then what was the reason behind Asha’s 
migration to city with her husband?  Ahmed (2011) answers this by describing how “the 
declining state investments in rural development has manifested itself as falling economic 
growth in agriculture all over India” (167). We can see in the case of Asha and other 
street hawkers that this has acted as a push factor in rural areas where poor farmers with 
lack of state’s support migrate to urban areas and, in turn, settle down slums. Still rural-
urban migration have recently started manifesting a declining trend (Binswanger-Mkhize 
2013, Kundu and Sarawati 2012).  Kundu and Sarawati (2012) explain that one of the 
reasons behind this declining trend is that the urban areas have been far less 
accommodating to their poor rural migrants. This is very well depicted in the case of 
Asha and her family, where spatial changes in the city related to the process of 
liberalization are making them look out-of-place.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the internal problems with the structure of the 
proposed TVC and WTC, and have shown how these problems will undermine the 
democratic participation of hawkers in problem resolutions. Also, since the creation of 
 201 
 
ward committees has been a mismanaged and halted process, framing TVCs and WVCs 
on similar lines proves to be an unsuccessful endeavor. A majority of decision makers in 
the TVCs are supposed to be elite intellectuals with modernist visions of space. For 
example, Chief Executive Officer of the TVC/WVC is supposed to be a state or central 
government selected Commissioner and not a democratically selected councillor. The 
other participants of TVC/WVC are RWAs, who as I discuss in detail have already 
threatened the existence of hawkers through their environmental politics. I have tried to 
shed light on the internal conflicts within various groups of TVC/WVC by using Delhi as 
a case study. The introduction of the Bhagidari system and the rise in the power of 
RWAs has already affected poor slum dwellers and hawkers in multiple ways, and to 
believe that these groups will accommodate hawkers in their neighborhood is unrealistic.    
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Chapter 7:  Neoliberal Subjects – Entrepreneurs of Themselves 
Basically what we need is a change of perception, so that businesses and planners 
see vendors as entrepreneurs and vending as legitimate employment.  
 Ela Bhatt, founder of SEWA
61 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I problematize the model of participation of hawkers in 
TVC/WVC. NPSV demands organization of street hawkers, who constitute 40% on the 
committee, and their representation by a head of the hawkers’ union. While 
deconstructing the tone of NPSV, CCS and other NGOs who create hawkers as 
entrepreneurial subjects, I show various internal contradictions in the entrepreneurial 
discourse espoused by these organizations by using dialogues from an executive 
conference organized by CCS and NASVI regarding the implementation of NPSV.  I 
highlight numerous locational discords in NPSV using various conversations between 
NGOs and state planners and the head of the hawkers’ union during the Jaipur executive 
conference. Lastly, I will show how the entry of national and multinational corporate 
retail is affecting even the street hawkers who are most well-off—those who are not 
harassed by the authorities and have been delineated spaces in hawking zones. 
                                                          
61
 Ela R. Bhatt Interview with Mirai Chatterjee, SEWA General Secretary, as recorded in 
Seminar No. 491 July 2000 
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Fake or Forced Entrepreneurs? 
Neoliberal governmentality and “technologies of self” aim to create an ‘enterprise 
subject’ who while acting as an independent political subject is also prepared to manage 
his or her own risks and vulnerability by taking responsibility for his or her own well-
being (O’Malley 1996). Burchell (1993) explains these as “contractual implications” that 
modern neoliberal technologies call for (276). This implies that in order for individuals to 
exercise freedom of action and decision that hitherto were managed by the state, the 
individual assumes absolute responsibility for not only their actions but also the 
outcomes. The role of instilling these new forms of ‘responsibilization’ and the related 
‘contractual implication’ is filled by the organic intellectuals of neoliberalism represented 
by the think tanks and NGOs. NPSV complies with this neoliberal strategy when it 
argues that “Street vendors, being the micro-entrepreneurs, should be provided with 
vocational education and training and entrepreneur developmental skills to upgrade their 
technical and business potentials so as to increase their income levels as well as to look 
for more remunerative alternatives”(15). During my field work, Ram rang me up one 
morning to inform me that NASVI was organizing a women street entrepreneur work 
shop in Delhi. He said that if I really wanted to see how NGOs and think tank people like 
himself help hawkers, I should attend the workshop.  
About 60-75 women vendors attended the workshop, which was held in a central 
location in New Delhi. I was introduced to Sheela, a lecturer in Business Studies in a 
private college who was hired to conduct the workshop by NASVI. Sheela told me that 
she often conducts workshops in which she teaches MBA students how to communicate 
and hence she was the right person to give her expertise to the women vendors. At the 
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beginning of the class, she asked all women to make a big circle and “at the count of one 
two three start walking in any direction.” Chaos ensued. After about 30 seconds she 
asked them to stop and make pairs with the closest women vendors next to them. She said 
that no one should pair up with someone they already knew. Once everyone was in a pair, 
they were asked to introduce themselves by name and their type of trade. The second 
exercise was that everyone should move and start giving high fives with the people they 
passed until Sheela asked them to stop. At that time, they were asked to pair up with the 
nearest person and share with her the experience of a past happy event. Sheela asked 
these women to do these ‘walking and talking’ exercise several times to narrate their 
pleasant or unpleasant experiences, discuss business ideas, tell positive and negative 
character traits, describe problems faced by women in general, and lastly simply shout at 
the tops of their voices to show how happy they were to be present in this workshop. 
After this, Sheela assembled them in a close circle and started telling them stories with 
some moral teaching. “When you meet someone you know, you greet them with namaste 
(hello). It feels good, right? Now why don’t you do that to the customers who come to 
buy from you? Would they not like it too?” Sheela then narrated a story:  
There was a man who used to sell hats. One day while crossing a small 
forest, he decided to take a nap under a tree. When he woke up, the monkeys who 
lived in the trees had stolen all his hats, and refused to come down and give them 
back. Then the man remembered that monkeys are known to imitate human, so he 
quickly threw his own hat on the ground. Seeing this, all the monkeys threw their 
hats on the ground to copy him. The man simply picked all his hats and set off to 
his work. The story does not end here! Now after many years, the man dies and 
his grandson takes over his businesses of selling hats. One day he finds himself on 
the same spot as his grandfather, doses off for few minutes only to wake up and 
see his hats are stolen by the monkeys in the trees. He remembers his 
grandfather’s story and takes off his hat and throws it on the ground. But this 
time, the monkeys don’t imitate him and instead make fun of him. The grandson 
asks the monkeys why did they not copy him like they typically do. The monkeys 
reply, that just like your grandfather told you his story, our grandfathers too told 
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us the same story! So the moral of the story is-- learn from your mistakes but the 
solutions of the problems that were valid few years ago may not work in present 
times. As the times are changing, we have to change ourselves and find new 
solutions. 
Next story told by Sheela was that of an elephant:  
When a baby elephant is born, its masters tie it with a strong iron ring and 
a pole. Since the elephant is young, it does not have the strength to break the iron 
ring. But as the baby becomes a full grown elephant, it gets used to being tied to 
the ring and even if it can break free now since it is much stronger, it does not 
even think of doing it because it still believes that it cannot break the iron ring. 
All you women are like the elephant, you were told that a woman’s life is in the 
kitchen when you were young. Now you make all sorts of excuses to go out and 
work. Let your husband and in-laws be upset, they will be okay with you going 
out to work after some time. All your problems are self-created.    
All the discussions and stories told by Sheela constructed women vendors as 
ignorant subjects who were poor because they lacked communication skills, or were 
unable to adapt to the new and changing urban life. This workshop was designed to teach 
them some basic techniques like how to talk to their customers and how to politely deal 
with police retribution. As Ong (2006) notes in countries such as Malaysia, radical Islam, 
which opposes the presence of women in the public sphere, is perceived as something 
that operates as a political opposition to the economic transformation of the country. Here 
too we see how the patriarchal system is deemed as something that stifles the creation of 
neoliberal entrepreneurs and productive subjects. And so, this workshop was also 
designed to teach women vendors some subversive tactics to deal with everyday 
problems of abusive husbands and demanding in-laws. It was assumed that just like MBA 
students are taught to manage business, these women could be taught how to sell 
vegetables professionally. All of their problems were reduced to issues with self. Most 
women vendors whom I talked to in other venues generally attributed all their problems 
to the system of inequitable distribution of wealth, the underlying economic structure 
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where one who is born poor stays poor, the second class status of women, and lack of 
government support. However during these discussions at Sheela’s meeting, none of the 
vendors ever spoke of one such issue. After a while I started becoming suspicious as most 
of the women vendors also looked like they came from slightly more affluent 
backgrounds than the women vendors I had interviewed previously. After talking to each 
participant, it became apparent why that was the case. This is how some of the women 
described themselves to me: 
Woman 1: I’m associated with the Integrated Child Development Services in 
Kolkata and I am the chief of Mahila Congress Presided of Kolkata, Barabazar and I’m 
also associated with the women vendors association. I help them often and I’m very 
proud to be here. I’ve only been to Delhi as a kid. 
Woman 2: I am not a hawker, I’m a housewife but I want their betterment. So I 
thought that I should come here if that could do any good to them. The former Mayor of 
Kolkata, Subroto Mukharjee, told me about this conference and said that I could go if I 
want. Sometimes when a women hawker is not well, I go and help her! I’m always ready 
to help. 
Woman 3: I’m not a hawker but I realize that if I don’t think about the poor who 
else will. I want both rich and poor to be happy. No one takes care of the poor, so I want 
that in India everyone should be happy and live in harmony.  
Woman 4: I’m a social worker and associated with Hind Mahila Sanghatan of 
Kanpur. I want to help every woman to achieve success in life. The chief of my 
association came in touch with NASVI and she asked me to go to Bhubneshwar for a 
similar conference last year. I really liked it and so I decided to come here as well. 
Arbind ji,
62 
the head of NASVI is very nice and I told him that since he has given me the 
opportunity to be here I’ll work very hard to organize the hawkers. Now, almost 10,000 
hawkers are organized in Kanpur. If I share the grief of the poor, I’m very happy. 
Woman 5: I have a cloth shop. My husband left me and my kids. I’m very 
unhappy. I need help (started crying). 
Woman 6: I have worked for SEWA for the past 25 years. I’m from Indore, MP. 
It’s our duty to come forward and help hawkers. (Asking an actual hawker) Does anyone 
from SEWA come to help you? 
Woman 8: I’m from Hoogli, West Bengal and work for the vendors of south 
Kolkata. So many of them get evicted, I want to help them. 
                                                          
62
 Ji is used as an honorific suffix in Hindi. 
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 To my astonishment, most of these women hawkers were in fact not hawkers. For 
most, their relationship with hawking was ancillary: these women were social workers, 
associated with different NGOs and had helped hawkers at some point. There were only 3 
women hawkers in the group. One had a textile shop which she was forced to take over 
after her husband left her for a younger woman. The other had successfully expanded her 
businesses to leave their vending business in the hands of other hired help and become 
head of the area’s hawking association. There was only one woman who sold vegetables 
on the streets and she had come from the state of Bihar.  
The fact that barely 5-7 percent of the women attendees were actually hawkers 
when the conference was meant for hawkers tells us something about this NGOs led 
hawkers’ movement in India. In Spivak’s vein, I would describe most of the discussions 
in these “walking and talking exercises” as rich women talking to each other about poor 
women. Such concerns have also been raised by Fraser, who while studying the 
professionalism of the movement to aid battered women, criticizes “the tendency for the 
politics of need interpretation to devolve into administration of need satisfaction” (Fraser 
1989, 177), and believes that professional administration destroys political expression 
and hence genuine feminist politics. Most of the women here were entrepreneurs. But I 
would not describe them as business entrepreneurs. They are in fact a new breed of lower 
to lower- middle class women entrepreneurs who worked part-time for NGOs and other 
“aid-poor-women” NGOs. They are a kind of social entrepreneurs, who had dedicated 
their life to the families and at some point come out of their traditional houses to join 
NGOs where they were happy to represent a social cause for lower salary. These social 
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entrepreneurs are in fact getting trained by bigger NGOs to be the lower wing of organic 
intellectuals.  
The purported entrepreneurs or women street vendors for whom these kinds of 
workshops are designed would hardly use the word entrepreneur to describe themselves.  
They are women who have no option but to go out and work every day to survive. The 
day they skip work to attend workshops or any other political demonstrations, their 
children will go to bed hungry. “Who will feed my children if I don’t work and come to 
these meetings instead?” said an angry women vendor in Jaipur while she waited outside 
the governor’s office to demand implementation of NPSV with a big group of hawkers 
assembled by the head of their hawkers’ union on Ram’s request. 
Secondly, one might even question if hawkers are perceived to be “entrepreneurs” 
at all by the NGOs. It is important to investigate what kind of eminence these NGOs 
prescribe to hawking as an entrepreneurial activity. On closer look, the “hawkers as street 
entrepreneurs” discourse pursued by NGOs appears to be ridden with contradiction; this 
contradiction is in turn translated into NPSV, which states:  
Stationary vendors should be allowed space/stalls, whether open or 
covered, on license basis after photo census/survey and due enquiry in this regard, 
initially for a period of 10 years with the provision that only one extension of ten 
years shall be provided thereafter. After 20 years, the vendors will be required to 
exit the stationary stall as it is reasonably expected that the licensee would have 
suitably enhanced his/her income, thereby making the said stall available for 
being licensed to a person belonging to the weaker sections of society (NPSV 
2009, 16).  
This issue was raised and severely debated during an executive conference in 
Jaipur convened by CCS and NASVI, at which the government’s urban planners and top 
executives were invited to discuss NPSV. Unfortunately, the discussions were not as 
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friendly as the NGOs had hoped, and many of the executives reported their concerns with 
certain provisions of NPSV. The executives unanimously agreed that the 20 year cap on 
the street vending spot license in NPSV did not make sense. However, various NGO 
representatives from NASVI, SEWA, CCS, and Nidan made early attempts to justify this 
provision. Several heads of Hawkers’ Associations from various districts of Rajasthan 
were also present in the conference but none of them were given a chance to speak on 
this topic. Below I include a brief dialogue between different participants as they discuss 
the 20 year cap. 
Box 7.1: Excerpts from Jaipur executive conference  
Chief Engineer of Jaipur Municipal Corporation: You are leading to the birth of a 
new kind of conflict here. If you ask someone to leave after 20 years why will they leave 
their spots? 
Chief District manager of Rajasthan Housing Board: That is tactically not 
possible.  
Arbind from NASVI: Actually the reason why the government of India put that in 
the policy…we strongly believe that a vendor should also graduate…you can’t keep 
having something… you have had a secured place for 20 years and so you should be able 
to graduate to some other profession …to a more settled profession instead of vending. 
That is why this policy is there. We (meaning hawkers) have asked for it. 
Shikha from SEWA: Now if I talk about Ahemdabad...there is an Urban 
Economic Welfare Board and first we included vendors in that… if their kids get free 
education even they want to study. But these vendors don’t have a steady income so they 
come into vending. For example a woman will sit in the main place and she will make her 
kid sit next to her with a small basket. But if you see…down the line after 20 years they 
really don’t want their kid to come into vending. Therefore the steady income is must... if 
they get steady income then the kid will go to study.  
Ram from CCS: And in fact here we have some representatives of street vendors 
and you can ask direct questions from them. Here I see an example…Babulal ji is a street 
vendor but he does not want his kids to be street vendors.. and all his kids are into 
different businesses and he is not going to remain a street vendor. 
Secretary of Jaipur Development Board: so tell me something...first, let’s say a 
vendor is sitting on a space for 20 years…how will you convince him to only sit in that 
space for 2 hours...listen to me! The second thing is what kind of mechanism will 
determine that one vendor will sit in a place for 2 hours and then some other vendor will 
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come in his place. The third thing is...the main conflict happens for the prime 
location…like I’ll give you an example…that in front of top road and in front of SMS 
hospital and Nehru Garden…every day you read in the newspapers that people will 
remove the vendors and they will come and sit there again…why do they come 
back…it’s obvious that their livelihood is very good there. So if you make vending zones 
in these prime locations and you give it only to people for 20 years for...you will only be 
able to give it to a few people for few hours…about 3-4% people. So now you are giving 
prime locations to 4% people for 20 years, and you are asking that they will not seat their 
children there…so maybe after 20 years their vending zone can be so successful that not 
just their children but even their grandchildren would want to sit there…so this is all a 
market game. And which profession will these people take up after practicing vending for 
20 years…they simply cannot stop eating after 20 years. 
Ram: I’ll add 3 things… so the first concern is that the vendors continue to be 
vendors…so what we have found in our project called Law Liberty and Livelihood, that 
because they are insecure they remain poor and they cannot expand their business…as 
Arbind from NASVI say that they have to run with their carts once the police comes, they 
never expand their business. So they continue to be poor but as their business expands 
they don’t want their kids to continue hawking.  They want their kids to be software 
engineers or doctors or some other things. That’s one thing. 
The second thing is a response to your question (directed towards Chief Engineer 
of Jaipur Municipal Corporation): I think we require customized solution to each of these 
problems. These challenges will come but that should not discourage us to not work. I 
think with this regulation (NPSV), 80% of the problems will get resolved but some of 
these problems will appear and there will be disputes. They will get resolved gradually… 
like hawkers will think that here “I’m insecure and if I go elsewhere where I have 
permanent space I’ll be better”… they would probably like to go. So when we get into 
the field probably the problem will not be as big as it seems to be. 
The third thing is that I say ..there is a recent study that I was exposed to…was 
about extinct business.. That there are kind of business that are not prevalent. So we had 
seen a lot of business in Delhi ..there were people called Laltope walla... 
Audience : yes yes, we know who they are. 
Ram: but now they are very few of these people. So there are lot of businesses 
that are extinct and street vendors will also, we think down the line in 20 years, probably 
become extinct. So the question is that…the vendors will keep coming into the city and 
there will be an influx of vendors, probably that will not be as big of a problem.  
Chief Engineer of Jaipur Municipal Corporation: Now you said (to Ram) that as 
their social status improves they feel like moving out of that place. They usually don’t. 
They understand that the electricity is free…the place is not rented...all their savings they 
don’t want to waste...I mean they don’t want to sit in the big prime locality and just leave.  
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 Ram briefly describes the fate of “laltope walla” or “men with red hats” in Delhi. 
In an earlier conversation he had explained: “these people were professional ear cleaners 
and used to roam around on the streets of Delhi, cleaning ears of unknown strangers and 
making money in return. In fact there was a time when they were very popular -- used to 
go from one home to another to clean ears and made a lot of money. But now this 
profession is almost gone…you tell me, have you ever seen an ear cleaner? Now people 
use ear buds instead.” Similarly, he justified the opening up of organized retail in India 
by citing the inevitable death of hawkers-- “hawkers are the future ear-cleaners of India. 
They will cease to exist in the future because there will be no demand.” So perhaps these 
NGOs would best describe hawkers as moribund entrepreneurs who are being helped to 
exit this celebrated yet dying profession.  
Here we are able to see the contradiction at work. On the one hand this profession 
is assumed to be dying and “will soon go extinct” and on the other, spots are only given 
to hawkers for 20 years. In this time, it is assumed that they will make enough money to 
either retire or graduate to some other profession so that new hawkers can take up their 
prime spots. If the profession is really dying, then it is absurd for Ram and other 
proponents of NPSV to believe that 20 years is enough to make a poor hawkers wealthy 
and hence their spots be given to weaker section of the population. Also, if the profession 
is really making poor hawkers wealthy, one should ask Ram why they would want to 
switch their profession after 20 years. As stated before, NPSV explicitly states that 
hawkers should be trained to improve their technical and business potential so that they 
can find some other profession. I spoke to many hawkers with or without licenses who 
have been hawking on the street for more than 15 years. None of them had accumulated 
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enough money to retire or had any skills to change their profession. Dhan Prakesh, a food 
hawker in the Safdar jung area of Delhi, has been hawking for 25 years and now he is 
getting old. He cannot see from one eye and worries about what will happen to him when 
he is not able to hawk due to blindness and old age. He will not be able to pay rent for the 
small room in the nearby slums where he lives, and with no flow of income, will not have 
access to food, medicine or healthcare. His only resort will be begging, he maintained.  
He thought that he would probably go back to the village he came from many years back 
to draw his last breath. At least people in the village will cremate him even if he does not 
have any money when he dies to pay for it himself. Ramwati, a women hawker who used 
to sell vegetables in my neighborhood in Ashok Vihar before Chandu, described that 
although she used to make enough money at one time, she has no savings because she 
spent all her money to get a one room house to live in a slum. Her son-in-law gives her 
200 rupees ($4) a month with which she has to take care of food, electricity and 
medicine. She even asked that all the residents of Ashok Vihar whom she had served for 
20 years should give her some kind of retirement allowance for the excellent service she 
had provided then. The point here is that most hawkers I spoke to were only making 
enough money to sustain themselves for few days, if they were lucky. Then, one might 
ask how CCS and NGOs could suggest that hawkers would be able to graduate and retire 
after 20 years. These NGOs are choosing flawed prototypes to make speculative 
statements about the future of hawkers. During the above discussion Ram pointed out 
Babulal, a former hawker, as an example of a successful hawker who has graduated into a 
profession other than hawking. After the conference, I spoke with Babulal for about an 
hour, during which he told me his life story in English. He was fairly well educated and 
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even had an undergraduate degree. A few years back, he owned a booming textile 
business and had a shop in a posh neighborhood of Jaipur. Then he met with an accident 
while traveling in a car with a friend. He was bed ridden for 2 years and could not even 
walk. He took heavy losses in his business and had to shut it down. That’s when he 
decided to enter into the fruit business. He invested a lot of money and started selling 
fruit in a shop. He became successful and now he is no longer a vendor, he has turned to 
politics and has formed his own party along with Ghayn Shaym, the head of Vidhyadhar 
Nagar mandi union. He has a daughter who is married and lives in the US. Clearly, 
Babulal does not represent a typical poor vendor and success stories like his are used to 
make policies for the entire 2% of the population. This is a classic example of causal 
inference that neoliberal proponents often engage in. Wade (1992) maintains, in reference 
to the East Asian countries, that the proponents of neo-liberalism pioneered a new 
principle of causal inference (283) where the strong economic success was attributed to 
free market changes. Anything that was not in line with the neo-liberal prescription was 
either ignored or blamed for impeding the alternative’s faster progress. For example, the 
developmental and interventionist state in East Asia was falsely presented as a minimalist 
state to promote neoliberal strategies in other countries. Here too, the entrepreneurship 
discourse regarding hawkers is bolstered using incorrect examples and inaccurate 
specimens. In the end, I view the street entrepreneur discourse pursued by CCS and other 
think tanks as an act of disciplining the urban poor rather than supporting their struggle 
over basic rights to livelihood. 
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Locational Discords in NPSV 
In the above dialogue, Ram, while responding to criticism of NPSV, says that 
80% the problems of creating hawking zones will be resolved with the implementation of 
NPSV but the other 20% will need site-specific intervention. He simply refuses to look at 
many studies that have been done so far to show that when hawkers were relocated to far 
off places and given permanent spots, many times they returned to their previous sites 
because they failed to sustain their livelihood in the new ones. As mentioned before, CCS 
itself has mentioned this fact in their publication Law, Liberty and Livelihood several 
times. Kumar and Bhowmik (2010) have also noted such concerns in their study of 
evicted vendors of the Sunday market near Red Fort in Delhi. The Sunday market had 
been functioning for many centuries, and was a kind of flea market that attracted a crowd 
from all over Delhi. However, in August 2001, all 4000 vendors of the area were 
removed because they were suddenly thought of as a threat to the historic monument. The 
government initially provided no alternative spots for the vendors but three prominent 
vendors’ unions and several NGOs became involved actively to get alternative sites for 
the displaced people. Over the course of 5 years, the government deliberated over five 
different sites to house the displaced vendors but for each one either some urban planning 
authority like DDA or Sports Authority of India or some religious association or local 
RWAs objected. Finally the hawkers were placed in an area called Raj Ghat, where only 
1200 spots were provided. However, within weeks the hawkers realized that the business 
in this area was going to be very low and many returned to their previous spot near Red 
Fort. As a result, the remaining hawkers faced further reduction of income because of 
their inferior hawking spots as compared to the ones in Red Fort. Babulal narrated a 
similar case in Jaipur, where the congressional government “made some 10,000 kiosks to 
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house the vendors and invested scores of Rupees. But now these kiosks are useless…no 
one uses them. If I live in Malvyanagar and my kiosk is in Murlidhara…it’s 15 km travel 
one way and 20 rupee bus ride back and forth. If I earn 40 Rupees and pay 20 on the bus, 
what’s the point?” 
Secondly, CCS targets License Raj or the system of issuing licenses in India as 
the reason for all the troubles faced by the hawkers. Ram maintains that hawkers are 
forced to pay bribes to Police and MCD authorities as a majority of them do not carry 
licenses and practice illegally. For that reason they are often harassed even after paying 
heavy bribes and hence are not able to expand their business or accumulate enough 
money to graduate to more successful professions. To solve this licensing problem, he 
maintains, it’s important to implement NPSV. Bhowmik (2003), one of the main 
architects of NPSV, explains how the rent- seeking activities that harass unlicensed 
hawkers would be curbed within NPSV through a registration process: “The policy 
(therefore) recommends that instead of licenses, there should be a simple registration of 
street vendors and non-discretionary regulation of access to public spaces in accordance 
with planning standards and nature of trade/service. Registration of street vendors will be 
done by the ward committees as these are best suited to assess the situation at the ground 
level and vendors will be provided identity cards” (1545).  NPSV states that “this policy 
adopts the considered opinion that there should not be any cut off data or limit imposed 
on the number of vendors who should be permitted to vend in any city/town, subject to 
registration of such”(3). But, on closer inspection, it appears that NPSV barely changes 
anything other than giving the TVCs direct control of street hawkers. The license system 
that has been considered the root cause of all the troubles of street hawkers by NGOs is 
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left intact. The permit to hawk even by registered vendors is still given by TVC and that 
too on a time-share model. NPSV explains how TVC can regulate hawkers:  
Vendor markets/outlets should be developed in which space could be 
made available to hawkers/vendors on a time sharing model on the bases of a 
roster. Let us say there are about 500 such vending places in about a 100 new 
vendor’s market/push cart markets/motorized  vending outlets. Let us also assume 
there are 5,000 who want to apply for a vending site on a time sharing basis. Then 
by a simple process of mathematical analysis, a certain number of days or hours 
on particular days could be fixed for each vendors in a vending place on a roster 
basis through the concerned TVC (3). 
It is apparent here that even if hawkers are registered, a majority of them may not 
be able to hawk because of the time constraints imposed by TVC, which will have to 
accommodate a large number of vendors on limited vending spots. Although this may 
seem a small compromise to the architects of NPSV who are eager to regularize street 
hawkers, and thereby curb the state’s rent-seeking activities, it may present serious losses 
to street hawkers. Let me explain this by giving an example. Chandu, the itinerant vendor 
in Ashok Vihar, explained that the RWAs of the neighborhoods had imposed a restriction 
on hawkers from entering the colonies between 1 and 5 PM.  The afternoon hours, as the 
president of Ashok Vihar federations of RWAs had explained, are the most dangerous as 
all the male members of the family are outside and women are taking a nap. At this time 
an unknown person can enter the house and commit theft. Chandu further maintained that 
since he cannot sell during the afternoons, he has to compensate for the loss of sales by 
working on Sundays, which had previously been his day off. He explained: “Now there is 
no holiday for us, it is tiring but we don’t have any option, we need to earn enough to 
take care of our family, and 4 hours loss everyday has to be compensated on a Sunday.”  
  There is one more problem with this registration system under TVC. The 
Commissioner of Jaipur development Association raised this in the conference: 
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Actually what this law wants to do…is create a separate power group…the 
ward committee that is going to issue licenses and MC will get revenue about 100 
Rs per license...but we don’t realize these prime locations will be sold for a huge 
sum…you are actually empowering these dadas (the corrupt local leaders who 
can become head of the vendor’s union) and other local power groups (RWAs) 
that will also be as corrupt as the Municipal corporations and police (anti- policy).  
She is correct to mention that corruption will still seep in, albeit through different 
channels. Also, it’s not that vendors will hawk on the spaces for free, something that they 
do right now. NPSV states that, “Street vendors would be charged a monthly fee towards 
the space they use and the civic services they receive. There should be a direct linkage 
between the municipal authorities and the street vendors for the collection of a) 
Registration fee, b) monthly maintenance charges—differentiated according to the 
location/type of business, and c) Fines and other charges if any”(13). It is assumed here 
that street vendors would be willing to pay money to the Municipal Corporation because 
they willingly pay bribes to corrupt state officials. But through many conversations with 
vendors, it is clear that they don’t pay bribes willingly. After shelling out money to the 
corrupt authorities, they hardly have any to save for even the next day’s food. Another 
problem with registration is how to differentiate between a genuine vendor and someone 
who is there just to get a vending spot that can be leased out. During the conference a lot 
of executives raised the issue that vendors who are well connected in politics or know 
members of TVC will get not just one but multiple spots easily, but the ones with no 
connections will not even get registered. A vendor from Jodhpur raised this issue during 
the conference and infuriated Arbind from NASVI. He shouted at the vendor saying: 
“does this happen with vendors only? If three lakhs people fill interview forms for India 
Administrative Services (IAS), will you make all three lakhs
63 
of them IAS officers? Is 
                                                          
63
 Three lakh is three hundred thousand. 
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this the way to select an IAS officer?” This statement created lot of murmurs in the 
conference room. He continued saying “no no no! the problem is that we have to select 
the genuine from the fake IAS. If you want genuine then you have to take preliminary 
exams of 3 lack students and then select 2000 for the main exams. And then only 100 
candidates are selected as genuine IAS.” At this point the Chief Engineer of Jaipur 
Municipal Corporation said “the issue is not that you are selecting 80 people…but that 
you are selecting only 80 people to sit inside out of thousands who are eligible…where 
will the rest go even if they are genuine. And who do you think has time to do a 
background check of 2% of the urban population with the same rigor as the IAS officers.” 
Arbind replied “ok, if you want to regulate the city…you have to work hard for it. But if 
you want the city to be free for all then you don’t have to do anything…whoever wants to 
vend wherever they can vend.”  
        In the end, during the conference, the secretary of Jaipur Development Board 
smartly did the actual math and pointed out that only 4 percent of the entire vendor 
population will get spaces where they will be able to make enough money. Thus the 
change of power in disseminating licenses from MCD to TVC will not solve the problem 
of limited spaces. When he told Ram that more vendors will flood in once the existing 
ones had been provided spaces, Ram replied, “you will have to put a stop somewhere, 
you cannot keep allowing everyone to become a vendors, you have to say no! There has 
to be a boundary…so see it’s all about enforcement at some point”. 
          Even though Ram often maintained that hawkers have a right to practice 
livelihood in public space, when he was made to discuss its nitty-gritties, his tone quickly 
changed to mimic elite middle class citizens. From the above two dialogues, it is apparent 
 219 
 
here that Arbind and Ram are trying hard to find a spatial solution to the problems of 
street hawking rather than finding solutions to the problems of the hawkers. These 
viewpoints are translated into NPSV and are making their way into Indian cities. 
Problems With Participation Of Hawkers 
The purpose behind NPSV is that the multi-stakeholder town vending committee 
will solve the problem of vending in urban space while empowering the vendors in the 
same process. In previous sections I have discussed how different stake-holders that form 
the TVC will actually undermine the participation of hawkers because of their conflicting 
imaginaries of urban space. In this section, I will discuss the problems with the 
participation of vendors themselves. NPSV states that:  
 
(T)o enable the street vendors to access the benefits of social security 
schemas and other promotional measures in an effective manner, it is essential 
that street vendors are assisted to form their own organizations. The TVC should 
take steps to facilitate the formation and smooth functioning of such organizations 
of street vendors. Trade unions and voluntary organizations should play an active 
role and help the street vendors to organize themselves by providing counseling 
and guidance service when required (16-17).  
 
To facilitate this process, NPSV suggests that “The representatives of street 
vendors’ associations may constitute forty per cent of the number of the members of the 
TVC...The process of selection for the street vendors’ representatives should be based on 
the following criteria: participation in the membership based organization and 
demonstration of financial accountability” (10). 
There are a number of problems with this model of participation for street 
hawkers. First, this model does not recognize the internal hierarchies within the hawkers’ 
union. As I have described in the last two chapters, the head of the hawkers’ union does 
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not necessarily represent a typical hawker. In fact, both Ghayn Shyam and Babulal don’t 
even practice hawking at all times and have become involved in politics by forming their 
own political parties. Also, this model of participation ignores the fact that a majority of 
hawkers are unorganized and will not be able to participate in the process. For this 
reason, Bandyopadhyay (2012) maintains that NPSV seeks to institutionalize certain 
forms of participatory exclusion. Thirdly, many of the key hawking areas have a large 
number of associations. The Secretary of the Jaipur Development Board pointed that in 
some places there are 3 or 4 unions and all of them can show that they are formally 
registered with the government. In fact, she maintained that she happened to know an 
area where there were as many as 10 unions. There are internal rivalries between multiple 
unions; this creates unnecessary confusion and delays the outcomes. Kumar and 
Bhawmik (2010) in their study of Sunday market at Red Fort have noted how three rival 
unions did more damage than help in getting the vending spots for the evicted hawkers. 
Many of these associations are connected with political parties or are based on religious 
or regional groups. In the case of the Sunday market, one association was connected to 
the larger National Congress Party and the other one was a Muslim Association. One 
cannot assume that these associations will not favor their members when it is time to allot 
spaces. As Kishwar (2011) in her online blog notes, “each union will try to marginalize 
the other and seek hegemonic status by getting patronage of the bureaucracy, police or 
powerful politicians”.  Another problem with the registration process is that there can 
only be one registered hawker per family. In the system of joint family where two or 
more brothers live in the same household or large families like Asha’s have six children, 
this limitation can mean a meager earning per family. This requirement of joining an 
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organization to seek employment also makes this profession, which is easy to enter, 
rather closed.   
Here I wanted to point out CCS’s actual stance on the unionization of street 
hawkers. In their publication Law Liberty and Livelihood CCS states:  
If the government continues to ignore their (hakwers) problems, it would 
obviously result in large-scale unionization. Nothing wrong in that. Only, once 
this happens, this powerful lobby could well attract political interests as a 
potential vote-bank. The hawkers could begin to extract privileges from the 
political class through various benefits and possible distortionary funneling of tax 
payers’ money. And hence the state will end-up creating one more political lobby 
(Shah and Mandava 2005, 78). 
From Mandis To Malls 
During my field work in Jaipur, one day after conducting interviews with hawkers 
of the mandi, I decided to take Ram and Ghayn Shyam for an early dinner while we 
chatted about some key topics related to street vending. Ram told me that the department 
store cum mini-mall called Handloom had a wide selection of food that was delicious as 
well as hygienic and also had a good seating arrangement. So we both headed out 
towards Handloom in his motor bike after texting Ghayn Shyam to join us there. Ram 
and I ordered food for all three of us and got ourselves comfortable seated. Ghayn Shyam 
joined us there and we started devouring our snacks. Ghayn Shaym is the head of Jaipur 
Hawkers Associations and has ties with local politicians. He also appeared to be 
wealthier than other hawkers, as both of his kids go to private schools. He completed 8
th
 
grade and can understand conversational English. He also dresses in shirts and trousers, 
carries a mobile phone, and wears stylish sunglasses. Perhaps that was the reason why he 
appeared to be more confident than the average street hawker and seemed to feel pretty 
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comfortable among the middle and higher- class crowds that were present in the 
department store. I would imagine an average hawker to look and feel a little awkward in 
such places. Within a few minutes, however, he started looking around anxiously. I asked 
him if there was a problem. He replied with a smile that if the manager of this store 
happen to see him there, he would probably become very uncomfortable. I asked if he 
had gotten into any trouble with the store, or there was some other reason. 
 Ghayn Shyam replied:  
No! You see, in Jaipur, all these retail store people know me as someone 
who can create havoc. Last year I organized anti-malls drives and participated in 
so many demonstrations and strikes to force the government to close these malls. 
Since Reliance fresh and other big companies have started coming in the field of 
retail… small hawkers like us have faced lots of problem. They can even bear loss 
for some time and still function. But people like us have to dig a new well every 
day to drink water…meaning that we have to earn every day to eat our daily roti 
(bread). This fact affected us badly and that is why we stand up against it. We 
have asked the government to safeguard small professions like us. If big giants 
like Ambani, Tata and Birla, Walmart all get into the business that poor people 
like us relay on, than where will we go? The government should control the retail 
sector and only poor people like us should be allowed to do business in this 
sector. But no one listened. The only benefit that happened was that before these 
stores could sell without any tax but now the government had put 4 % of retail tax 
on their sales. Earlier the government had about 365 laghy udyog (small 
industries/business) that barred big corporations …for example the matchstick 
industries…only small people could make matchsticks. But now everything is 
getting privatized (or corporatized). 
 
Ghayn Shyam is referring to a change in the retail sector that is affecting the 
traditional industry, which has been largely community based and poor man’s bread. 
Traditional food and groceries constitute about 70% of retail sales in India, which 
employs about 40 million people and has primarily been a community based setup 
dominated by small-privately owned shops and hawkers. About 0 .8% of this 70% is 
organized, and the rest is largely unorganized, contributing about 10% to the GDP 
(Kalhan 2007, Khalan and Franz 2009, Kearney 2007). Even the organized large-scale 
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retail in metropolitan cities has been community based, and all the wholesale markets 
such as mandis and grocery stores have been managed and regulated by policy that 
ensures benefits to both farmers and consumers (Khalan and Franz 2009). Also, the 
public distribution system that functioned primarily through retail outlets called “ration 
shops” have been active in distributing subsided food grains and groceries to the poor.  
However, since liberal changes in 1991, the retail industry has become the site of 
major changes. It is, in fact, emerging as one of the country’s largest industries with a 
total market zone of $320 billon and growing at a compound annual growth rate of 5%. 
Seeing the potential for expansion, several local and national actors such as Reliance, 
Tata, Birla, Pantaloon Retail, Subhiksha, and Spencer’s Retail have successfully entered 
into supermarkets and hyper-markets (Khalan and Franz 2009). According to Kearney 
(2007), India was ranked top among the other most attractive markets for the big global 
retails to enter by K T Kearney’s Global Retail Development Index (cited in Khalan and 
Franz 2009). Under pressure from neoliberal advocates and global retailers, the Indian 
government agreed to allow Foreign Direct Investment up to 51% in single brand in 2006 
and multi brand in 2011 and this saw the entry of Walmart, Carrefour and Tesco and 
other global retail joints in the past couple of years.  
Various scholars have conducted work that shows the negative effects of 
organized retail on not just small-scale private shops but also 2% of hawkers (Anjaria 
2006, Kalhan 2007, Rajgopal 2002, Voyce 2007). Kalhan (2007) in a survey of Mumbai 
city show that 71% of the hawkers in the two main areas where shopping malls with 
department stores have opened show not just a decrease in sales but also an increase in 
the evection drives where agents of the mall actively worked side by side and helped the 
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government evictions agents in the process. According to Anjoria (2006), in Mumbai it is 
widely believed that the new hyper-markets regularly pay huge bribes to the police and 
the BMC to evict unlicensed hawkers from the nearby areas. In South Asian countries, 
the state has started taking measures to slow down the penetration of global multi-
national retail stores after realizing the harm that they do to the local economy (Coe and 
Wrigley 2007). But India and China are two countries in the emerging market that are 
actively seeking changes in the retail sector, so much so that as Kalhan (2007) notes, 
analysts are often heard saying that “India is attempting to do in 10 years what took 20-30 
years in other major global markets” (2063). 
The above fact is acknowledged by both Ram and Ghayn Shyam who discussed 
how the sales of the mandi have gone down in past 8 years. It was further confirmed 
during my survey of the middle-to high income residents of the nearby neighborhood. 
Instead of 40, I was only able to interview 25 households. Out of 25 households, 13 
purchased all their vegetables from the department stores, 8 purchased from both the 
stores and the mandi and 2 went to the bigger wholesale mandi and only 2 to the 
Vidhyadhar Nagar. This is a considerable change in the pattern of shopping as about 10 
years ago, there were practically no department stores which sold fruits and vegetables. 
The residents cited numerous reasons for choosing stores over mandi, all of which I’ve 
discussed in chapter 5; however, a larger and organized sample study is needed to 
confirm how much the effect of organized corporate retail on small scale vendors is. 
At this point of the conversation with Ghayn Shyam, I looked at Ram who was 
also present and had been participating very actively in all the previous conversations. He 
gave me a blank look and started eating his food. I asked Ram what he thought about this 
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situation, but he simply nodded and resumed eating. Ghayn Shyam left in about an hour 
and I eagerly asked Ram again if he had any thoughts on what Ghayn Shyam and other 
hawkers demand. It is then he started talking in an agitated tone.  
If these people want freedom from the government, they should expect the 
same for others too. How can the government give only a small section of people 
freedom to carry on their livelihood? If there has to be just society, there has to be 
competition in the market, otherwise it’ll become an unjust society. People from 
the mandi will simply stop innovating, they will become lazy and bad sellers. Did 
you see how much effort they are making right now to compete with the 
department stores? And people like us are there to help them, it’s not like they 
have to do everything on their own. We conduct workshops and organize 
seminars to educate the vendors so that can improve their ways and perform better 
business. And look around you (pointing to the cashier), after all these employees 
make their livelihood through these stores and hawkers in future will get absorbed 
in all these new kinds of professions. In the future, there will be no hawkers, it is a 
dying profession, I’m just here to make this transition easy for them, get them 
organized and educated so that their children don’t have to do this lowly job. And 
believe me, if you ask them, they want this too! 
 
These shocking conversations and differing perspectives were only visible 
because, as discussed before, I was able to pay attention to two things. To untangle the 
speech of the one who is represented from the one who is representing to understand the 
politics of representation of the subaltern. And for this, attention should not just be given 
to what is said but also to what is not being said. Like other neoliberal proponents who 
write commentaries for CCS, Ram too believes that the retail stores in the future will 
have the capacity to provide employment to 2% of urban population that is represented 
by hawkers. This further highlights a typical characteristic of an advocacy think tank. The 
staff of these organizations often lack the basic understanding of the key issues that they 
work on and are primarily hired for their ideological and political affiliations. It is a 
statistical fact that in neoliberal period, the growth in the rate of employment is 0.34 
percent lower than in the pre-liberalization period. Also, it is about 3.6 times lower than 
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the growth rate of employment in the informal sector (Kalhan 2007). As Franz (2010) 
explains, big retail stores affect most people adversely. Not only do small-shop owners 
and hawkers fear for their loss of livelihood, but also the middle-men face their role 
becoming obsolete as the efficiency in the supply chain increases and the companies have 
started approaching farmers directly. The farmers are also scared of being exploited by 
pricing control imposed by corporate buyers, something that has already been 
documented as having disastrous consequences in many countries. Hence, only an 
employee of an advocacy think-tank can make such a contradictory statement to what is 
going on in reality. 
Secondly, Ram claimed that the competition between the retail stores and hawkers 
is fair. The advantage of huge economies of scale in retail trade, access to cheap capital, 
progressive and efficient sales forecasting techniques, access to large storage and 
handling facilities, transportation and replenishment systems, are just to name a few 
leverages that retail stores have over street vendors (Gereffi 1994, Arnold and Fischer 
1994, Kalhan and Franz 2009). But Ram seems to acknowledge only the effects of 
capitalist seductions of display, symmetry and order and air- conditioned stores that make 
it easy to attract customers. Also, Ram ignores the unfair practices of big retail stores that 
mold the political and economic climate in their favor, often with the help of lobbying 
through think tanks like CCS. Let me briefly discuss the unfair advantages that organized 
retail enjoys over small vendors. 
There are multiple regulatory authorities that regulate business and retail and 
ensure that the big retail stores do not engage in monopolistic and predatory practices to 
harm the middle and small scale traders. First are a set of laws that oversee retail 
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competition called “competition laws.” Competition laws (also known as anti-trust laws) 
prohibit and regulate behaviors by market participants that might have an adverse effect 
on competition (Bhattacharjea 2010). But the newly formed Competition Act of 2009 is 
arbitrarily defined when it comes to retail and clearly biased towards big businesses. For 
example, the Act allows the regulatory body to discount anti-competition practices of a 
firm if it contributes to the economic development of the country. But when the meaning 
of development itself is ambiguous and controversial, any practice that threatens small-
business can easily be labeled as development. Second, the Competition Act ignores 
mergers in which foreign firms with no current Indian business enter the Indian market 
by merging with local firms, instead of competing through exports or foreign direct 
investment. Since the restrictions on FDI in retail is highly controversial and fiercely 
debated in India, this loophole lets foreign brands have a presence in the Indian market 
very easily. While competition laws aim to regulate fair competition, it takes no actions 
to promote the same. For example, to date no measures have been taken to connect small 
traders and hawkers with the back end of the supply chain which can reduce their 
procurement price, something that the big retail stores enjoy. In fact, many state 
governments (eg Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Punjab) have enacted amendments 
that allow big retail companies to bypass the strict Agricultural Produce Marketing 
Committee that earlier restrained their development of integrated supply networks. As a 
result these companies are now allowed to buy directly from farmers and even start their 
own contract farming (Franz 2010). 
Still, competition laws somewhat regulate the unfair practices even if they do not 
do so efficiently or in a way that is friendly to the poor. But Parth Shah, the head of CCS, 
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labels even these lax competition laws as unfair and impediments to growth. In an article 
for a popular financial newspaper he wrote that “The competition law is no friend of 
competition, of businesses or of consumers. Better competition requires simply removal 
of all entry and exit barriers that government has created through its various acts and 
laws” (2001). 
Changes in urban land laws in recent times have also contributed to the easy 
penetration of retail stores. As Kalhan and Franz (2009) note, state level planners have 
barely assessed the issues concerning large retail stores such as “their desired number per 
unit of population and their effect on the scarce urban space and energy” and how these 
stores are going to impact local communities and traffic and congestion (60). 
Additionally, there have been rapid changes in how urban land is regulated. Land in 
Indian cities was managed and regulated by multiple authorities through the Land ceiling 
Act that was passed in 1976. The aim of this act was to put a cap on the amount of land 
that could be owned by a single person and the overall objective was to acquire surplus 
land from private holders and use it to develop housing for the poor. Though the 
objective of developing low-income housing was never achieved (discussed in detail in 
next Chapter 6)-- either the state government which confiscated excessive land 
successfully let it stay undeveloped, allowing slums and hawking hubs appear over time, 
or in many other cases the loopholes in the act let the private owners seek exemption 
(Singh 2006). But, as India embarked on the neoliberal route, land liberalization to attract 
foreign investment became more important than providing housing and livelihood space 
to the poor. In 1998, the government of India repealed the Urban Land Ceiling Act and 
asked different state governments to implement the repeal as they were the ones who had 
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the authority to do so. In 2005, the government of India launched an ambitious urban 
renewal mission for improving and modernizing urban infrastructure and give a face-lift 
to the cosmetic look in 65 cities nation-wide. It was called Jawaharlal Nehru Urban 
Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and was designed to release funds to different cities on 
competitive bases conditioned on the success of the state government in implementing 
the 74
th
 Amendment Act that promoted decentralization. One of the conditions for 
discharging funds from the central government for the renewal was that the state 
governments repeal the Land Ceiling act of 1976, which many had not done yet. The 
repeal of the act was pushed on the basis that the true purpose of the law was never 
achieved and it resulted in artificial scarcity of land. This, according to the union 
government, resulted in sky-rocketing land prices and in fact adversely affected the poor, 
for whom the Act was originally designed. So instead of seeking better implementation 
and amending the loopholes, the government decided to give it up all together. This has 
allowed private investors to amass large chunks of unused land not just from the market 
but also from state governments. Also the requirement for the proof of “public good” has 
been altered so much that now the local governments acquire land at below market prices 
and sell it to private developers at cheaper rates. In Delhi, this was done in a series of 
policies and program initiatives, in which the government and DDA actively seek public-
private participation not just in developing land but also in land acquisition (Granthar 
2010). Finally in 2005, the real estate and construction sector was opened to 100% 
foreign direct investment, when earlier it had been capped at 40%. McKinsey Global 
Institute, the economic research arm of the management consulting firm McKinsey and 
Company, released a study that compared India with China, which showed better growth 
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in GDP. Land regulation was declared as the major culprit and privatization of land was 
proclaimed to be more important than privatization of government industries. The 
example given by McKinsey was in the retail sector: “allowing FDI and removing land 
market barriers will allow retail supermarkets to increase productivity more than four-
fold from the current 20 per cent to almost 90 per cent of US levels in 10 years” (MGI 
2001, 69 cited in Grethner 2010). Kalhan notes, many local and national retail giants--
Reliance Retail, Croma, Aditya Birla group, S Kumars, Shoopers’ Stop, Westside, 
Subhiksha, Trinethra--along with realty, brand and market shares are already in the 
process of consolidating their real estate in big cities. Now with the opening of FDI in 
real estate, foreign multinational brands can acquire land that was originally meant for 
poor such as slum dwellers and hawkers, for their own setup.  
I asked Ghayn Shyam about what he thought when people such as Ram come to 
help hawkers but believe that retail should be open to corporate and multi-national 
chains. He replied, “see we don’t need any help from anyone. All we need is that the 
government should control the retail sector in favor of the poor hawkers and traders like 
us. I don’t mind listening to people who come to help…they can give us some good 
suggestions but our problems are generally bigger. After all a big fish always swallow the 
small fish.” 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I deconstructed the entrepreneurial discourse that is popularized 
by CCS and NGOs. Not only does entrepreneurial discourse romanticize hawking as a 
profession, it also allows CCS and NGOs to recommend policy changes that can have 
damaging effects on hawkers. For instance, I have shown that the controversial NPSV 
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proposal to have a 20 year cap on space available to registered hawkers is bolstered by 
the entrepreneurial discourse. Also, internal contradictions in NPSV on one hand frame 
hawkers as entrepreneurs and on the other hand propagate hawking as an archaic and 
dying profession. NPSV is rife with such contradictions and I have discussed this further 
in the section on locational discords. For instance, even though according to NPSV every 
hawker will be registered and will get a space to hawk, the time of the space allotted will 
be so limited, hawkers will barely earn anything.   
In the second part of the chapter, I discussed problems with the model of 
participation of hawkers in NPSV. First, the model of participation institutionalizes 
exclusion by only inviting organized hawkers to participate in TVC/WVC, while the 
unorganized remain outside any decision- making process. Further, through my 
fieldwork, I also highlighted the heterogeneity and internal hierarchies prevalent within 
hawkers’ organizations that will forestall their meaningful participation. In the last 
section, I discussed how the growing presence of corporate retail is adversely affecting 
hawkers, something that NPSV does not address. CCS, on the other hand, acknowledges 
the competition yet considers it healthy. I have shown through my fieldwork of 
Vidhyadhar Nagar mandi in Jaipur that even when hawkers are provided with fixed spots 
in the hawking zones, competition with newly established retail stores and super markets 
make them bear heavy losses. To counter CCS’s claims, I presented a case to make 
readers aware that this competition is not only unhealthy, but also unfair.  
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I give my concluding remarks, provide a summary for the 
dissertation, and discuss potential areas for future research. I have discussed how the 
processes of neoliberalism-are spreading in urban areas, coopting different global and 
local discourses, and mutating to find their ways into polices regarding the urban 
marginalized that appear poor-friendly. Street hawkers are a group of poor informal 
workers who often attract attention because of the conspicuous nature of their work, 
which revolves around their presence in public space. This dissertation analyzes the 
National Policy of Street Vending, 2009, that was created by a large “alliance” of NGOs, 
think tanks, social activists and scholars who had been fighting state agents for the rights 
of street hawkers for the past decade. This policy was subsequently passed by the Union 
Cabinet of the Government of India as the Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of 
Street Vending Bill on 1 May, 2013. As the alliance of pro-hawker policy begin to 
celebrate and start claiming their contribution or organizations in different elements of 
the policy in the media, it becomes even more important to analyze this so called pro-
hawking policy before it is implemented on the ground with big media support. I selected 
the Center for Civil society, a free market think tank, as my site of inquiry to delve into 
the analysis because CCS is more open about its free market approach and is foreign and 
corporate funded. It also has access to many policy networks and has been successfully 
able to garner the attention of media and the public through various tactics.      
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On April 1
st
, 2013, I received an e-mail sent out by a CCS member in my inbox 
that was meant for a mass audience. It said “(T)his is to share an update on the report 
from the Standing Committee on Urban Development which had reviewed the Street 
Vendor Bill 2012.  Many of the changes are in line with the recommendations that 
CCS had made in a memo to the Committee”. A list of six recommendations followed. 
This information was shared to convince readers that CCS had done its job well and was 
indeed active and working, among other things, for the betterment of street hawkers. In 
this dissertation, I have attempted to question these claims by analyzing CCS as a think 
tanks, the discourse it uses to gain entry into not only policy networks and NGOs but also 
the trust of the marginalized such as street hawkers. In the first chapter, I analyze the 
concept, discourse and practice of civil society that is actively employed by CCS. I show 
that the concept of civil society that is currently used by CCS is the one that separates the 
state from civil society and depoliticize social struggles. I also show how the discourse of 
civil society is aiding in the deployment of global hegemonic discourses of neoliberalism 
and neoliberal governmentality. The discussions of civil society are further elaborated in 
chapter 3, where by problematizing imaginations of state and civil society and replacing 
their relationship from vertical national to a horizontal global plain, I show how the third 
sector or the NGOs and think tanks are able to attain entry into this horizontal level of 
state and civil society and work as transnational apparatus of governmentality. I analyze 
CCS is as a think tank in the remainder of the chapter to help readers understand the 
process of internationalization of ideas, the politics of donor agencies, the local 
environment that contextualizes a specific model, and the tactics used by these 
organizations to affect the climate of opinion. Both chapter two and three are framed on 
 234 
 
the premise that it is important to situate an organization in the global political economy 
in order to investigate their local politics on the ground. This move helps me identify the 
limitations in the discourses and understandings of CCS regarding informals and street 
hawkers, something that I discuss in Chapter 4. Here I discuss various interpretations of 
informality, including the ones espoused by CCS and NGOs only to show how they 
romanticize street hawking as an entrepreneurial activity and create hawkers simply as 
economic and homogenous object of inquiry. Here hawkers are inscribed with single and 
ahistoric consciousness, which downplays the role of gender, caste, family and kinship. 
In order to avoid this trap, I develop my approach to look at hawkers as heterogeneous 
subjects who form a part of the broader political economy. They are considered not only 
economic but also political, social and cultural actors who confront the world at multiple 
sites that include their home in the slums or pavements, urban streets as spaces of 
livelihood, government hospitals, schools, and their rural villages. With the help of these 
dialogues, I progress to analyze CCS’s conception of space and the place of hawkers in it 
in Chapter 5. I show how CCS treats space as a capitalist commodity through discussions 
on public space. To provide a nuanced inquiry, I discuss different connotations of public 
space and critically analyze the recommendations of CCS regarding public space to show 
how it challenges it’s indigenous and open character. These recommendations become 
derivatives in NPSV’s design to divide the city into hawking and no- hawking zones. I 
use Timothy Mitchell’s idea of enframing that he developed to analyze colonial spatial 
reorganization of space in 19
th
 century Egypt to show how NPSV and CCS are 
attempting to convert the rich communal space of Indian streets into abstract space that 
facilitates capitalist production and consumption; divide space to bifurcate rich social life 
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into public and private, exterior and interior; and construct a space that initiates and 
invites a tourist gaze that drives consumption as the sole social practice. I explain how 
this transformation of space will be achieved by NPSV through calling for creation of 
Town/ Ward Vending Committees in every administrative ward. Not only is the 
conception and materialization of such a committee shown to be farfetched, but I argue 
that its organization and internal structure are flawed and undemocratic. Also it demands 
only models of participation that will undermine pro-hawking principles. In order to 
show that, I make reference to the rise of the new middle class in the form of Resident 
Welfare Associations and the contribution of the governmental led Bhagidari initiative in 
Delhi that is transforming urban space with an elite imaginary. By using Delhi as a case 
study to talk about the rise of the elite middle class, I show how hawkers and slum 
dwellers who navigate through entangled spaces of informality have been affected by 
elite politics in the last decade, only to prove that the presence of RWAs in TVCs and 
WVCs will undermine the participation of hawkers. The participation of hawkers who 
constitute 40% of the TVCs and WVCs is questioned in chapter seven. NPSV demands 
organization of street hawkers and their representation by a head of hawkers’ union. I 
show using interviews, and participant observations, how this kind of participation is 
ridden with complexities. This sort of arrangement not only institutionalizes participatory 
exclusions where unorganized hawkers get no representation, but also treats hawkers’ 
organizations as homogenous entities and does not pay attentions to the internal 
hierarches of the union. I also deconstruct the tone of NPSV that creates hawkers as 
entrepreneurial subjects to show various internal contradictions by using data from an 
executive conference regarding the implementation of NPSV organized by CCS and 
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NASVI. Some locational discords in NPSV are discussed to show that the main problems 
of hawkers will not only continue to exist but also be exacerbated with the 
implementation of NPSV.    
This dissertation will hopefully pave way for future scholarship to investigate the 
role of think tanks and NGOs in the policies regarding urban poor such as street vendors. 
More site- specific study will extend my analysis and open visibility to further 
complexities arising from management and reorganization of street hawkers. Further 
research on formalization of street vendors can provide excellent insights to the politics 
through which they are mobilized in neoliberal discourse. For example, the creation of a 
hawker identity cards and biometric surveys can be analyzed using Foucault’s insights on 
classification, biopower and governmentality. Additionally, studies are needed to show 
the internal hierarchies within hawkers’ and hawking unions.  
I started this project with intent to critically question the aggressive political 
negotiations and agendas of hawker's organizations and to demonstrate inherent 
contradictions and regressive political repercussions. Beyond the academic significance 
of this dissertation, I hope that the social implications of this project invite new scrutiny 
to the role of think tanks and NGOs in the politics of the poor, marginalized, and 
informals. Unfortunately, people (like me) who are committed to social justice 
unknowingly make think tanks and NGOs the site of their modus operendi without 
critically evaluating the agendas of these organizations. I hope this work makes not just 
scholars but also general public, state officials, and most importantly the marginalized 
more vigilant of the goals and agendas of the organizations they form alliance with.   
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Hawkers form 2% of the total urban India population and any measure to change 
the status quo should be analyzed. On the ground, the implications of this project will be 
reflected in new debates and intense probing of NPSV for its purported pro-hawking 
stance. I’m hoping that this research will introduce policy debates that are truly inclusive, 
reflect on the true characteristics of indigenous spaces and acknowledge the growing 
presence of organized retail as a threat to millions of poor hawkers. Finally, this project 
has the potential to successfully change the course of hawker’s movement in urban India 
towards goals of more genuine participatory solutions than the ones proposed by NPSV. 
The central message of this research is a call to question the presence, 
commitment and practice of the so called ‘civil society’ organizations or the ‘third sector’ 
in democratic political engagements. As I have shown in the case of street hawkers, these 
think tanks and NGOs instead of initiating meaningful participatory political discourse, 
attempt to depoliticize social struggles. Rather than galvanizing politics from below for 
progressive social change, these organizations imprint on the polities, their own model of 
solutions that are strongly indented of corporate capitalist interests. The lessons from this 
research, I hope, will ensure more scrutiny to these organizations and make their current 
practices hard to carry on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Priyanka Jain 2013  
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Appendices 
Ego Hawking by Naveen Mandava, Researcher at CCS 
Ego Hawking  
Do we need a license for advocating a social cause? 
The stretch of unlicensed hawkers in front of the crowded Safdarjung Hospital in 
South Delhi offer a variety of fast foods among which pav bhaji forms one of the most 
favourite. A couple of years back , the local pradhan Bhagwan Dada who controls entry 
of hawkers onto the pavement and also incidentally runs a pav bhaji shop passed an order 
declining the setting up of any other pav bhaji shops except of his own. Most relented. 
However one hawker Bharat was adept at providing good pav bhaji and proceeded to set 
up the stall. Soon customers began flocking to his stall. This enraged Bhagwan Dada. 
What does he do now? Since he cannot drag customers to his stall, he uses the lowly tools 
of accusing his competitor of spurious wares. How does Bharat feel like? Just like us. 
Madhu Kishwar has been regarded as a grassroots organization on the hawkers’ front for 
long. The Centre for Civil Society has long been acknowledged for its public policy ideas 
and research. Among other areas of research like education, environment and 
governance, the Centre for Civil Society has been working against the existence of 
licence permit raj (entry barriers for business) since that hampers the street entrepreneurs 
of India more than the rich. Where Madhu Kishwar has succeeded in bringing to notice 
the plight of street vendors and cycle rickshaw pullers, CCS has made valuable inroads in 
providing workable solutions to this end. CCS is bothered not only about the street 
vendor but also the middle class citizen who values a clean sidewalk in front of his home.  
Our publication Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the Street is an 
outcome of this motivation to find public policy solutions that will benefit both the 
harassed street vendor and the urban middle class citizen who values his quality of life. 
Our policy solutions fall within the framework of individual rights and the rule of law. So 
when Tavleen Singh writes in support of Madhu Kishwar and rants bitterly against the 
Centre for Civil Society and its founder Dr Parth J Shah, it makes us sit up and take 
notice. We have high regard for Tavleen Singh’s fiery pen and hence had chosen her for 
penning the preface of our book given her claimed understanding of free and competitive 
markets. It is apparent that we were wrong.  
Tavleen Singh’s article is a textbook example of a journalist using her pen to 
slander without indulging even in a pretense of analyzing facts. Even our Research 
Internship Program designed for undergraduate students has seen better examples of 
factual writing. She writes that “ Madhu rang me last week to tell me…Parth J Shah had 
plagiarized huge chunks of research and documentation done by Manushi, to write his 
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book, and not bothered to slip in the smallest acknowledgement.” This claim needs to be 
analyzed on two parameters. First, is it a case of a direct copy from Manushi literature 
without citation OR two, is it a broad charge of having taken the ideas of Madhu 
Kishwar?  
Let us consider one. CCS is open to Madhu Kishwar pointing out the material 
which she claims has been plagiarized from Manushi literature. Madhu Kishwar is in 
possession of more than one copy of the book. Manushi literature has been cited on four 
pages: page 80, page 232, page 234 and page 235 of the book where the content had been 
sourced. Not to mention the preface where she has been highlighted well. That takes the 
total count of her mentions in the book to 8. In contrast Dr. Parth J Shah, Coeditor of 
Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the Street is mentioned only in 5 
places through the book. Are we so dumb as to plagiarize her material and then have an 
ode to her in the Preface and then have her release the book! Credit us with some 
intelligence. And as is clear from my recent email exchange with Madhu Kishwar, there 
is no case of plagiarization of her research material or documentation.  
On the second issue of borrowing ideas comes across the pathetic plight of Madhu 
Kishwar. Since when did people need to get a licence to fight for a particular cause? Does 
this mean that henceforth every research done on street hawking and cycle rickshaws in 
any corner of India has to begin with an ode to Madhu Kishwar? She wants abolish 
license raj when others are in charge but create one where she will be the authority? I 
have yet to come across an ego greater than this. This comes across in her statement that 
“Not one street-vendor or rickshaw puller or small shop owner in India would endorse 
CCS’s claim to be a champion of their rights.” She needn’t have asked them. We 
ourselves would have said the same. We find no purpose in convincing street vendors of 
economic freedom. They know it better than we do. Our purpose is to convince the 
people who make and change the policies that impact street hawkers. The purpose of our 
research is to bring facts regarding them to light of policy-makers. If in course of that we 
have not acknowledged a particular individual’s contribution to the study it is because 
that person’s contribution was not relevant to the research study. Madhu Kishwar’s 
documentaries may have helped us to see the issue in a better light but that is it. Neither 
she, nor her documentary and neither Manushi had any direct bearing on the research 
study Law, Liberty and Livelihood: Making a Living on the Street.  
Our way of acknowledging her contribution to the cause (since she did not have 
any direct contribution to the book) was to make her release the book and allow Tavleen 
Singh write a near-ode to her in the preface.If she is under the impression that the tools of 
analysis were borrowed from her, then even in that case her concerns are misplaced. This 
study is probably ideologically indebted to Hernando de Soto, Murray N Rothbard and 
David Friedman than anybody else. For they have provided me with the intellectual 
thoughtwork to think of street space as private property that could revolutionise street 
entrepreneurship in India. But I have not acknowledged them because they had no direct 
bearing to the research study. If anything else, Madhu Kishwar’s encounters with street 
vendors in Delhi proved that she does not understand the principles of street markets. Her 
initiative to organize vendors in a static market complex and Tavleen Singh’s suggestion 
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“that every street in every city can accommodate a certain number of vendors, at half 
kilometer distances” betray a misunderstanding of street vendors’ requirements. Street 
vending is influenced by customer demand. You cannot plan street vending space like 
you would plan a an airport. If anything this demonstrates that they have not given up the 
idea of central planning of vendor spaces. It is this very centralized urban planning by 
bureaucrats that we have panned in the book. Nevertheless it is important to have people 
like Madhu Kishwar who highlight the issue though they themselves may lack an 
understanding of the principles of markets. Our role as a public policy research and 
advocacy think tank is to delve on solutions and shift the quality of debate. In the 
marketplace of ideas, it is necessary to havecompeting ideas to arrive at better solutions 
for the problems challenging us today. There can never be enough ideas! So today you 
have the Law, Liberty and Livelihood study, a first in India that talks of privatizing 
governance and bringing an end to centralized urban planning. Radical ideas that Madhu 
Kishwar and Tavleen Singh have not even thought about and would be ready to disown if 
only they knew these were part of the book as well. Incidentally Voluntary City is the 
only other study that had the intellectual courage to think on these lines. We did NOT 
indebt it because it had no bearing on the research study. The rest of Tavleen Singh’s 
article sounds like a personal tirade against the Centre for Civil Society. Analyze 
statements like “…his phony center has just won the Templeton Freedom Award, 2005” 
and “many instances of misguided international funding, for NGOs as spurious as the 
Centre for Civil Society.” In an article whose headline is supposed to dwell on NGO 
corruption, 45% of the sentences are devoted to Parth J Shah and the Centre for Civil 
Society and not a single other NGO is mentioned. From this single point of the Centre for 
Civil Society, she goes on to paint a corrupt picture of the NGO sector without providing 
any facts other than stylized generalities. Even amateurs do not make mistakes like these. 
If Tavleen Singh had only bothered to Google for us, she would have found that this 
“phony” Centre was well acclaimed for its previous research publication State of 
Governance: Delhi Citizen Handbook 2003. As T N Ninan, editor of Business Standard 
put it “If one small NGO can put all this together, think of what our mass circulation 
newspapers could do if they chose to be newspapers instead of advertising gazettes.” 
Incidentally, this “phony” Centre also has individuals like me who have left lucrative 
careers in software for a fulfilling role in public policy formulation for a better India.  
Given my talent at research, I could go on to dig allegations that some street 
hawkers had made of Madhu Kishwar taking money from them without providing 
receipts on pretext of providing hawking space. But as these issues did not deem to be 
pertinent to the objectives of the research study Law, Liberty and Livelihood, we did not 
pursue them. I could also rake up Tavleen Singh’s previous incidents of slander through 
her column as in the Teesta Setalvad case. But frankly these detract from the prime 
purpose of my work. The way I see it is this. Tavleen Singh is past her prime whose 
knowledge of licence permit raj for the poor is relegated to only Madhu Kishwar and her 
work. Neither has she updated herself on the current scenario nor has she made an effort 
to understand the difference between the work of activists and the work of researchers. 
My conscience as an honest researcher tells me that I shall not bow to the demands of 
whimsical activists and senile journalists to acknowledge their ego. I am not here to write 
their history but to dig facts and facts it is that I shall go after. Question is whether 
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Madhu Kishwar is threatened that here has come a book that may put them out of the 
spectrum of public limelight that is perhaps oxygen for them. History is replete with 
people like Mao Tse Tsung who fell in love with their causes and finally became a 
hindrance to the very cause they promoted. Maybe Madhu Kishwar’s time has come!  
Researching Reality  
Naveen Mandava 
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